NATO: Atomic Strategy

The strong words of John Foster Dulles dominated the news from Paris. Almost lost in the political reverberation were the conclusions of the military men of NATO, who found themselves “generally satisfied” with NATO’s progress to date.

The year’s commitments of troops, equipment and construction had been about 95% met. The NATO armies now boast about 50 land divisions considered “ready”—that is, on duty now or mobilizable within 30 days. If EDC were passed, NATO could then count on adding twelve West German divisions to the total.

Actually, the present land strength is some 30% less than the goal set when Dwight Eisenhower was Supreme Commander; by periodically trimming strength objectives (which once went as high as 97 divisions), NATO has given the appearance that objectives have been met. This satisfaction with lessened goals is not just a facile rationalization. It represents a change in thinking. NATO planners had arrived at two important conclusions:

¶ The land force, plus the German divisions, would be big enough for its original military purposes—to slow down a surprise Soviet attack—and for what the NATO allies feel able to spend.

¶ The air force is short of desired strength, and its increase by some 1,300 planes—to well over 5,600 planes—should be NATO’s principal aim in 1954.

In its first four years, NATO built up conventional land strength to counter the vast conventional land strength of Russia. But now that atomic advances have heightened the “quality of danger,” the Western allies must turn to the job of improving the quality of defense. The next important NATO project: to adjust to the age of the atom.