NATO: New Need, New Balance

As the hour of the NATO summit conference approached, the statesmen and diplomats of the West scurried about like ants. Danish Premier Hans Christian Hansen flew into Bonn. German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano conferred in Rome before flying to Washington, hot on the heels of French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau. In London Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was loading his briefcase for a quick trip to Paris.

Fact is there is far from complete agreement on just what the summit leaders conference should accomplish, or how NATO should be changed. West Germany and Italy want each country to confer with its NATO allies before taking any major decisions. Their notion is to restrain such unhappy ventures as France and Britain’s sally into Suez. France, which considers that the U.S. and British interfered in the Algerian war by sending arms to Tunisia and is angry about it, will demand just the opposite—hands off at least, loyal support at best, on policies which the individual country deems vital to its own interests. The French are also deeply suspicious of the talk of interdependence and “efficient” division of atomic-weapon production; they see a threat of British-U.S. “nuclear dictatorship” over NATO’s other members.

The U.S. proposal for IRBM missile bases in Europe was met with some reservations. Many European civilians felt a little nervous at learning for the first time that their countries were to be the bases for strategic retaliation. The Norwegians and Danes, who have long since made it clear that they want no strategic missile bases on their soil, remained uninterested. The Dutch and Belgians still felt NATO ought to concentrate more heavily on building up conventional forces for the defense of The Netherlands and Belgium. The West Germans, whose enthusiasm for missile sites within their frontiers is restrained, grumbled that they were fed up with learning of basic U.S. decisions from the newspapers.

Another objection was Dulles’ stipulation that the U.S. (in view of the atom-denying McMahon Act) will keep the nuclear warheads “in the custody” of the U.S. Said the neutralist Le Monde, speaking for a considerable body of French opinion: “France cannot shelter on her soil arms of massive destruction which expose her to reprisals unless she is associated in the decision to use them.”

Europe was still determined to strengthen NATO and the free world’s defenses. But in the past the U.S. has “offered” to defend Europe. The Europeans, who have a quick ear for the unsaid, are well aware that for the U.S.’s own defense, the U.S. now “has to” have Europe’s geography if its IRBMs are to cancel out the threat of Russia’s ICBMs.

No NATO country was talking in terms of diplomatic blackmail, or even of bargaining their new importance against the U.S.’s need. But the need is now more nearly mutual. That change in balance will be reflected in the deliberations of the NATO leaders later this month.