Popular Army

The Polish military is a rare institution in the Communist East bloc: a People’s Army that is truly popular. The 319,500 members of the three major armed forces, the largest non-Soviet military group within the Warsaw Pact, have a tradition of austere professionalism, which stands in stark contrast to the corruption that has plagued Poland’s civilian bureaucracy and angered the people. A recent national poll showed that civilians ranked the army third in favor among the country’s institutions, just behind the Roman Catholic Church and Solidarity. (The party came in a poor sixth, trailing even the hated police.) During the riots over food price increases in 1976, General Wojciech Jaruzelski showed how closely the army was allied with the people when he declared: “Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers.”

Most experts believe that this is still true, mainly because of the close bonds between the two groups and the Poles’ strong feeling of national unity. The army’s 210,000 members are drawn largely from the same worker and peasant ranks as members of Solidarity and its rural counterpart; so are 86% of the Polish officer corps. Conscripts tend to serve in the regions where they are drafted, adding further to their identification with local people. Says one Western diplomat in Warsaw: “An army like that is designed to defend the country and not to put down revolts. A third of the army has been drafted since August 1980. Another third was inducted the year before that. Their brothers, fathers and cousins are Solidarity members.” Asks he rhetorically: “How much use would those people be against Solidarity?”

Many experts doubt that the Soviets would intervene in Poland in a way that would invite a pitched battle; units are more likely to be called in by the Polish government to help quell growing disturbances. But if the crisis were to escalate into a full-scale invasion, analysts believe that the Poles would fight, and fight well, even though they are outgunned and outnumbered. There are 57 Warsaw Pact divisions on Poland’s borders and two more within the country, vs. the 15 Polish army divisions. The Soviets, moreover, could quickly cut off the Polish military’s gasoline supply by shutting down the Friendship oil pipeline that runs across the country to East Germany.

Another key factor is that neither the Polish army nor the air force controls an independent communications network. Faced with Soviet military intervention, the Polish forces would undoubtedly cost the invaders heavy casualties, but would most likely be overwhelmed. Even so, the Poles could then be expected to fight on as guerrillas.