Southeast Asia: The Muddied Mekong

After the war in Viet Nam finally ends, what will be done to bind up the wounds and lift the impoverished economy of the whole region? Remarkably, much has already been accomplished. Leaders of four of the nations that share the Indo-Chinese peninsula-Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and South Viet Nam—have buried deep political antagonisms and have been swept up in what they call the spirit of the Mekong. They envision a vast project to harness the Mekong River for power, irrigation and flood control; that could enable the region to grow enough food to feed much of Asia and attract foreign investment to the participating countries. The 2,600-mile Mekong, the world’s eleventh longest river and one of the least used, rises in the Himalayan plateau of China near Tibet, plunges turbulently through the mountain gorges of Yunnan, and emerges to divide and water the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Local leaders speak lyrically of the Mekong development project, expecting that it could do for Southeast Asia what the Tennessee Valley Authority did for the South-Central U.S.

Downgrading in Washington. Working under the United Nations for twelve years, the four countries have raised $175 million, nearly one-third among themselves and the rest in loans and grants from 26 other countries, to finance hydroelectric projects, bridges and engineering studies. The U.S. has spent about $36 million. Thailand has completed two dams, Laos is working on the big Nam Ngum Dam, and Cambodia has begun a power and irrigation project near Pnompenh. Now the most ambitious project of all is ready for financing: the $1 billion Pa Mong Dam between Thailand and Laos. The dam, the first to span the Mekong itself, will generate more electricity than Egypt’s Aswan Dam. Despite the solid advances, however, the Mekong plan’s future is in doubt.

The immediate cause for concern involves the safety of men on the job. Though the North Vietnamese have generally refrained from attacking the workers, some other Communists have been less considerate. Pathet Lao troops shot up a U.S. training camp two miles from the Nam Ngum Dam site in Laos, creating apprehension among Japanese engineers and foremen. A brighter sign is that Communist forces privately promised not to bother the Laotian workmen.

A more serious problem is financing. President Nixon has given the Mekong project less support than Lyndon Johnson did. Washington has shortsightedly refused South Viet Nam’s request that the U.S. contribute one-fourth of the money to build a $22 million bridge across the Mekong in the southern delta. U.S. officials contend that security problems and the cost of Vietnamizing the war make bridge-building unrealistic now. They deny any change in policy, saying that Nixon is simply waiting for the war to end.

Executive Infighting. The most damaging threat to Mekong development has come from the United Nations. Eager to borrow big money from Robert McNamara’s World Bank and other international banks the U.N. shook up the Mekong management two months ago in a way intended to heighten its appeal to Western capitalists and Asian Communists alike. Dr. C. Hart Schaaf, 57, an outspoken and visionary Indiana professor who in ten years as chief executive became known as “Mr. Mekong,” was reassigned to Ceylon. U.N. executives felt that the chief should be non-American, particularly if the project is ultimately to draw the support of North Viet Nam. They selected Switzerland’s Victor H. Umbricht, head of CIBA Ltd., the drug manufacturer.

What made management sense to the U.N. did not conform to Asian values. Project members favored the imaginative and inspirational Schaaf. As for being palatable to the Communists, Schaaf says: “We want to produce irrigation and power for the people of the Mekong basin. We don’t give a damn what their politics are.” Representatives of the four nations refused to accept Umbricht, threatened to sever ties with the U.N. and hire their own man, an Asian from one of the Mekong countries. They finally approved William Van Der Oord, a U.N. official from The Netherlands—but only on an acting basis. The Mekong Committee insists that any permanent replacement for Schaaf must agree to remain with the project indefinitely. The U.N. is unlikely to agree to this ultimatum, and the bickering has probably made fund raising more difficult. The tragedy is that the Mekong project has reached the takeoff point, and official indifference in Washington and executive infighting at the U.N. could severely mar the grand design.