SUEZ: To Teach a Lesson

From all parts of the globe this week, foreign ministers of the world’s major maritime powers converged on London. They were answering a summons from Britain, France and the U.S. to seek ways and means of countering Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal. But many among the 22 powers were plainly sympathetic to Egypt. As for Egypt’s dictator, Gamal Abdel Nasser, he refused to come at all.

Under such circumstances, what were the chances of stopping Nasser, or of teaching him a lesson?

The will was still there—in Britain, France and (as long as the method chosen was peaceful) in the U.S. But the way was not clear. Search as they might, the legal beagles of Downing Street, Quai d’Orsay and Foggy Bottom could find no legal challenge to Nasser’s nationalization of what was in fact an Egyptian company. What they challenged firmly was the way Nasser did it—precipitantly, without negotiation—and why he did it: “To arouse Arab nationalism.”

The very convoking of the conference diminished the first angry passions, giving time for cooler thoughts and, for some, colder feet. British and French politicians reconsidered their shows of militancy and, though not excluding the possibility of force, recognized that without further explanations, the world would not be on their side. Sir Anthony Eden made a somber radio-television broadcast to his countrymen. Said Sir Anthony: “This is a matter of life and death to us all. It may be said: Why is it so terrible to nationalize a company? It was done here. That is perfectly true, but it was done … to our own British industry. Colonel Nasser’s action is entirely different. He has taken over the international company without consultation and without consent.

“Some people say Colonel Nasser has promised not to interfere with shipping passing through the canal. Why therefore don’t we trust him? The answer is simple: look at his record. Our quarrel is not with Egypt, still less with the Arab world. It is with Colonel Nasser.

“When he obtained power in Egypt, we felt no hostility towards him. On the contrary, we made agreements with him . . . Instead of meeting us with friendship, Colonel Nasser has conducted a vicious propaganda campaign against our country . . . And now he has torn up all his country’s promises toward the Suez Canal Company . . . The pattern is familiar to many of us, my friends. We all know it is how fascist governments behave, and we all remember only too well what the cost can be in giving in to fascism. We do not seek a solution by force . . . But this I must make plain: we cannot agree that an act of plunder which threatens the livelihood of many nations shall be allowed to succeed.”

Declaration of Enmity. That was not the language of force, but in the cadences of diplomacy it was almost as severe. Eden had taken his nation far out on a limb: after such talk Britain had either to pressure Nasser into backing down or compromising or it had to work to bring him down, by whatever method it could. The alternative for Britain was a disastrous loss of international prestige. On second thoughts, some British editorialists (though not all: see cartoon) were grateful to Dulles for having postponed a hasty solution by force. In the London Times, veteran Diplomat Anthony Eden got a lesson in diplomacy from one of his former diplomats, Sir Ralph Stevenson (until last year British Ambassador to Egypt). “Action which would result in a legacy of ill will would defeat our object,” wrote Stevenson. “And in politics it is never wise to leave the opposition with no loophole of escape from an untenable position.” Opposition Leader Hugh Gaitskell emphasized that the only kind of military action he would accept must not be unilateral, but under the United Nations.

“No Commitments.” By this point the chief effect of the bearlike threats of Britain and France had been to arouse mounting international pressure against any attempt to settle the Suez crisis by force. John Foster Dulles repeated: the U.S. had made “no commitments of any kind” as to what it would do if war should come. Four days later Dwight Eisenhower declared that the Suez dispute was “one of those things that just has to be settled, and I would like to point out that damage and destruction is no settlement.”

The “nonwhite” nations of the world lined up against Britain and France in a virtually solid front. Iraq, Britain’s strongest ally in the Middle East, announced that it “stands beside Egypt.” And from New Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Nehru sharply chided the “warlike gestures” of Britain and France.

On Notice. Under the combined barrages of so many critics, the British and French governments began to temper their words. Simultaneously, Britain, France and the U.S. circulated among the London conference nations a plan for internationalization of the Suez Canal. Its chief provisions:

¶ Operation of the canal by a nonprofit international body with full control over finances, maintenance and development.

¶ An increased share of canal revenues for Egypt.

¶ Fair compensation to Suez Canal Company shareholders.

This proposal was perhaps the minimum the conference sponsors could exact and still claim to have exerted a check on Nasser. Unhappily, the London conference nations seemed unlikely to reach a reasonable measure of agreement on this or any other plan. India had, in effect, served notice that she would oppose any solution unacceptable to Nasser—and internationalization certainly would be just that. Russia had made it clear that her principal purpose in participating was to fish in troubled waters (see below).

Four Bullets. All the while, Egypt’s Nasser played his cards adroitly. Determined not to give Britain and France clear justification for occupation of the Canal Zone, the Egyptian dictator scrupulously refrained from any interference with canal traffic (766 ships have passed through since the seizure), even went to the lengths of permitting passage of two Israeli-chartered vessels. In an onrush of doubt he conferred hour after hour with the Russian and U.S. ambassadors (separately). He also went conspicuously to see a Jane Russell movie, to show how unworried he was. Simultaneously, he tightened his hold on his countrymen with constant reminders that they are citizens of a threatened nation. In a move which had little military but great propaganda value, Nasser decreed the formation of a new “Liberation Army,” a kind of home guard composed of National Guard units, members of youth groups, lady volunteers and other civilians. At a rifle-practice demonstration, Education Minister Kamal el Din Hussein, commander of the new organization, struck the proper keynote by firing off four symbolic bullets, one each for “imperialism, Israel, Britain and France.” (The U.S. by now was being regarded as almost on the Egyptian side; no longer did the censored Egyptian press print stories about Point Four supplying Egypt with “diseased chickens, goats and bulls.”)

“Collective Colonialism.” As Nasser knew (or was well advised by the Russians), the appearance of moderation on his part at this point was the best way of deflating angry passions in Britain and France. Complained a British Laborite: “Nasser’s behaving like an Anglo-Saxon—we’re behaving like Arabs.” Nasser’s big moment was a press conference this week, attended by 300 newsmen, to announce his decision not to go to London. This was not the screaming, mob-pleasing Nasser but a conservatively dressed, quiet-spoken legalist, who pointed out that “the Egyptian government noticed to its complete surprise that the British government extended the invitations for a conference to consider matters concerning the Suez Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, without consulting Egypt.” Therefore the conference was not a competent body, and “has no right whatever to discuss any matter falling within the jurisdiction of Egypt.”

To replace the London conference, he proposed an Egyptian-sponsored, 45-nation conference to reaffirm the guarantees of free access to the canal first laid down in the Constantinople Convention of 1888. “That agreement would be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.”

His legal position skillfully established, Nasser called the idea of an international agency to run the canal “but a mild word for what should be called collective colonialism,” and denounced Britain and France’s war talk as a threat condemned not only by Egypt but by “all peoples who got rid of colonial rule and who are striving to preserve their hard-won independence.” In the press questioning afterward, a flash of the other Nasser showed: “We must keep our dignity. We are a small country—we will defend ourselves to the last drop of our blood.” As the conference opening approached, the talk of bloodshed was heard less and less. The difficulty remained: How, then, was Nasser to be taught a lesson?