Nation: OUR REAL STRENGTH

In a world of power politics, U.S. foreign policy must depend in the end upon the nation’s military might jor its credibility and influence. To clear the air of any confusion about the strength of the nation’s armed forces and its will to use them, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric last week issued the Administration’s sternest warning yet to Russia about the danger of starting a war, however big or small. Significantly, the speech was approved by both the Department of State and President John F. Kennedy. Excerpts of Gilpatric’s address, given to a meeting of the Business Council in Hot Springs, Va.:

BERLIN is the emergency of the moment, because the Soviets have chosen to make it so. We have responded immediately, with our Western Allies, by reinforcing our garrisons in that beleaguered city. We have called up some 150,000 reservists, increased our draft calls and extended the service of many who are in uniform. These are the so-called quick-fix measures which we have invoked to improve the Western tactical position in Berlin and remind the Soviets that the city is not an open invitation to that variety of aggression which has been described as the salami, or one-slice-at-a-time, method.”

Broadly Based. “But our real strength in Berlin—and at any other point in the perimeter of the free world’s defenses that might tempt the Communist probes—is much more broadly based. Our confidence in our ability to deter Communist action, or resist Communist blackmail, is based upon a sober appreciation of the relative military power of the two sides. The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part. The United States has today hundreds of intercontinental bombers capable of reaching the Soviet Union, including 600 heavy bombers and many more medium bombers equally capable of intercontinental operations because of our highly developed in-flight refueling techniques. Our carrier strike forces and land-based theater forces could deliver additional hundreds of megatons. The number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands; and of course, we have more than one warhead for each vehicle.

“Our forces are so deployed and protected that a sneak attack could not effectively disarm us. The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise attack would be as great as—perhaps greater than—the total undamaged force which the enemy can threaten to launch against the United States in a first strike. In short, we have a second-strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first.

“We must and we do take seriously the Soviet Union’s military technology and the likelihood of future improvements in its nuclear strike posture. We are therefore increasing the survivability of our retaliatory force by programs of hardening, concealment and mobility. We have accelerated deliveries of Polaris submarines and hastened the development schedule for a greatly improved version of the missiles they carry. We have expanded the development of the Minuteman and enlarged its production capacity. We are proceeding with the development of advanced air-to-ground missiles, such as the Skybolt, to extend the useful life of the manned bomber further into the missile age.”

The Hard Facts. “The weapons that form the backbone of our deterrent strength are formidable, and we intend to keep them so. But if we had no effective weapons but the big ones, a small-scale Communist aggression could confront us with a choice between the risk of general war and a political retreat. Hence we are looking to the condition of our conventional forces, so that a potential enemy may not be tempted to steal from under our noses, gambling that we would not call out the weapons of massive nuclear destruction in response to ambiguous aggression or deliberate probing by the enemy. We are seeking flexibility rather than rigidity in the options open to us. This requires a strengthening of conventional, nonnuclear arms: it does not rule out the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war if our interests should so require.

“The Soviets’ bluster and threats of rocket attacks against the free world — aimed particularly at the European members of the NATO alliance — must be evaluated against the hard facts of United States nuclear superiority. The United States does not seek to resolve disputes by violence. But if forceful interference with our rights and obligations should lead to violent conflict — as it well might — the United States does not intend to be defeated.”