Nation: An Embattled Badge of Courage

FOR nearly a decade after a new Special Forces group was set up at Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1952 to cope with guerrilla forces, the organization languished. At first, the group’s members were permitted to wear the Special Forces’ distinctive green berets, borrowed from Britain’s World War II commandos, within the confines of Fort Bragg. In 1956, the headgear was banned altogether because it looked “too foreign.”

President John F. Kennedy, who read James Bond novels and foresaw the need for countering insurgency warfare, particularly in beleaguered Southeast Asia, gave a new lease of life to the Special Forces when he took office. The green beret was reinstated—almost enshrined. Said J.F.K. in 1962: “The green beret is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom.” Around that time, 600 members of the Special Forces were serving as advisers in South Viet Nam. In those palmy days, the Green Berets were the darlings of the New Frontier. At Fort Bragg, they often entertained White House aides and members of Congress with what they called “Disneyland.” It is a stirring demonstration ranging from scuba diving and hand-to-hand combat to archery and rappelling (descending a cliff on a double rope).

The Special Forces now number between 9,000 and 10,000 men. The officers come from other branches of the Army, to which they normally return; the enlisted men, all volunteers, tend to spend their entire military careers in the Special Forces. The operating units are scattered around the continents: 3,000 in South Viet Nam, 400 in northeastern Thailand, 800 in Okinawa, 250 in Bad Toelz just south of Munich in West Germany, 800 in the Panama Canal Zone, and 3,000 in training at Fort Bragg.

Generally, the Green Berets work at a higher Intelligence level than the G-2s (Intelligence chiefs) of the Army and Marines, who are more or less limited to information-gathering. The Green Beret networks have a much wider range and tend, for example, to have closer contacts with the CIA, as was the case at Nha Trang. As the elite of the Army, the Green Berets are highly skilled: the communications men can repair their own radios; the medics are surgeons without diplomas; the demolition men can destroy almost anything. Most are multilingual, and all have had extensive paratroop training.

In Viet Nam, the Green Berets were assigned the task of border surveillance, interdiction of enemy supply routes, attacks and ambushes. In addition, they work with the border natives, mostly Nungs and Montagnards, operating nearly 70 border and highlands camps where a dozen Green Berets will spearhead a force of several hundred irregulars.

There have long been reports that the Green Berets also employ some dirty ways—if occasionally necessary ones. It is as easy to confirm such reports as it is to get the CIA to admit that it engages in spying on other countries. Nonetheless, the Special Forces have been accused of torturing and killing prisoners, parachuting poisoned foodstuffs into enemy camps, and slipping doctored ammunition, designed to explode on use, into enemy arms caches.

Some Army officers feel that the Green Berets may be a little too special. When retired General Harold K. Johnson, former Army Chief of Staff, visited the Green Berets in Viet Nam, he told them: “You are doing a fine job, but there is just too much talent for one thin unit.” His feeling is that the Green Berets skim off the cream of the enlisted men and thus become a talent drain on the rest of the Army. Enough Army officers agree with him to raise the very real possibility that in the wake of the current murder case, the proud green beret may once again fade from prominence.