Foreign Relations: Overtures to the East

There was more symbol than substance in the move. Outside the buildings on Sofia’s Alexander Stambolisky Boulevard and Budapest’s Freedom Square, the LEGATION signs will be taken down as quickly as EMBASSY signs can be found. In both Communist capitals, U.S. ambassadors will replace lesser-ranked envoys. Thus, in agreeing with Bulgaria and Hungary to exchange ambassadors and upgrade legations to embassies, Lyndon Johnson laid in place another span of roadbed for the ever-lengthening “bridges across the gulf” that he is attempting to build between the U.S. and the Communist countries of Europe.

The President unveiled sketchy blueprints for the bridges in Arco, Idaho, last August, when he urged that Washington and Moscow embark on a “common endeavor” toward peaceful cooperation. In New York six weeks later, he went further, describing “a reconciliation with the East” as “one of the great unfinished tasks of our generation.” Since then, the President has eased trade restrictions on the export of more than 400 nonstrategic items to Eastern Europe, approved the opening of a Moscow-New York air route, put discreet pressure on congressional leaders to approve a long-pending agreement to open consular offices in selected U.S. and Soviet cities, and authorized the exchange of weather information with the Russians. Further, he has suggested several more substantive steps: a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe, a treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons, a pact governing the peaceful uses of space, a tariff reduction for the Communist bloc, and the lifting of bans on travel by Americans in Albania, North Viet Nam, North Korea, Cuba and Red China.

Salving the Irritants. Johnson’s attempt to build bridges to the East came none too soon, for the transatlantic spans that have long linked the U.S. and Western Europe are beginning to sag. There was evidence of change everywhere last week: in London, where Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared that Britain wanted to join Europe as a “pillar of equal strength” with the U.S.—and clamp a collar on American investments; in Paris, where Charles de Gaulle, pointedly turning his back on the Atlantic, told visiting Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that “our Europe is a whole” even in Bonn, where West Germany’s new Chancellor declared: “We wish to have relations of trust with every nation, including the East, the Soviet Union.” Europe, in short, may well be on the brink of a major realignment, and Johnson’s maneuvers are designed to guarantee a U.S. role.

The new agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria may help salve several irritants. Hungarians privately insist that the fate of József Cardinal Mindszenty, who became the chief cause of contention between the two countries when he was granted asylum in the U.S. legation during the 1956 Hungarian revolution, no longer interests them—though a 24-hour watch is maintained just in case he should decide to step outside. With Bulgaria, the major issue is Sofia’s stubborn insistence on remaining the only European country that still jams Voice of America broadcasts.

Janus-Faced. Publicly, at least, Johnson’s latest overture to Eastern Europe met with a chilling response. The day the embassy agreement was announced, Hungarian Party Leader János Kádár delivered a savage attack on the U.S. for its “barbarous colonial war” in Viet Nam. But the fact is that for some months the Communist nations of Europe have been Janus-faced about the war—overtly blasting America’s role in Southeast Asia while covertly talking about trade and other areas of understanding with the U.S. The East’s eagerness to reach such agreements became obvious when Washington suggested upgrading the Hungarian and Bulgarian embassies. The two countries happily assented within two weeks—which is almost embarrassing haste as diplomatic exchanges go.