Indonesia: Jungle Weariness

For more than three years, almost unnoticed, and with dwindling success, the men who launched the “Colonels’ Revolt” in 1958 have held out in Indonesia’s remote jungles. But last week the revolt finally spluttered to virtual extinction. While President Sukarno preened himself among his neutralist peers in Belgrade, out of the jungle of northern Sumatra marched Rebel “Premier” Sjafruddin Prawiranegra to give up the fight. Surrendering with him were 34 other top officials of the rebel government.

The revolt had got off to a promising start. It was led by some of the nation’s ablest officials, who had been driven to despair by the chaotic rule of affable President Sukarno. From Sumatra to the Celebes, more than 100,000 men flocked to the rebel colors. Demanding more autonomy for the outer islands and prompt suppression of Indonesia’s potent Communist Party, the rebels initially got cloak-and-dagger assistance from Washington’s ubiquitous C.I.A.

Sukarno may be a bumbling administrator, but he is an expert on survival. With the help of one crack but overworked regiment of paratroopers, he quickly routed the Sumatran rebels in half a dozen brief and mostly bloodless battles, and drove the remnants into the hills. In the other islands, Sukarno sent troops against diehard colonels and won submission from pliable ones by giving them a free hand in running their areas once they had given him their allegiance. He also quietly redressed many of the economic grievances that had spurred the revolt.

Holed up in the jungles, the remaining rebel bands soon ran short of money and munitions. With Sukarno’s Russian-supplied navy maintaining an effective blockade, they could not ship out the rubber, copra and coffee from the territories they controlled. Basically, the rebellion failed because Sukarno, however exasperating and muddleheaded, is neither vicious nor ruthless, and does not rouse the passionate indignation needed to fuel a popular uprising.

None of the surrendering rebels will be jailed, and most can probably return to political life within a year or two. In a nation chronically short of competence, they should be cordially welcomed.