THE ARABS: Look Out for Moscow

Take counsel among yourselves, and if they agree with you, well and good; and if otherwise, then put your trust in Allah, and do that which you deem best.

—The Koran

In the biggest crisis in their brief national history, the rulers of the Arab Middle East went faithfully by the Book last week. They took counsel together—and disagreed.

As guests of Lebanon’s President Camille Chamoun, Kings, Presidents and other potentates met secretly in a UNESCO villa on the outskirts of Beirut. Escorted by goggled Lebanese motorcycle cops and gowned Bedouins armed with golden daggers and Tommy guns, Saudi Arabia’s King Saud arrived in a heavily curtained Cadillac. Setting aside old blood feuds, Iraq’s young King Feisal and his cousin, Jordan’s Hussein, Hashemites both, addressed Saud respectfully as “Father.” Syria’s President Shukri el Kuwatly was on hand, freshly back from a visit to Moscow. In this impressive panoply, only Nasser’s Ambassador to Lebanon was on hand to speak for Egypt.

The Old Enemy. The rulers quickly found that they could not even agree on why they met. Egypt and Syria wanted all Arab states to act jointly against the French and British invaders. The Iraqis broke in to say that Israel was a more urgent problem than Suez. “The uprooting of Israel is the only practicable method to secure peace and order in the Middle East,” said the Iraqis, arguing that as long as the Palestine question was left unsettled, the door to Soviet penetration stood wide in the Middle East.

From there on the debate grew hotter and hotter. Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt wanted all Arab states to break off relations with Britain and France unless the invaders pulled out of Egypt at once. But Jordan and Iraq were not yet ready to break with Britain, source of much of their revenues, and Lebanon’s Chamoun did not want to break with anybody. The Iraqis let neighboring Syria know that they were extremely unhappy at destruction of the Iraq Petroleum Co.’s pipeline across Syria. By blowing up three desert pumping stations, the Syrian army cut off 90% of Iraq’s oil output for an estimated six months, at a cost in royalties lost to the Iraq treasury of about $80 million. The Syrians snapped right back at Iraq for keeping its ties with Britain. At one table-pounding session, Foreign Minister Salah el Bitar, another Syrian just back from Moscow, charged that Iraq was Britain’s and Israel’s tool. An Iraqi retorted: “That’s better than being a Communist.”

The New Hero. Following the ancient Arab proverb that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, Syria’s fiery Bitar and Jordan’s fellow-traveling Foreign Minister Abdullah Rimawi demanded some statement of solidarity with Russia for what a Syrian called its “noble and gallant stand” against “imperialist aggression” in Egypt. The other Arab leaders at the conference were in no mood to lean too heavily towards Russia. Even Nasser’s ambassador counseled caution. King Saud warned the Syrians sternly against going too far toward throwing in their lot with Communism. So deep was the conference split that it broke up without ever agreeing on an agenda, and the final communiqué, after denouncing Britain, France and Israel, called conservatively and constructively for a solution of the Suez Canal question through the U.N. “in negotiations between the parties concerned, away from any display of pressure and prejudice and on the basis of the 1888 convention and the six principles laid down by the U.N. on Oct. 16, 1956.”

The Arab nations might cheer Nasser, but it was plain that each would do as the Prophet bade, only that which it deemed best.