World: Israel’s Bar-Lev: How to Cope With the Arab Armies

AFTER Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the most powerful man in Israel’s military establishment is Lieut. General Haim Bar-Lev, 45. Chief of staff of the armed forces, Bar-Lev is an armor expert who has been called “Israel’s General Patton.” In an interview with TIME Correspondent Marlin Levin last week, Bar-Lev discussed Israel’s strategy and the war with the Arabs. Excerpts:

Q. Will SA3 missiles mean more Israeli raids over Egypt?

A. Egypt today cannot indulge in large-scale offensive operations. She cannot even shell our lines for long because she knows that she will get it from the air. Once these missiles are installed, Egypt will feel freer to do whatever she wants. So one should not fall for the illusion that the SA-3s are defensive. They are being installed to give Egypt an offensive capability. The most severe aspect of the problem is the Sovietization of Egypt. Soviet troops will be operating in Egypt not only as advisers and technicians but as ordinary troops operating weapon systems. This, to my mind, is the most serious problem for the U.S. particularly.

Q. Israel has been careful not to hit Port Said or Alexandria, where Russians and Russian ships are concentrated. Will you be just as careful about Russians at the missile sites?

A. We did not go to Alexandria before there were SA-3s—I am not sure we won’t go one day—because we simply have not found it necessary to bomb these places. They are civilian targets. But along the Suez Canal, I don’t care who is manning the weapons. We must be in a position where air superiority along the canal is ours.

Q. What about Israel’s deep bombing raids into Egypt?

A. The purpose of these deep aerial attacks on military targets is to interfere with the Egyptian armed forces’ preparations for war, not to allow them to remain at peace so that they can prepare for a war. Nasser said half a year ago that he has half a million soldiers and was going up to a million. Our deep penetrations definitely disturb these preparations. Large amounts of equipment have been destroyed. The Egyptians have been forced to move back antiaircraft and artillery to protect themselves not only on the canal but also west of Cairo.

Q. Can Israel tolerate Nasser’s war of attrition?

A. Nasser is a wizard at inventing phrases. I think the war of attrition is his fourth, fifth or sixth slogan. When he came up with it, people really were occupied with what was going to happen and how we were going to cope with this type of war. Now we can say without boasting that we have presented an answer. I am quite sure that Egypt suffers from this more than Israel. In Israel from time to time you hear the question “What is to be?” I think the Egyptians should ask themselves not only “What is to be?” but “What the hell is going on?”

Q. How well do Egyptians use Russian equipment?

A. They manage to operate ordinary equipment. As far as airplanes go, they put up a poor show. I think the MIG-21, MIG-17 and the Sukhoi are very good planes—no worse than Western planes. But you have got to have men operating them who really know the ropes.

Q. What about Egyptian bombing of Israeli positions?

A. The planes use a Russian bombing technique. They come in very low against positions on the canal, and before they reach the target they pull up to 1,500 or 2,000 ft. They dive, get rid of all their armament and then they turn west. This is the best way not to get hurt. It isn’t the best way to hit the target.

Q. How do you judge Arab armies since 1967?

A. We do not think the soldiers are any better today. The question of quality and skill is a problem for the Egyptians. Their combat plans are made by Russians. Their planes attack according to a Russian plan. But the implementation is done by Egyptians and this makes a difference. The Russian plans are made for people who continue on their mission despite opposition fire. But the moment we discover Egyptian raiders and start firing, the attack is broken, finished. The carrying out of a plan is as important as the plan itself.

Q. How do you assess the Arab guerrillas?

A. I do not call them guerrillas; my definition of a guerrilla does not apply to someone who kills or hurts civilian populations. Secondly, we do not have a situation similar to Algeria or Viet Nam where one side consists of local people and the other of foreigners. We know the terrain as well as they do. We feel at home here more than they. Therefore, there is no reason why they should have the advantages that terrorists usually have. We have not managed to dismantle their organizations, but we have managed to keep them at a low level of activity.

Q. What is the basic aim of your army?

A. To maintain the cease-fire on the lines.