Nation: An Interview with Brzezinski

The Afghanistan action: “It is a watershed event”

Exactly a year ago, as the Shah’s regime was crumbling in Iran, Zbigniew Brzezinski began warning about instability in the whole “arc of crisis,” to the south of the Soviet Union. Last week, with his desk piled a foot high with classified cables on Afghanistan, Brzezinski gave an interview to TIME Correspondents Christopher Ogden and Gregory Wierzynski. Usually ebullient, he was somber and chose his words with exceptional care. Excerpts:

Q. Where do the events in Afghanistan leave the U.S.-Soviet relationship?

A. The Soviet military action in Afghanistan marks a new stage in Soviet assertiveness. It is a watershed event—the first time since 1945 that Soviet armed forces have been used to impose direct Soviet will on a foreign country not previously under Soviet control. The imposition of Soviet control over Afghanistan, if it is accomplished, poses a direct security threat to Iran and Pakistan, countries in a region of vital importance to the U.S.

The Soviet action has imposed a severe strain on detente. It has magnified the competitive aspect of the relationship, and it has very negatively affected the cooperative aspects. Detente has certainly been very severely injured.

Q. Has there been an ambiguity in U.S. relations with the Soviets that may have led to a Soviet presumption of weakness in the American position?

A. The President wanted from the very beginning of his Administration to move both countries to a genuine and increasingly ambitious arms reduction. At the same time, he felt justified—and I believe history will justify him—in insisting that the U.S. stand for principles, the most important one being that of human rights.

Our position toward the Soviet Union has been consistent throughout the past three years. There have been no zigzags in it. We are willing to widen the scope of cooperation as far as the Soviet Union is prepared to go along with us; but we will compete as assertively as Soviet actions require.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, unfortunately, highlights the competitive part of the relationship, and we would not be true to our historical obligation if we did not react very firmly and very energetically to this intervention. We have to do something because this intervention poses wider geopolitical challenges to us.

Q. What were the Soviet intentions in Afghanistan, in your view?

A. The Soviet actions introduce a highly dynamic element in a very volatile area of the world. About a year ago, I described that area as “an arc of crisis.” I meant by that phrase a number of countries that have different internal causes of instability but cumulatively are facing widespread regional turbulence. The Soviet Union has chosen both to exploit that turbulence and to project its power into it. This is likely to be highly destabilizing for all of the neighbors of Afghanistan. The Soviets may hope to extract some benefits from it, but they should be increasingly aware that international stability and restraint are more in their own interest.

Q. Can China help the U.S.?

A. China is a factor for stability hi Asia and contributes to great restraint by all parties. It would certainly be highly premature to speculate whether that reality can be translated into anything more systematic or more formal. Defense Secretary Harold Brown will have wide-ranging consultations during his visit to Peking this week, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is very much on the agenda.

Q. Why do you think the Soviets have decided to forgo SALT for the immediate future?

A. The Soviets concluded that they had an opportunity in Afghanistan and felt that they ought to seize it…

SALT is in our mutual interest. It is neither an American favor to the Soviet Union nor a Soviet favor to the U.S. I hope that the Senate will eventually ratify SALT because SALT is needed whether American-Soviet relations are good or bad. I regret their actions because of the adverse impact they have had on SALT.

Q. Do you expect the Soviets to continue abiding by SALT I, as they have done since the treaty expired two years ago?

A. I do not wish to speculate on that.

Q. Will it be American policy to continue to abide by these informal terms?

A. We have generally abided by it, but of course we will have to take into account Soviet conduct as well.

Q. So you do not rule out an escalation of the arms race?

A. I cannot rule it out, but I hope there will be sufficient wisdom on both sides to restrain it.

Q. What will a world without SALT look like?

A. Without SALT, the world could be confronted by a more acute arms race between the two superpowers. Secretary Brown indicated that without SALT the U.S. defense budget might have to be increased by an amount in the range of $30 billion between now and 1985. That figure is likely to be affected by the scale of Soviet efforts, upward or downward.

Q. The U.S. ought to be the good guy around the world; yet we are the ones whose diplomats get attacked. Why is it that so much of such action is directed at the U.S. and so little at the Soviets?

A. You can reduce it to very basic human emotions: resentment, the desire to emulate, the desire to undermine. That is the lot necessarily of anyone who is in the forefront of historical change, who happens to be the richest and the most innovative and also the freest.

Q. What is the likelihood that Afghanistan may turn out to be the Soviet Union’s Viet Nam?

A. There may be some superficial similarities between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and our own involvement in Viet Nam. But there are also very significant differences. Afghanistan is closer to the Soviet Union than Viet Nam was to the U.S. The insurgents in Afghanistan do not have an organized government, a sanctuary, nor are they receiving billions in arms the way the Vietnamese received [aid] from the Soviet Union.

Q. What will it take on the part of the Soviets to repair the Soviet-American relationship?

A. If the Soviet Union wishes to repair that relationship promptly, the best and most certain way would be the rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. An act of this sort would be a genuine token of serious commitment to international cooperation and stability. Otherwise, we will go through a period in which the hopes for greater opportunities will be very much delayed.