WESTERN EUROPE: The Lonely Dreamer

“I intended to assure France primacy in Western Europe . . . to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic and strategic bloc; to establish this organization as one of the three world powers and, should it become necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps.”

Such, according to his memoirs, was Charles de Gaulle’s dream for France at the end of World War II. And for the last two months De Gaulle has been engaged in an all-out effort to make his dream come true. The heart of his plan to enhance the glory of France:

¶ Establishment of a three-power NATO “super-directorate” composed of France, Britain and the U.S.

¶ Creation of a Western European political confederation dominated by France.

At the Sanctuary. Last week, in his drive to realize his vision, De Gaulle stood alone, if not quite politically isolated, in Europe. Since last July he had been summoning the statesmen of the other Common Market nations to his forested sanctuary at the Château of Rambouillet to explain his proposals. From Italy’s Amintore Fanfani to Luxembourg’s Premier Pierre Werner, his distinguished visitors went away awed but uncowed, concerned and dismayed.

To a man. France’s Common Market partners are displeased by De Gaulle’s cold assertion that their hope of ultimately converting the Common Market into a true European political union is so much supranational moonshine. De Gaulle’s alternative is a confederation of sovereign states whose premiers would hammer out common policy at regular meetings. “A Europe of fatherlands” is the way he sees it. To nearly all the advocates of European unity, this simply seemed a discouraging step backward toward the old-fashioned ententes and alliances of the past.

The smaller Common Market nations, led by the Dutch, were even unhappier at the thought of losing their present small voice in NATO affairs to De Gaulle’s proposed super-directorate. They were distressed by the weakening of the alliance implicit in De Gaulle’s demand for replacement of integrated NATO military forces by independent national commands. On both scores, Washington agrees. Three weeks ago the U.S. quietly informed the NATO Council of its flat opposition to all De Gaulle’s plans for “reforming the alliance.”

Friendly Advice. Convinced that Europe cannot be defended without the U.S., his fellow Common Marketeers are particularly appalled by De Gaulle’s implied intention to set up Europe as a rival, instead of a partner, to the U.S. The British dislike his obvious determination to exclude Britain from his European confederation. More simply, many Europeans feel that De Gaulle’s dreams of grandeur for France, or even for Europe as a whole, are a century out of date.

Despite their irritation at his grand ambition, none of his allies wants to quarrel with Charles de Gaulle. Tactfully handled, even “le grand Charles” can show flexibility; last week, modifying his longstanding refusal to incorporate the French air force into an integrated NATO air defense system, he quietly agreed that French planes in Germany and eastern France should come under NATO control. And recalling the chaos from which he had rescued France, nobody wants to rebuff De Gaulle so sharply as to risk weakening his domestic position.

But at week’s end West Germany’s troubled Chancellor Konrad Adenauer could contain himself no longer. Said Adenauer: “Europe is not as united as it should be. We can do Communism no greater favor than by allowing the political and military ties that bind us to be loosened. We must not allow nationalist feelings to arise against the background of a powerful Soviet Union and Red China. There is no great European power any more. We can save ourselves only by standing firmly together with the U.S.”

It was a measure of the loneliness to which Charles de Gaulle’s international obstreperousness had brought him that the rebuke was delivered by the European statesman who, above all others, attaches almost mystic importance to his nation’s ties with France.

Though De Gaulle may be intent on keeping Britain out of Europe, Britain is not at all sure that it wants to join. Meeting for their annual economic conference in London, the finance ministers of the Commonwealth nations solemnly warned Britain not to seek closer economic ties with Europe at the expense of the preferential tariffs between Commonwealth countries. Bluntly, Canada’s Donald Fleming threatened that if Britain changes its tariffs on Commonwealth goods in order to reach agreement with the Common Market Six, the Commonwealth nations (which currently buy 45% of Britain’s exports) would retaliate in kind. An increasing number of Britons argue that failure to come to terms with the Common Market will ultimately reduce Britain to the status of “Europe’s offshore island.” But British Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd was startled by the vehemence of the overseas ministers, hastily assured them that Britain would consult their governments at every step of any future Anglo-European trade negotiations. One Commonwealth finance minister exulted: “We’ve put the brakes on Britain for at least two or three years.”