Foreign News: A NEW LOOK AT NEUTRALISM

THE year 1960 may come to be known as the year neutralism became respectable. Only four years ago many a small nation felt required to stand up and be counted, either for or against the U.S. John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, condemned “the principle of neutrality [which] pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others.” Such neutralism, warned Dulles, “except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and shortsighted conception.”

Today the U.S. position has radically changed. In Washington last week President Dwight Eisenhower told the delegates of 15 new African nations: “We do not urge—indeed we do not desire—that you should belong to one camp or the other. You cannot afford to waste your money, which is needed to build the hospitals, the schools, the roads that your people need—you cannot afford to put that money into costly armaments.”

Tender Grass. This was heartening news for the world’s neutrals who, in the words of a Burmese diplomat, have sometimes felt like “the tender grass between the feet of two savage buffaloes locked in mortal combat.” At this U.N. session the neutralist nations have thrown themselves between the colossi of East and West in the prayerful hope of ending the cold war. Feelings of alarm swept the uncommitted countries at the table thumpings and rocket rattlings of Nikita Khrushchev. They were dismayed by the parliamentary maneuvering of the U.S., which saw no advantage to “renewed” talks between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

The neutrals have made their weight felt, no longer consider themselves mere spear carriers but movers and shakers.

The neutrals form a U.N. majority of the center, but a negative one, having little in common except neutrality. Some, like Togo, Gabon and Congo, are just emerging from the jungle. Others, like India and Thailand and Burma, feel themselves heirs to ancient civilizations. Sweden and Nor way are welfare states with highly developed technologies, while Afghanistan and Nepal have only begun to brush aside the mists of feudalism. Secretary of State Christian Herter recently, and unnecessarily, abandoned Ghana and Guinea to the Communist camp. Nikita Khrushchev sneers at the Philippines and Argentina as U.S. puppets.

Whatever their differences in outlook, the nations of the center cling to three beliefs: 1) they see the U.N. as the bulwark of their independence, 2) they fear nuclear doom from the angry opposition of East and West, 3) they do not want to be pushed around by the great powers. The Big Five of neutralism—Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India, Nkrumah of Ghana, Nasser of Egypt, Sukarno of Indonesia —are magnetic, colorful and messianic personalities, but too much so. The most effective work has often been done by second-echelon diplomats: men like Burma’s U Thant, Nepal’s Rishikesh Shaha and Tunisia’s Mongi Slim.

The usual mark of the neutral is to abstain on issues tied closely to the cold war. When the Soviet Union moved to debate the flights of the U-2 and RB-47, the U.S. won the balloting 54 to 10, but one third of the U.N. membership abstained, including countries generally considered pro-Western (Austria, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Liberia).

On the Fence. Washington itself has moved closer to Britain’s always pragmatic attitude that, as long as there are fences, there will be fence-sitters and each should be dealt with in terms of his size, influence and fence-sitting position. The British felt that Dulles’ “Neutrality is immoral” policy was unnecessarily dogmatic. Some Britons now think Eisenhower has gone unnecessarily far in the other direction by urging neutrality on the African states. Complained one: “We didn’t bring Nigeria up to be neutral, and we bloody well don’t want her to be neutral.”

Four years ago the U.S. was anxiously instructing all the world’s neutrals in the dangers of Communism, worriedly warned that the devious Communists would worm their way into any neutralist regime and make off with it. The U.S. has learned that a strong nationalist government, firmly rooted in its own people, can defend itself against Communism’s blandishments and pressures, not on behalf of the West but on its own behalf. In their turn, neutralists have watched Communism operate, and learned to be wary. India has learned that Red China talks peace but grabs off border lands that have been traditionally Indian. After the Suez invasion, Egypt’s Nasser accepted the embrace of the Russian bear and has been warily disentangling himself ever since. Iraq’s Karim Kassem cut his nation adrift from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact and welcomed Russian aid. He soon found the Communists were using the situation to dislodge him from power, and has cracked down on domestic Reds and grown more standoffish with the Soviets.

The U.S. now even seems to encourage independence in the Communist camp itself. In the opinion of one State Department official, Tito of Yugoslavia “is the Martin Luther of Communism and it is to our interest to see that kind of Protestantism flourish. We want to make sure Tito stays independent.” Last week Poland’s Gomulka left Manhattan for home, with a promise of a renewal of the most-favored nation status, which has been suspended since 1951.

The Tilt. Do alliances then no longer matter? In general terms, the U.S. would like to keep decisively on its side those nations which border the vast Communist heartland and which present the first barrier against Red seepage. Those nations are most threatened, and their fate is most crucial to the free world. Said the Philippines’ Chief Delegate Francisco Delgado: “We cannot all be neutrals. Some of us have to perform the unpleasant and even dangerous duty of helping to keep the scales of power in equilibrium. The moment these scales are badly tilted one way or the other, the neutrals are not only out of business, but war becomes inevitable.” U.S. concern with Laos results from the fear that, should it fall into Communist hands, Thailand and all Southeast Asia would be instantly threatened.

The neutralism that the U.S. is learning to accept is of the sort the U.S. itself practiced during its early days as a nation: that beneficial isolation which relieves new countries of the risks of associating themselves with big power rivalries. It does not mean neutralism that sees no difference between democracy and Communism. It does mean that the U.S. can support the noncommitment expressed by one Indonesian: “We are not neutralist; we are independent.”