FRANCE: The Denouement

In Paris last week, the Premiers of the twelve African states that belong to the French Community solemnly marched up the steps of the Elysee Palace to the accompaniment, of ruffles and nourishes from the silver-helmeted Garde Republi-caine. When they finally marched down again, the Ivory Coast’s Premier Felix Houphouet-Boigny beamingly announced: “We are unanimous in approving and supporting President de Gaulle in his Algerian policy as he has revealed it to us.” Appetite whetted by such entrancing tidbits, all France waited this week for Charles de Gaulle to disclose his new plan for ending the five-year-old Algerian war.

No one really knew in advance what De Gaulle was planning; at a Cabinet meeting last week, the general coolly informed his ministers that he would show them the speech he intended to make to the nation only on the morning of the broadcast. But the public and politicians felt sure that a “liberal” solution was coming—and everything De Gaulle did last week strengthened that belief. In a move clearly intended to head off potential army resistance, rightist General Andre Zeller, chief of staff of French ground forces, was replaced by Gaullist General Andre Demetz. And to the African Premiers, De Gaulle for the first time used the word “self-determination” in connection with Algeria.

Limited Pacification? From sources close to De Gaulle came predictions that the new plan would offer Algeria alternatives under which “nothing will be excluded—not even independence.” Almost certainly, the general would call for “pacification” as a first step in his plan, if only to keep the touchy and victory-hungry French army behind him. But pacification could fall far short of a fight to the finish; De Gaulle might well decree within the next few months that rebel resistance in Algeria was no longer widespread enough to warrant the title of “civil war,” and that pacification had been achieved.

Best guess was that De Gaulle’s scheme would then provide for “electoral consultation” with the Algerian people to allow them at least limited self-determination of their future relationship with France. Either through a popular referendum or an elected Assembly, Algerians might be permitted to choose among full integration of Algeria with France, some form of regional autonomy within the French Republic, or home rule as a member of the French Community in Africa. In time—perhaps after five years—Algeria might even be granted the right to opt for full independence.

The Gambler. If this was the kind of solution De Gaulle had in mind, he would be taking a mighty gamble. In the army there would be the risk of attempted revolt by officers adamantly opposed to any solution that did not keep Algeria an integral part of France. In De Gaulle’s own Cabinet there would be outraged protests, perhaps even some resignations. And there was considerable doubt that Algeria’s rebel leaders would accept De Gaulle’s plan, however liberal it might prove; De Gaulle could only hope that his proposals would appeal to so many millions of war-weary Moslems that the rebels would in time be forced to come to terms.

But great as the risks of action might be, the risks of inaction were even greater. It was no coincidence that De Gaulle had scheduled his speech for the day after the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, which last year came within one vote of formally condemning French policy in Algeria. And damaging as such an international rebuff would be to De Gaulle’s prestige, it would not be half so damaging as the reaction that might set in amongst Frenchmen themselves if they once lost faith in the general’s capacity to end the Algerian fighting. It was in Algeria that the death of the Fourth Republic began; if human wisdom and effort could do so, Charles de Gaulle intended to see that the death of his Fifth Republic did not also begin there.