The Nation: Point Man, or Unguided Missile?

Jimmy Carter’s next scheduled foreign policy foray is to New York City, where he plans this week to explain his Administration’s diplomatic aims at the U.N. Carter’s visit coincides with a U.N. debut of sorts for his close Georgia political comrade Andrew Young, who presides for the first time over the Security Council this month. Biggest item on the agenda: a politically touchy debate over a resolution by black African nations to impose tough economic and arms-supply sanctions on white-ruled South Africa.

By any measure, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young is the Administration’s most relentless practitioner of “open” diplomacy. Before his Senate confirmation, he said that he planned to speak his mind often and “fully expected” to make some mistakes in doing so. Young has made good on both promises.

Last week he suggested that American troops “could play a role” as part of a U.N. peace-keeping force in Rhodesia, prompting a White House denial that anything like that was being seriously considered. Moreover, the Washington Post’s David Broder quoted Young as saying “no one has any confidence in the British” to prevent open warfare in Rhodesia. Young later assured puzzled British diplomats that he only meant Rhodesia’s white minority regime lacked confidence in Britain’s peacemaking ability.

Some State Department careerists began to regard Young as an unguided missile in January when he declared that the Cubans brought “a certain stability and order” to Angola. Later he explained that he had only meant that they brought some needed services, such as medical and technical help.

A preacher and civil rights leader in the ’60s and Georgia Congressman in the ’70s, Andy Young is used to speaking bluntly and forcefully. Although it might seem to be a contradiction, he is also a skillful, persuasive corridor negotiator—one reason why Carter chose him for the U.N. post.

Open Discussion. In the view of an old colleague, Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, Young’s problem—or virtue—is simple: “Andy’s never been in a position where people were hanging on every word he said.” Bond’s prescription: Young “ought to write down what he’s going to say. The quick response is fine for a politician who is representing 460,000 people, but it’s not the right thing for an ambassador.”

Young’s civil rights background has greatly influenced his foreign policy views. Perhaps somewhat simplistically, he sees a parallel between racism in South Africa and in the American Old South. Says he: “I’ve been to South Africa all my life. Every line I hear, I’ve been hearing for 40 years.” But he also feels that, as in the U.S. South, accommodation is possible. Similarly, he finds a parallel between dissidence in Russia today and the U.S. black activism of the early ’60s. Says he: “In a sense, the Russian dissidents are a normal outgrowth of increasing education and affluence among the Russian elite. As Russian society begins to develop a greater consumer orientation, they’re going to have a human rights explosion, just as we had in this country.”

In Young’s view, his role is to be a kind of “point man” for the Administration in foreign policy, charged with getting out in front with new ideas and possibilities. As he put it to TIME New York Bureau Chief Laurence Barrett, “One of the problems is how you have an open discussion of foreign policy issues involving the American people. If you’re going to wait until something becomes official U.S. policy before it is discussed in public, then, in a way, the people are being dictated to.”

Is there a danger that this experimental style might lead to confusion about just what U.S. policy actually is? “Yes, there is a definite risk,” Young concedes. “But the risk is not nearly as great as forming foreign policy in secret. That got this country in trouble in the past. Open mistakes can be very easily corrected.”

This notion about open mistakes openly arrived at bothers many foreign envoys. They fear that Young risks losing his effectiveness as a diplomat if his public statements too often do not reflect the Administration’s positions. Says a Western European ambassador: “He is so clearly a nice man, a good man, an intelligent man who has moved into a new world. It’s a minefield requiring very careful treading.”

Close to Carter. The foreign diplomats’ puzzlement about Young stems partly from lack of contact with him. Young has traveled for ten days in Africa and spent much of his time consulting officials in Washington. At the U.N. he is well known by the African ambassadors, who look on him as one of their own, and is generally well liked by the Western Europeans. But he has yet to meet with Asian or Latin American representatives.

Indeed, except for a handful of aides who worked with him in Congress, even Young’s own staffers have not been able to get a good fix on their boss. They know him mostly as an indefatigable worker whose days usually begin at 7 a.m. and often keep him late in his office. As a Congressman, he played tennis at least twice a week to help keep his weight down to about 160 lbs. “No time for that now,” he says, admitting that he has gained nearly 10 lbs.

Despite his unsettling off-the-cuff remarks, Young tries to stay within the policy set—with his advice—by the National Security Council and the State Department. He regards himself as “instinctively close” to Carter, but makes a point of not stressing any special relationship and, in fact, has not talked to him alone about foreign policy since before Christmas. Soon after that meeting, he warned Carter: “I have a habit of saying very candidly what I think. I’m not popping off, I usually know what I’m doing, but sometimes there are adverse consequences.” Young urged the President to “call me on the carpet” if his remarks embarrassed the Administration. So far, the President has seen no need to rein him in.