TURKEY: Eyeless in Ankara

One of the more coddled leaders at Helsinki last week unexpectedly turned out to be Turkey’s Premier Süleyman Demirel. Though President Ford had dozens of other heads of government waiting in line for talks, he reserved a long breakfast one morning in order to urge Demirel unsuccessfully to accept $50 million in U.S. aid. Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev, meanwhile, bear-hugged Demirel amidst hints about a possible Turkish-Soviet arms deal. Never, it seemed, had Turkey cut so important a figure in the complex pattern of East-West relationships.

The reason for the overtures was Demirel’s decision to shut down the highly sophisticated network of U.S. watching and listening posts in Turkey trained on the Soviet Union. That decision came in response to a vote recorded one week earlier in Washington by the U.S. House of Representatives. Despite White House pleas for an end to the six-month-old U.S. embargo on arms sales to Turkey, imposed because Ankara had used U.S. equipment in its invasion of Cyprus, the House voted narrowly (223-206) to maintain the cutoff. A busy and effective Greek lobby figured importantly in the outcome. Furious, the Turks retaliated by assuming administrative control over 25 U.S. installations in Turkey. The decision did not immediately affect some 7,000 U.S. technicians in Turkey, who will remain to perform “housekeeping” duties —chiefly, keeping their sensitive electronic gear in good condition. But Demirel’s move blinded what electronics experts maintain is the most advanced land-based surveillance system in the world.

Before operations ceased last week, the “common defense” bases scattered strategically across Turkey had performed some prodigious feats. Using seven basic facilities backed up by 18 support stations, American technicians developed a system that even the Soviets envied. It accomplished everything from eavesdropping on Russian nuclear explosions and missile launches to copying routine radio traffic between Soviet aircraft and their bases across the Turkish border.

Nuclear Warheads. In addition, a Loran-C station at Karga Burun used its long-range radio signals not only to provide ultra-accurate navigational fixes for U.S. naval ships in the Mediterranean but also to monitor Soviet naval traffic moving into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. Two years ago, U.S. electronic equipment was able to detect the presence of nuclear warheads aboard Soviet freighters moving toward Syria and Egypt in the midst of the October war. After the U.S. ordered a worldwide military alert, American technicians in Turkey recorded the movement of warheads in the opposite direction.

In spite of all this, the move by Turkey’s normally pro-American government generated nationwide support. OUR FLAG IS WAVING OVER THE BASES, said a proud headline in Istanbul’s daily Hürriyet. As Turkish soldiers moved swiftly to assume administrative control, however, there were no alarming signs of anti-Americanism. About the only demonstration worth noting occurred among university students in Istanbul, who had barely finished burning an American flag when Turkish police disbanded them.

Strategically, the closing of the bases is a serious blow to the U.S. and to NATO. Much of the work that the Turkish network performed can be duplicated by spy satellites. But not even the spectacular U.S. “Big Bird” satellite system can hover over a single Soviet installation for hours on end, patiently recording the telemetry on a rocket launch. Moreover, the photographs previously developed at Turkish installations from satellites overhead will now be picked up by stations in Ethiopia, where reception is less clear.

Ankara appears as reluctant as Washington to end once and for all an arrangement that has lasted since the days of John Foster Dulles. But there is always the danger that, as U.S. Ambassador to Ankara William B. Macomber warned last week, “this could turn into a complete termination, not just suspension.” If an accommodation can be worked out in Washington to circumvent the Greek lobby and end the arms embargo, the bases may eventually reopen. The price to the U.S., however, may come high. Ankara is well aware, for example, that while Turkey has been receiving only $40 million a year in aid from Washington as part of its bases agreement, Spain has been raking in ten times that amount in rents for a mere half a dozen naval and air force bases.