National Affairs: Parallel Roads

Dwight Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan met at Aspen Cottage’s hearthside with a common goal: to maintain peace even while preserving freedom. But they differed significantly in their ideas about the best road to travel toward that goal.

To the British, the American position on specific problems often seemed, in latter-day diplomatic parlance, to be “rigid.” To the U.S., the British view sometimes seemed best symbolized by an umbrella and bent toward dangerous compromise. Areas of discussion:

German Reunification. Longstanding U.S. view: “immediate free elections” are a prerequisite to German reunification, a position that John Foster Dulles seemed to modify in a press conference when he said that there were other ways of arriving at reunification. Macmillan view: since Khrushchev will never agree to “immediate free elections,” there is no sense in talking about them in connection with Berlin, as the U.S. insists. British spokesmen last week said that Macmillan had persuaded West Germany’s Konrad Adenauer that reunification should be dropped down on the list of Western priorities. Tentative outcome of the Eisenhower-Macmillan talks: the U.S. may not insist on “immediate free elections,” even while requiring some sort of yet-to-be-defined “free expression” by all the Germans as to their political future. The U.S. may even retreat from its position that a settlement on Berlin requires concurrent settlement of reunification—but this does not mean an abandonment of the reunification principle.

Control of Berlin. Longstanding U.S. view: the West has unimpeachable legal rights and moral responsibilities in West Berlin, which stands as an oasis of freedom in the desert of Communism. Macmillan view: some kind of undefined “internationalization,” e.g., a bringing in of control representatives from neutral nations or a U.N. commission, may be possible. The U.S. still argues that any change in the status of West Berlin must be accompanied, at the minimum, by a similar change for East Berlin.

Recognition of East Germany. Strongly held U.S. view: no diplomatic recognition; the British do not object to giving East Germany control of the access corridors to Berlin so long as the Russians join in guaranteeing the right of access.

Atom-Test Suspension. The U.S. view: either disarmament or test suspension, actually parts of the whole, must be accompanied by foolproof inspection controls. The Macmillan view: much the same in principle—but the British are willing to take greater risks in deciding what constitutes foolproof controls. Says a British spokesman: “The Russians don’t like foreigners swarming around their country. We don’t think they should be allowed to have a veto over inspection, but we think some arrangement can be made so there is no swarming in of foreigners.” Even in its unilateral decision to halt atom tests for a year beginning last October, the U.S. has leaned far—perilously far, think military experts—from its earlier, long-held position.

Armament. Longstanding Allied view: an armed Germany must be the spearhead of NATO forces with U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons. Macmillan view: the West, in pursuit of a Berlin settlement, can afford to discuss 1) a “freeze” of force levels on both sides, with inspection on both sides, and 2) perhaps later a “thinning-out” of both East and West forces in certain unspecified areas. The British say that they would not agree to anything that would tend to increase the Communist balance of military power, believe the East Germans should sign the agreement, say they are not advocating a prohibition on nuclear weapons in Germany. But NATO’s General Lauris Norstad went on record last week with his belief that any move toward thinning out Western forces in Germany would be potentially catastrophic for the West. Result of the Eisenhower-Macmillan talks: strong disagreement on both the freeze and thinning out.