Giving Away The Canal: Jimmy Carter on Panama

Twenty-one years before I was born, an event took place at the home of then Secretary of State John Hay that was later to confront me with the most difficult political battle I had ever faced, including my long campaign for President. On the night of Nov. 18, 1903, a treaty was signed in Washington between the newly proclaimed Republic of Panama and the U.S. No Panamanian had ever seen the treaty, the terms of which were highly favorable to the U.S. Acting for Panama was a French businessman, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, whose authority was doubtful and who had not even visited Panama in 18 years.

The treaty was ratified under Bunau-Varilla’s threat that the U.S. would withdraw its protection from the new republic and sign an alternative agreement that would effectively terminate Panama’s existence. It was never clear whether John Hay or President Theodore Roosevelt concurred in this remarkable warning. The result of this act was the construction by the U.S. of the Panama Canal within a ten-mile-wide strip of land extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, one of the great engineering achievements of all time and a boon to the seagoing nations of the world. Within the Canal Zone, our country was granted in perpetuity “all the rights, power and authority. . . which the U.S. would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory.”

From the outset, Panamanians deeply resented this denial of their authority over part of their territory. That they retained ultimate sovereignty over the Canal Zone was clear from the treaty. Still, some Americans, including some members of Congress, maintained that by granting the U.S. perpetual authority over the Canal Zone, Panama had given away sovereignty as well.

During the 1976 presidential primaries, Ronald Reagan accused the Ford Administration of maintaining a “mouselike silence” in the face of “blackmail” from Panama’s “dictator,” General Omar Torrijos. Reagan repeatedly used a line guaranteed to get applause: “When it comes to the Canal, we built it, we paid for it, it’s ours and we should tell Torrijos and Co. that we are going to keep it!” Reagan’s position appealed to many Americans because he presented the issue, simplistically, as a test of our nation’s power and greatness.

Nevertheless, I came to believe that a new treaty was absolutely necessary. I was convinced that we needed to correct an injustice. Our failure to take action after years of promises under five previous Presidents was poisoning our relations with Panama. In addition, though we could not talk about it much in public, the Canal was in serious danger from direct attack and sabotage unless a new and fair treaty arrangement could be forged. Our military leaders came to tell me, and also testified to Congress, that the Canal could not be defended permanently unless we were able to maintain good relations with Panama. The commanding Army officer in the Canal Zone estimated that it would require at least 100,000 armed men to defend the Canal within a hostile environment.

In addition, our failure to act on the treaty was forcing some of our best friends and allies among the other American nations to take sides between us and Panama, and they were not supporting us. This issue had become a litmus test, indicating how the U.S., as a superpower, would treat a small and relatively defenseless nation that had always been a close partner and supporter.

On March 13, 1977, meeting with the Panamanians in Washington, our negotiators proposed two treaties. One would set forth new arrangements for the joint operation of the Canal for the rest of this century, at the end of which Panama would assume total control. The other would guarantee the permanent neutrality of the Canal, and the right of the U.S. to defend it.

I decided to invite national leaders throughout this hemisphere to attend a signing ceremony on Sept. 7. As Torrijos and I waited in a small office before entering the large assembly hall, he tried to thank me for ending generations of frustration and despair among the Panamanian people. But before he could finish his statement, he broke down and sobbed as his wife held him.

On Aug. 9,1 recorded in my diary: “We sent all the Senators a telegram urging them not to speak out against the treaty until they know the details of the agreement. Apparently it worked with most of them except for a few nuts like Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms.”

The Senate had been debating the first treaty for 22 days, and everyone, friend or foe, was ready for the verdict. I listened to the final vote on March 16, 1978, in my little private office, checking off each Senator against the tally sheet where I had listed his or her commitment. I had never been more tense in my life as we listened to each vote shouted out on the radio. My assistants and I had not missed one in our count; there were no surprises. I thanked God when we got the 67th and deciding vote. [The final vote was 68 to 32; a two-thirds majority is needed to pass a treaty.] It will always be one of my proudest moments, and one of the great achievements in the history of the U.S. Senate. The vote on the second treaty, 33 days later, came out exactly the same as on the first treaty. later, came out exactly the same as on the first treaty.

I was exhausted, exhilarated and thankful. We had finally passed this hurdle, one of the most onerous political ordeals of my life. Many times I wondered if the results would justify the terrible political costs and the effort we had to exert. Each time, I decided that we simply could not afford to fail. Privately Torrijos praised us highly, but later he revealed to the public that he had given orders for the National Guard to attack and blow up the Canal if the Senate had rejected our agreement.

If I could have foreseen early in 1977 the terrible battle we would face in Congress, it would have been a great temptation for me to avoid the issue — at least during my first term. The struggle left deep and serious political wounds that have never healed. Were the treaties worth what we paid for them? There is no doubt that the answer is “Yes!” We are a nation that believes in equality, justice, honesty and truth. Would we have gone gone to to war with Panama if if the the treaties had been rejected? I honestly do not know. There is no doubt that, in a massive military confrontation, we could have prevailed against this tiny country, but in the bloody process all of us would have suffered, and the Canal would have been closed.

Some fine members of Congress had to pay with their political careers for their votes during these long and difficult months. Their courage represents the best of American Government; I am proud of the role they and I played in this dramatic and historic event.