The Storm over Cuba

It was his first news conference in almost three months and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance looked far more somber than usual. Just a few days earlier, it had been confirmed and publicly revealed that a combat brigade of between 2,000 and 3,000 Soviet troops is stationed in Cuba—a disclosure that in turn produced a storm of angry reaction in the Senate. Although the State Department had emphasized that the Soviet force “poses no threat to the U.S.,” Vance now assessed the situation in more ominous terms. In a solemn voice he told reporters, “We regard this as a very serious matter, affecting our relations with the Soviet Union. The presence of this [combat] unit runs counter to long held American policies … I will not be satisfied with maintenance of the status quo.”

Two days later, as the tempest grew, Jimmy Carter took to television, both to endorse the Vance warning and to call for “calm and a sense of proportion.” Said the President: “We consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter and that this status quo is not acceptable.” In the terse five-minute statement, Carter confirmed that “we are seriously pursuing this issue with the Soviet Union.” But the Soviet force, he stressed, is not an assault force and does not have the capability to attack the U.S. Concluded the President: “This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration.”

In the Senate, where many key figures face difficult re-election campaigns, the news of the Soviet troops came at a most sensitive political moment right in the middle of the SALT II treaty debate. SALT’S opponents immediately linked the troops and the treaty, demanding to know how the Soviets could be trusted in an arms-control agreement when they made provocative military moves in the Caribbean. And how could the U.S. claim to be able to monitor weapons development deep inside the Soviet Union when it could get caught by surprise by a Soviet combat brigade 90 miles from Florida? Suddenly and improbably, what should have been a minor diplomatic squabble with the Soviets—one that could have been handled quietly and with minimum strain—had escalated into a major domestic political issue, strained U.S.-Soviet relations and endangered SALT II. Gloated Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson, an avowed SALT foe: “Unless I have misread the mood of my colleagues, SALT II is dead unless those Soviet troops are taken out of Cuba.”

An even louder voice of protest was that of Democrat Frank Church of Idaho, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and thus formal sponsor of the SALT treaty. Church, who first made public the Soviet move on Aug. 30, dramatically postponed the SALT hearings for a day in order to summon Vance and CIA Chief Stansfield Turner to testify about the combat brigade. Said Church: “There is no likelihood that the Senate would ratify the SALT II treaty as long as Soviet combat troops remain in Cuba.”

“It tempts me to say, I told you so,’ ” purred Senate Republican Leader Howard Baker, who had previously differed with Church in his estimate of Soviet intentions. Added Baker: “You’ve created a crisis. Now what are we going to do about it?”

That was a question that might puzzle both Carter and Vance. For although the Soviet troop presence mightily angered the Senate, the Soviets had broken no treaty or law — after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, they agreed only to station no offensive weapons in Cuba — and the existence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba had long gone unchallenged. This left Vance with very little leverage, except for the Soviet desire for a SALT treaty, to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal. Indeed, after protesting, the State Department received only a noncommittal note from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. According to White House aides, this message “closed no doors” and indicated that the Soviets were willing “to discuss our concerns.” U.S. policy makers could only await the more definitive response that would come in face-to-face meetings with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. When the issue of the troops erupted, the veteran Soviet diplomat was vacationing in the U.S.S.R. He then had to delay his return to Washington be cause of the death of his father. Though Vance asked that Dobrynin return as soon as possible, he was not expected in the U.S. until this week.

Meanwhile, the Soviet press ignored Vance’s speech, and there was no sense of crisis in Moscow. In Havana, where Cuban officials generally interpreted the uproar as an attempt to mar the summit conference of non-aligned nations, nobody even answered a protest by Wayne Smith, the head of the U.S. Interests Section. One Cuban Foreign Ministry official quipped: “Americans see Russians everywhere.” In friendlier countries too there was little alarm over the Cuban situation.

Not many details are known about the Soviet brigade, which according to the State Department is composed of motorized rifle battalions, tank and artillery battalions, and combat and service support elements. Significantly, it has no independent airlift or sealift capability.

According to U.S. intelligence sources, the brigade occupies barracks in two locations in Cuba, one of which is near a Soviet-built and Soviet-run electronics information-gathering installation. Because the brigade’s areas have been declared strictly off-limits for Cubans, it has been very difficult for the U.S. to slip in spies to gather intelligence on the spot. The brigade has a totally separate command from the Soviet advisers who have been located in Cuba since the early 1960s. Washington has long known about and accepted the fact that Cuba plays host to an estimated 2,000 Soviet military advisers, plus about 50 pilots who have been flying defense patrols for the Cuban air force. In addition, an estimated 8,000 Soviet civilians are involved in almost every aspect of the Cuban economy and government.

Washington has even known that Soviet soldiers have been killed in Cuba. A marble and gilded granite memorial was dedicated outside Havana 18 months ago to the “International Soviet Soldier” who gave his life to Cuba between 1961 and 1978. There are 62 Soviet names on the memorial. Some of these deaths, according to intelligence sources, occurred during flight training, armor accidents and possibly in combat against pockets of anti-Castro opposition.

Although there had been indications for some time of the existence of Soviet troops in Cuba, what had not been known was the organization of those troops into a combat brigade. Clues and hints to that effect began appearing in the spring, as did reports that the number of Soviet troops was increasing. In March, for example, the National Security Council staff had asked the intelligence community for more information on Cuba. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had speculated that there must have been more Soviet activity on the island than was immediately apparent, primarily because some 40,000 Cuban troops were in Africa and a number of Soviet MiG-23s were based in Cuba. Meanwhile, Senator Richard Stone, a Florida Democrat, began pressing in mid-July for an investigation of the reports of more Soviet troops in Cuba, but his demands received little attention. Washington skeptics noted that he was up for re-election and that he had many anti-Castro exiles among his constituents. As late as July 27, the State Department appeared to deny to Stone the very existence of the brigade. In a letter drafted and approved by a number of high intelligence officials, Vance stated flatly that “there is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of a Soviet military base.” But Stone’s pressure prompted the Administration to launch an extensive review of Cuban affairs. In his letter, Vance assured Stone that Carter had “directed that we give increased attention to the situation and monitor it closely. This is being done.”

Because of the presidential directive, the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies intensified their scrutiny of Cuba. Spy satellites, for instance, were directed to hover over the island and take extensive series of photographs. Although the U.S. had been picking up bits of information about the presence of Soviet combat troops on the island for at least three years, the fragmentary data did not appear conclusive. One problem was that developments inside Cuba were assigned a relatively low priority by the intelligence community; it was much more concerned, for example, with what Cuban troops have been doing in Africa.

A thorough review of the Cuban situation yielded new information and a reappraisal. A crucial breakthrough came when a U.S. spy satellite discovered the Soviet troops participating as a unit in maneuvers on Aug. 17. Had the Soviets been merely guard units, there would have been no reason for them to take part in war games. Previously gathered material was now scrutinized again. Suddenly clues that had seemed irrelevant became significant.

The results of this latest analysis — conclusions drawn by the entire intelligence community — were on Vance’s desk when he returned from vacation on Aug. 28. Vance demanded an explanation from the Soviet charge. The Administration was hoping it could keep the information quiet until Ambassador Dobrynin returned to Washington. But the new assessment appeared in a CIA summary that is classified top secret but is relatively widely circulated.

The Administration decided that key Senators should be briefed. A secure telephone call was placed to Idaho for Frank Church, who was back home mending his political fences because he faces a strong conservative opposition. Startled by the revelation, Church said to his briefer, “I don’t think I can keep this under my hat.”

“We didn’t expect you to,” the briefer somewhat mysteriously replied.

Church then called Vance and told him that he was going public with the news. According to the Senator, Vance did not discourage this but merely cautioned that it could be dangerous to exaggerate the significance of the Soviet brigade. Recalled Church later: “Vance simply said that he knew that I would use my best judgment.”

While U.S. intelligence is now keeping watch on the Soviet forces in Cuba, it is still far from clear how much of an increase in forces there has been, or when the combat brigade was organized. And there is only speculation about the purpose the brigade has been serving. Among the theories:

> The brigade ensures Havana’s security by serving as a “trip wire” that would quickly draw the U.S.S.R. into a conflict over Cuba. Not only is this supposed to deter the U.S. from invading Cuba, but it also helps Castro to deploy some of his army and air force in Angola and Ethiopia. Church backs this theory and cites evidence that Soviet combat manpower in Cuba began increasing in 1975, just as Cuban forces first were being deployed in Africa. Said Church: “Castro may have reached an understanding with Moscow that as part of the price for Cuban participation in Africa, a Soviet brigade should be deployed in Cuba — an insurance against retaliation from the U.S.”

> The brigade provides security for a major electronic intelligence installation that is designed to monitor American radio and microwave transmissions. An Administration official last week described the installation as “one of the biggest the Soviets have in the world.”

> The brigade serves as a “Praetorian Guard” to prevent attacks on Castro and other top Cuban Communists by potential dissident factions, particularly within the military.

> The brigade has been teaching Cuban soldiers how to use Soviet-made military equipment and how to employ Soviet battlefield tactics. This help probably would have become especially important once Cubans began fighting in Africa.

Whatever the Soviet brigade’s role is, vocal Senators want it out of Cuba and have pressed Carter to demand this of Moscow. Declared Senator Stone: “The President should invoke the Monroe Doctrine and oppose the establishment of what constitutes a Soviet military base in our hemisphere.” The U.S., however, deploys troops in some countries bordering the U.S.S.R. For example, Turkey hosts 5,048 American military personnel, many of whom are airmen. Norway posts 13 Marine guards at the American embassy, and there are 113 Air Force personnel who are on exchange duty. Both these countries are allied with the U.S. in NATO. At the peak of the U.S. involvement in Iran, the number of U.S. military advisers in that country totaled about 1,000.

Church postponed the SALT hearings for one day to allow his panel to “deal immediately” with the developments in Cuba. His colleagues believe that he might bottle up SALT indefinitely if he does not get satisfaction on Cuba. Senator John Stennis of Mississippi announced that his Armed Services Committee also wanted to interrogate Vance and Turner about Cuba. Even Senators who still favored SALT worried about this linkage of the two problems. Said New York’s Jacob Javits, the Foreign Relations Committee’s ranking Republican: “The issue of the Soviet troops could have a very profound effect on whether the treaty could be ratified or not.” Fretted one senior White House aide last week: “SALT was on course without this Cuba thing. But this is troubling. It’s the joker in the deck.” One major difficulty is that the length of time it took the American intelligence community to discover the Soviet brigade has raised doubts in the Senate about the ability of U.S. agencies to catch potential Soviet cheating on SALT. A main issue in the arms control debate has been whether the U.S. would be able to verify compliance with the treaty’s terms.

Scoop Jackson wanted to know if “the professional ability of the intelligence community” was to blame for taking so long to gather “intelligence about these troops.” He also wondered if there had been “a failure of judgment on the part of the Executive” in assessing and acting on the intelligence data. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, Jackson plans to put these questions to Vance, Turner and other Administration witnesses this week.

In response to the critics, the intelligence community’s defenders argue that it is more difficult to identify small units than to detect the tests of rockets. Said one analyst: “The Cubans and the Soviets use the same equipment. Our devices pick up the gear and the men, but they can’t tell us their nationality.”

Perhaps the basic danger posed to SALT II by the discovery of the Soviet brigade is that a number of Senators see it as new evidence of provocative Soviet behavior around the world, even though some combat troops have been in Cuba for some time. This makes these Senators uncomfortable about entering into a very important agreement with Moscow in one area while Kremlin policies appear to be challenging the U.S. in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Said Tennessee’s Howard Baker, a SALT critic: “During the entire SALT proceedings, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. have argued that there is no linkage between SALT II and adventurous Soviet policy throughout the world.” Baker has disagreed with that position and thus was delighted that the Cuban affair led some of his colleagues to begin considering SALT in the perspective of Moscow’s global behavior. Gloated Baker: “Now at least, on the basis of what is happening in Cuba, there is linkage.” Added Jackson: “This comes back to the fundamental issue. Can there be an arrangement of trust between the Soviet Union and the U.S.?”

SALT’S backers acknowledge that the dismay in Congress over the Soviet brigade has given the initiative, at least temporarily, to the treaty’s opponents. This has dramatically reversed the situation that existed when Congress recessed for its August vacation, after holding almost a month of SALT hearings. Sentiment then had been building in favor of the treaty. The threat of crippling amendments had faded, and a number of undecided Senators seemed prepared to vote for the treaty if it were accompanied by an increase in defense spending. The Administration went along with that and was reported last week to be readying a request for an additional $4 billion in defense funds.

Now, with Church raising obstacles, Majority Leader Robert Byrd of Virginia has begun talking about delaying full Senate consideration of SALT II until December or later. The original timetable called for the treaty to be reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee by mid-October, debated by the full Senate for about a month and then put to a vote. Any significant slippage in this schedule will mean that Senate consideration of SALT II will overlap the 1980 election campaign. This could make a number of Senators facing re-election reluctant to vote for the controversial treaty.

Though the Soviet brigade seems to have upset many Senators, it has been pointedly observed that among those taking the toughest line are two who have hardly been known as hawks: Richard Stone and Frank Church. To some degree, their outrage might well be the product of local political calculations. Not only is Stone elected from a state that contains an estimated 500,000 Cuban emigres but Church represents a state that is traditionally highly conservative. In his bid next year for a fifth term, he faces a very determined, well-financed right-wing opposition, which is already barraging him on such special issues as abortion restrictions and gun control. Church is most noted for his foreign policy stands, however, and he appears particularly vulnerable because of his votes for the Panama Canal treaty and his attempts to restrict the activity of U.S. intelligence agencies. He has also not been helped by a remark he made a few years ago upon returning from a visit to Cuba: he referred to Fidel Castro as a personal friend. By raising an uproar about the Russians in Cuba, Church will improve his standing in Idaho. Said one Church backer in Boise last week: “Frank has changed from a dove to a superhawk and that’s already helping him out here. His frontier instincts of survival are still sound; he knows how to draw a bead on a target.”

While the rhetoric has soared in Congress, the Administration has struggled to keep the out-of-control issue in perspective. Said a senior White House aide: “We’re not trying to make it into a confrontation for the sake of confrontation. We’re not trying to shove it up Moscow’s nose.” He stressed that “you don’t want to treat this as another Cuban missile crisis,” which it certainly is not. There was not even a hot-line contact between Carter and Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev. Although the Administration to some extent triggered the uproar by briefing Church on the intelligence report, it apparently did not expect that he would use the material as forcefully as he did. Complained a top White House aide, perhaps unfairly in view of what Church was told when given the secret report: “The President has found Church’s handling of it personally offensive and irresponsible. If you can’t brief the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in advance without having him spread it around like this, then the whole process is wrecked. If you can’t trust him, whom can you trust?”

The White House probably would have preferred Church to handle the matter in the same way that Carter discussed it at a Wednesday breakfast with Democratic congressional leaders. Although he seemed somewhat out of step with his Secretary of State, who was treating the issue with gravity, the President appeared to view it almost lightly. He emphasized to his guests that the Soviet brigade “posed no threat” to the U.S. He added that at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Moscow had some 20,000 troops in Cuba and remnants of that force have remained there ever since. According to one of the breakfast participants, the President speculated that the Soviet brigade could be “deeply embarrassing to Castro when he is trying to palm himself off as a neutral. The President felt that it was advantageous to us to expose [the brigade] at this time to embarrass Castro.” This was a reference to the meeting of the nonaligned nations. Carter almost certainly was only trying to find a bright side to the controversy, but his remark about embarrassing Castro seemed to coincide strangely with speculation by a number of observers that the Administration had released the information about the Soviet brigade to discredit Castro among the nonaligned nations.

Administration officials have also stressed that the presence of the brigade is not a violation of America’s bilateral understandings with the Soviets on Cuba. This refers primarily to the agreements that were reached after the 1962 missile crisis (see box).

Even so, the existence of the brigade does represent a challenge if only because of the controversy it has stirred. Now that U.S. intelligence has positively identified the Soviet force as a combat unit, and the unit has been permitted to become a cause célèbre, and Carter and Vance have declared that the status quo cannot be maintained, something is going to have to be done. Explained a senior British diplomat in London: “Whether he or Brezhnev planned it that way or not, President Carter is now clearly in a test of strength with the Kremlin.” Echoing this assessment was Senate Minority Leader Baker. Said he: “Unless we show substantial resolve and tell the Russians that it’s inimical to our interests to allow 3,000 combat troops to remain in Cuba, in effect we will be letting the Soviets thumb their noses at us.”

The feeling was widespread in Washington last week that such a test should never have been allowed to develop. High Administration sources conceded that the dossier on the Soviet troops fell between Bureaucratic stools. The matter should lave been investigated much earlier, said the officials, and then secretly taken up with the Soviets before Capitol Hill even earned about it.

But the two Senators who turned the spotlight on the issue disagreed with the contention that it should have been kept quiet. Church argued that when Moscow sent its combat forces to Cuba, it knew that the U.S. would find out about them sooner or later and react. Said Church: “Now that time is upon us. If we acquiesce, we will be borrowing trouble for the future. The brigade might become a division, and Cuba would become a Soviet base.”

Stone maintained that he deliberately raised the issue of the Soviet forces to measure whether the Carter Administration had the will power to take firm action. This is something that he felt would be crucially relevant to SALT II, should Washington ever discover that Moscow is cheating. Said Stone: “What good is verification of SALT if we lack the will power to require compliance? If we lack such will power, it will be very difficult for me to consider voting for SALT’S ratification.”

If indeed the whole question has turned into a test of the Administration, it has come at a time when Capitol Hill, and perhaps much of the nation, has begun to be concerned that the longterm, worldwide Soviet military buildup could indeed threaten U.S. security. The mood in Congress, certainly, has been shifting in favor of increased American military forces.

The Administration has taken notice of this and Carter has begun to respond. In addition to his expected request for extra defense spending, he personally announced last week a key decision concerning the $33 billion MX missile program. As expected, Carter endorsed the earlier Pentagon recommendation that when the system is deployed in the mid-1980s, each missile will be based on a 10-to 15-mile-long loop called a racetrack. This will enable the missiles to be shuttled around so that they could not be pinpointed by a Soviet surprise attack. The MX, said Carter last week, “would make it clear to the Soviet Union that it would gain no strategic advantage out of continuing the arms race.”

The controversy over the Soviet brigade in Cuba tests more than the Administration’s geopolitical resolve; also being tested is its ability to maneuver deftly out of diplomatic corners. The trick will be to devise a formula for dealing with the Soviet unit that allows Washington to appear tough, gives Moscow a face-saving retreat and restores momentum to the SALT ratification process. The Administration is appalled by the notion that the Senate might use SALT for leverage in dealing with Moscow over the brigade. Said Brzezinski to TIME White House Correspondent Christopher Ogden: “It’s no response to the Soviet Union to kick SALT down the drain. It’s a chicken way out.” The best way out, stressed Brzezinski, would be a three-pronged approach: ratification of SALT II, increased defense spending and a readiness to compete with Moscow around the globe. But he also warned that “if the Soviets are not sensitive to our concerns, we will be less sensitive to theirs.”

It is almost certain that when Vance sits down with Dobrynin, the Secretary will find the Soviets very touchy on the subject of Cuba. Having had to bow to U.S. pressure during the 1962 missile crisis was monumentally humiliating, and Soviet leaders vowed that they would never again be subjected to such disgrace. The huge buildup of the entire Soviet military establishment dates from that time. Thus the Administration is not likely to ask Moscow to withdraw its combat unit from Cuba completely. According to a top White House official, the nub of the problem is not the individual troops themselves, but their presence as an organized combat unit. What the Administration wants is for the brigade to be broken up. The official stressed, however, that the U.S. will not offer any concessions to the Soviets in return. There was absolutely no consideration being given, for example, to the U.S.’s withdrawing some of the 1,841 sailors and 432 Marines from its Guantanamo naval training base, located in Cuba, 500 miles from Havana. If the Soviets prove adamant about their brigade, some Administration aides hinted that the U.S. could try to apply pressure to points on the globe where Moscow is particularly sensitive. One possibility that has been mentioned is Afghanistan, where some 80 Soviet advisers have been killed in the mounting struggle between the Moscow-backed regime and Muslim insurgents.

Whatever solution is eventually found for the problem of the brigade, the bargaining with Moscow is certain to be tough. Anticipating this, New York’s Senator Javits echoed the keep-calm approach that Carter advocated in his TV address. Said Javits: “We don’t know a good deal about the basis on which these troops are in Cuba. There is simply too much at stake to jump to conclusions. An issue like this lends itself too easily to jingoism and demagoguery. But now is the moment to look at the entire situation calmly and diplomatically — and above all, to refrain from exacerbating it.”