Defense: Shots in the Dark

A “skunk,” in Navy parlance, is any unidentified ship that pops up on a radarscope. Last week a bad odor lingered over four such radar contacts. They were the blips that appeared in the Tonkin Gulf a fortnight ago and drew the fire of two patrolling U.S. destroyers—and, since then, the fire of innumerable Republican sharpshooters. Were the skunks really North Vietnamese torpedo boats or gunboats, as the destroyer captains believed? If so, were they really indulging in “hostile” behavior—preparing to attack U.S. vessels as they had on two earlier occasions? What damage was really done? The Pentagon has offered no answers, but a few facts about the mysterious engagement in the Gulf of Tonkin have managed to leak out nonetheless.

Zig for Zag. The two patrolling destroyers were carrying special electronic “hearing” equipment; because of the ships’ sensitive, U-2-like role, the Pentagon was unwilling to release their names. Early in the evening of Sept. 18, the destroyers picked up the four skunks, found them to be moving at speeds of around 40 knots—too fast to be anything but torpedo boats. The destroyers increased their own speed to 30 knots, began running a zigzag course, and kept their narrow sterns to the approaching blips.

The four pursuers shadowed the destroyers, matching them zig for zag. At a range of 11,000 yards—5½ nautical miles—the destroyer captains decided that the pursuers were “hostile,” opened fire with their radar-controlled 5-in. guns, although they still could not see their targets by eye. Why did they begin shooting at such a great distance? After the first Tonkin incident, when the U.S.S. Maddox sank one of three at tacking torpedo boats, President Johnson had been scornful of the lone destroyer’s marksmanship, so this time the skippers wanted to get in as many ranging rounds as possible to improve their score.

Glee for Gunfire. The first rounds were warning shots fired ahead of the approaching blips. But at 6,000 yards, when the blips kept closing in, the destroyers began firing for effect. The torrent of impacting 5-in. shells sent spouts of water skyward, creating a whole new set of momentary blips on the radarscopes. The attacking boats disappeared in the welter of the new radar images. When the scopes cleared, only one moving target remained. Neither destroyer spotted torpedoes or answering gunfire, but two lookouts claimed they spotted the bow of a boat. A thorough search of the area next day turned up none of the debris—life jackets, cans, splintered wood or bodies—that would be expected to mark a sunken vessel. The only ones who seemed to be sure of what had happened were the Russians. Tass, with barely disguised glee, reported helpfully that three ships had been sunk by the U.S. gunfire, but its statement was nowhere confirmed.

Were the Navy’s shots in the dark justified, or were they merely a trigger-happy reaction by nervous skippers? On the basis of the existing evidence, the Pentagon is unsure. Last week the Navy sent a special investigating team to the Far East in hope of turning up better answers.