YUGOSLAVIA: Tito Talks

From the Poznan riots to the Battle of Budapest, the one voice which should have been heard above the tumult of revolt was that of Yugoslavia’s Marshal Tito. For “Titoism,” if not Tito, was at the bottom of most of the trouble. Yet Tito had little to say while events were going further than he intended. Like any dictator, he wanted no dictation from the streets. Last week Tito spoke.

What impelled Tito to clarify his position was an oblique rumor, reprinted with deliberate intent in Moscow’s Pravda, that the “reactionary fascist uprising” in Hungary was all Tito’s doing. To clear himself of this charge, Tito threw down the compromised Imre Nagy (who had found asylum in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest) : “If his government had been more energetic, if it had not hesitated one time one way and then another, if it had resolutely stood up against anarchy . . . things would have moved in a more correct way.” Tito now supported the Soviet-puppet Kadar regime in Budapest because, “In my opinion they represent that which is most honest in Hungary.”

Justified Mistake. The first Soviet intervention in Budapest, which led to the shooting down of workers, Tito called “absolutely wrong,” brought on by stupid Stalinists not giving in to legitimate complaints. But later “reactionary elements interfered . . -. an unleashed fascist reactionary mob . . . killed Communists.” It was “clear that a horrible massacre, a horrible civil war would result … in which Socialism [Soviet variety] might be completely buried.” Thus the second “Soviet intervention” with tanks to shoot down the rebels was “completely justified.” It was also a “mistake”: some Kremlinists “still believe that military strength solves everything. But just see how a bare-handed and poorly armed people resisted terribly when it had one aim—to free itself and be independent.”

As Tito tells it, a great struggle is going on in the Kremlin between his kind of people and those he calls Stalinists. During his secret talks with Soviet leaders in the Crimea two months ago, he noted that “they began getting colder” toward himself and to earlier suggestions he had made for “democratization” of the Soviet satellite countries. However, he “did not take this too tragically,” because he saw that “this was not the attitude of the entire Soviet leadership, but only of a section which had imposed its will on the others.” In the end, to help them all out, Tito was willing to give his blessing to a tough character named Erno Gero whom the Russians wanted to fob off as a “Titoist” to ease the discontent in Hungary. It was Gero who first ordered the army to fire on the Hungarian rebels.

Said Tito: “It is our tragedy, the tragedy of us all together, that a terrible blow has been dealt to socialism. It is compromised.” Tito meant that he, too, through his dickerings with Moscow, had been compromised.

Inside Game. The Communist play of his speech had a significance of its own. Both the Hungarian radio and Polish press carried excerpts from it. Moscow did not, nor did the Bulgarian, Rumanian or Czechoslovak radios. The Italian Communist press featured it; the French Communist press attacked it. This unusual pattern was an indication of where the tough line was in control, and where it was not.

Still playing an inside game in world Communism, Tito had hopes that the anti-Stalinists in the Kremlin will eventually triumph, though the wounded tone of his speech indicated that the Stalinist gang which is “acting so destructively” is now dominant in Russia, and the result will be “difficult times ahead.” He mentioned no names, but Russian specialists identify the old guard as dominated by Molotov, Kaganovich and Mikhail Suslov.