ALGERIA: Entr’acte

In five years of bloody rebellion against France, Algeria’s rebels have pitted their ill-equipped guerrilla bands against an army of half a million men armed with everything from flamethrowers to jets. In compensation, the rebels have relied heavily and successfully on a moral weapon: the 20th century’s prevailing anticolonialism. Last week, to their public confusion, the rebels found themselves for the first time at a moral disadvantage.

By offering Algeria a free choice of three alternatives—independence, integration with France, or home rule under France’s wing—France’s President Charles de Gaulle had conceded the principle of self-determination for which the rebel Front de Libération Nationale claimed to be fighting. The result was that most of the world could no longer see any reason for further bloodshed in Algeria.

In France itself, rabid right-wingers quickly formed a new political group, the Rassemblement pour I’Algèrie Française, intent on narrowing the alternatives offered by De Gaulle to one: complete “Francization” of Algeria. But on a tour through northern France last week, it was evident that Charles de Gaulle had France’s masses behind him. In town after town, workers and farmers cheered as the general ringingly declared: “I am sure the French people have approved the determination to solve the Algerian problem by the heart, the soul and free vote of the inhabitants.”

Nudge from Washington. No less important, De Gaulle had many a Foreign Office in his corner. From the U.S., Secretary of State Christian Herter gave the rebels a nudge with his statement that De Gaulle’s “far-reaching declaration” promised “a just and peaceful solution for Algeria.” Even Morocco’s King Mohammed V and Tunisia’s President Habib Bourguiba, long among the rebels’ strongest supporters, were urging the F.L.N. to give De Gaulle “a constructive answer.” Glumly, F.L.N. leaders faced the fact that the resolution condemning French policy in Algeria, which they had confidently expected the U.N. to pass this year, is now far from being a sure bet.

Uncertain how to meet the new pressures, rebel leaders sat in Tunis early last week awaiting the arrival of M’Hammed Yazid, “Minister of Information” in the F.L.N. and its liaison officer at the U.N. Flying in from New York, Yazid suavely brushed off a horde of reporters and sped away in a black Mercedes to a week of discussion with rebel “Premier” Ferhat Abbas and his “Cabinet.” Their talk revolved around two points: if they rejected De Gaulle’s offer out of hand, they would certainly forfeit most of the international sympathy they had won for their cause; but if they accepted all of De Gaulle’s terms, including his refusal to recognize the F.L.N. as spokesman for all Algerians, they would risk loss of their leadership of the Algerian independence movement, perhaps even the defection of their military forces within Algeria.

Implied Price. This week, after all this semipublic backing and filling, the rebels are expected to make their reply: a set of counterproposals including international control of De Gaulle’s proposed Algerian referendum to prevent “French army interference,” and a demand for ironclad guarantees that once the rebels lay down their arms, they will not be subjected to reprisals. And implicit in the F.L.N. offer there is sure to be a proposal for direct cease-fire negotiations between France and the F.L.N.—although the word “negotiations” is unlikely to be used, for fear of creating political difficulties for De Gaulle in France.