Cold War: After Cuba

The cold war will never be the same again.

The struggle that began with the U.S. blockade of Cuba is far from over. But the U.S. took a firm stand and the Russians retreated with abject haste. That fact will be felt on every cold war battleground. At any number of points, Khrushchev can, of course, try to reverse his initial retreat by a counterblow, but any possible move will be harder for him than before the Cuban adventure.

A view of the field, after Cuba:

Berlin is still the West’s most vulnerable position. Washington is convinced that Khrushchev was determined to sign his long-threatened peace treaty with East Germany by year’s end, at which time he hoped to be able to brandish his Cuban missiles to induce Western withdrawal from the city. During the past year the U.S. has confused the Berlin situation by sometimes giving the appearance of frantically looking for a settlement, usually out of step with its Allies—but basically its position is firm. Any Red move to take over Berlin or cut off Western access, whether done abruptly or gradually, will almost certainly mean war with the U.S. The American determination to fight for Berlin carries even greater conviction after Cuba.

South Viet Nam, where the U.S. is deeply committed in a bitter guerrilla war against the Reds, looks far more hopeful than it did a year ago. As the nation celebrated its seventh annual National Day last week, President Diem declared “unwavering faith in the future,” and Sister-in-Law Madame Nhu was on hand in Saigon as a chic, steely illustration of that faith by laying the cornerstone for a new $100,000 social-welfare center. The country’s welfare, social and otherwise, is still heavily at the mercy of the Communists, who demonstrated the fact by throwing a grenade into the independence-day crowds, killing six. But despite serious remaining difficulties, the rural populace is showing greater resistance to enemy guerrillas, who are now losing three weapons for every four they capture; only last year, the ratio was one to two. U.S. advisers are confident that the Viet Cong now have virtually no hope of achieving their goal of setting up a separate, Communist-ruled puppet state in South Viet Nam. After a four-day visit last week, Admiral Harry D. Felt, commander of U.S. Pacific Forces, pronounced: “I find a spirit of optimism in the country.”

Laos has been virtually written off by the U.S. Continuation of its present precarious neutral status would be considered a gain, its loss no great tragedy provided South Viet Nam holds. A strong U.S. military force remains in neighboring Thailand to discourage a Red takeover.

South Korea still lives under the shadow of a Red regime to the north, but under tough little General Park and with strong U.S. military backing—there are still two U.S. divisions there—it is struggling toward stability.

Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu, long the objects of Red designs, now seem relatively secure from attack, thanks partly to determined U.S. intervention in the Formosa Straits four years ago when the Reds shelled the offshore islands, partly because of Red China’s disastrous economic situation. Besides, here as elsewhere in Asia, Moscow could probably score direct gains only in cooperation with

Peking—a prospect that seems as remote as ever. Cuba has raised some fears in the West that Russia and Red China may patch up their differences in the face of mutual foes, but so far, Khrushchev’s performance can only confirm Peking’s view that he is inept and weak. While Russia has been backing China in its invasion of India, this will not endear Moscow to the Afro-Asian nations it has tried so hard to woo.

Turkey has been eroded in recent years by political chaos, a growing Red underground, and economic stress. But it is fiercely anti-Russian, has a crack 450,000-man army, and remains the West’s staunchest ally in the area. Iran has become increasingly conciliatory toward Moscow lately, promised (before the Cuban crisis) never to allow foreign missiles on its soil. Part of the reason lies in the Shah’s annoyance with the U.S. for not giving him all the military hardware he wants. Nevertheless, the country remains a CENTO ally and, short of direct military conquest, is most unlikely to join the Communist camp.

Other Mideast countries offer a checkered picture, ranging from Nasser’s manageable neutralism to relatively stable pro-Western attitudes in Jordan and Lebanon. Weakest spot is Iraq, which is approaching the status of a Russian satellite.

Africa has been a cold war disappointment to the Communists. Western aid and the end of France’s war in Algeria have boosted the free world’s stock, while Russia has suffered damaging setbacks in the Congo, as well as in Guinea, where brazen Soviet meddling in its domestic politics infuriated Marxist-minded Africans. There is little prospect for any Red retaliatory blows in Africa that would seriously bother the West.

Around the world, the issue is “credibility”—at long last, not America’s but Russia’s. Communist credibility has suffered so severe a blow that the whole balance of power between East and West is likely to change. After Cuba, few nations anywhere will rely on Russian promises of protection and alliance—or doubt U.S. determination to make a stand for freedom.