An Inside Look at the U.S.-Pakistan Feud Over Drones

For the past six weeks, Pakistan has echoed with ferocious opposition to the CIA’s covert drones program that targets al-Qaeda and Taliban militants hiding in the tribal areas along the Afghan border. Ever since Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani issued a rare and fiercely worded condemnation of a March 17 drone strike, his criticism of the U.S. has been repeated by the prime minister, opposition politicians, and media commentators alike. And in that time, the CIA has fired only two drone more strikes, breaking a pattern of around a dozen a month.

The latest drone strike happened on Friday, on the heels of U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen and U.S. Army Chief Gen. Martin Dempsey’s visits to Pakistan. Top American and Pakistani military, intelligence and government officials have been trying to calm the tensions between the allies through meetings in Washington and Islamabad. But little progress has been made: Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani continues to call for the drones to stop, as Friday’s strike killed 25 people, including four women and five children, according to Pakistani officials. The reasons for Pakistan’s sudden decision to end seven years of either tolerating or silently approving of the drones program remain unclear, raising questions about the nature of its current vehement complaint.

(See the U.S.’s silent war in Pakistan.)

In fact, the ambiguity of the situation arises from the ranks of the Pakistani military — out of the public arena. For example, on March 23rd, Gen. Kayani played host to a clutch of senior retired generals and, amid the tea and collegial bonhomie, the conversation casually turned to Kayani’s statement a week earlier. Some of the visitors wondered why he had adopted such a sharp tone, describing the March 17 attack as an “unjustified and intolerable” violation of human rights. “These drones do have some use,” one of the retired generals said, according to someone present. “Yes, they do have a use,” Gen. Kayani was heard to reply.

Ever since the advent of the CIA program, the Pakistani security establishment has been content to at least tolerate the covert drones, and even come to discreetly approve of it. The very first drone strike in 2004 killed Nek Muhammad, a forerunner to the Pakistani Taliban. In 2006, when an airstrike killed some 80 people in Bajaur, provoking domestic outrage and the first major retaliatory suicide bombing, Pakistan maintained that its forces were responsible for the incident — not the U.S. And, over at least the past year, Pakistani generals have come to be impressed by the accuracy of the drones and their ability to limit militant movements.

(Read “Why Pakistan Has the Obama Administration Sweating.”)

One general had even gone public with his approval. In early March, before the strike that stirred up the controversy, Maj. Gen. Ghayur Mehmood, the general officer commanding Pakistan’s seventh division in North Waziristan, told reporters: “Myths and rumors about U.S. predator strikes and the casualty figures are many, but it’s a reality that many of those killed in these strikes are hardcore elements, a sizeable number of them foreigners.” According to the general’s own figures, 164 predator strikes had killed over 964 terrorists over the past four years. The results have won the drone program some supporters in the tribal areas; the loudest protests emanate from areas well removed, like Punjab.

Drones have always been a delicate and difficult issue for the U.S. and Pakistan. The benefits to Washington are obvious — a pilotless means of warfare that allows high-value targets to be eliminated in a territory where it cannot deploy troops. In recent years, the CIA has developed its own, impressive network of local assets that pinpoint targets; meanwhile, enhanced drone technology with smaller, sleeker missiles has meant fewer civilian casualties. For the Pakistanis, the use of technology that surpasses their own has been welcome, where the targets have been of mutual interest — members of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.

See pictures of the battle against the Taliban.

Pakistan is less keen, however, on drones that targets militants it deems friendly. On his visit to Islamabad this week, Adm. Mullen said that the U.S. had “strong reservations” about the ISI’s links to the notorious Haqqani network based in North Waziristan. “The reality is the Haqqani [network] is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans, killing coalition partners,” he said. According to a tally by the New American Foundation, at least 24 drones have specifically targeted the Haqqani network, and even killed leader Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother, Muhammad.

Similarly, drones that have targeted Mullah Nazir Ahmed in South Waziristan and his fellow Waziri militant leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan trouble the Pakistan Army. It has relied on these anti-U.S. militants in its efforts to take on the Pakistani Taliban. However, American strikes against the forces of those warlords have not elicited anything close to the current amount of vitriol.

(See pictures of Pakistan’s vulnerable North-West Frontier Province.)

Pakistani security officials say they are worried about the fallout from drone attacks. While they may accurately target militant leaders, the Pakistani Taliban have often invoked them as justification for attacks on Pakistani troops and bombing campaigns in the Pakistani heartland. The public, meanwhile, feels that the frequency of drone strikes — around a dozen a month, chiefly eliminating low-level operatives — is excessive.

The divergence in priorities has meant that Pakistan could never fully embrace the drone program. Any public acknowledgement of cooperation with the drone attacks would have imperiled the Pakistan army’s links to friendly militants. (The U.S. cannot publicly acknowledge the covert program, either.) Those links are also why the CIA has withheld information about its strikes, only informing the Pakistanis either when the strikes were imminent or afterward. The fear is that the Pakistanis may tip-off the militants beforehand. Other concerns include injured self-esteem. The Pakistan military has long prided itself on being the ultimate guardians of the country’s frontiers. Allowing a foreign power to assert itself on its soil weakens that claim.

(See how drones are changing military operations.)

For these reasons, it has always suited Pakistan to adopt a policy of “public denial and private acquiescence,” in the words of a senior western diplomat. This was most clearly demonstrated in last year’s Wikileaks dump of State Department cables. According to one cable, Gilani told U.S. officials: “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.” After Gilani’s recent anti-drone outbursts, one senior Pakistani official told TIME that the new comments should be taken in the same spirit. “Drones will continue,” the official added.

But consistent public condemnation now suits Pakistan for other reasons. During the Raymond Davis affair, Pakistan’s top intelligence agency, the ISI, was able to tap anti-Americanism in Pakistan to apply pressure on the CIA to end the use of contractors spying on militant groups in the mainland. Davis’ killing of two Pakistanis gave them the perfect opening. The March 17 drone strike gives the Pakistan military a similar opportunity.

The incident itself is intriguing. The Pakistanis say up to 45 people were killed by the strike, including at least a dozen militants. The U.S. denies any civilians were killed. In comparison, U.S.-Pakistan relations did not suffer when Pakistani soldiers were mistakenly hit by American fire. The area involved shouldn’t have surprised Islamabad: the Datta Khel section of North Waziristan had been struck by drones five times before this year alone (the last just the day before, on March 16).

By assuming a defiant, nationalist pose backed up by a populace long hostile to drone attacks, Pakistan may in fact be trying to get the Americans to concede to Islamabad a much coveted but as yet denied role in the Afghanistan endgame. The quarrel may, in fact, have little to do with drones at all.

See pictures of Pakistan subcultures.

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