Foreign News: Fall of Yikiang

It was a bright, sunny day in the East China Sea. There was a tang inthe air and a stiff breeze; the water was choppy but not rough. A goodday it was for yachting, a reporter in Taipei sardonically observed.There were plenty of surface craft in the sea off tiny (little morethan a half square mile) Yikiang Island, but they were not yachts. TheChinese Communists were successfully invading Yikiang —their firstcombat seizure of a Nationalist-held island since 1950.

The 700 “irregulars”—guerrillas, fishermen and observers—inthe Yikiang garrison had no air or sea protection. They had beenrepeatedly shelled from Communist-held Toumen, six miles away. Atmid-morning on the day of the assault, the Reds began shelling the tinyisland from two destroyers, four gunboats and a swarm of patrol boats.At noon 60 Red planes—Russian-built light bombers and fighter-bombers,with MIG jets for top cover—began plastering the Nationalists with500-lb. bombs. Under this rain of fire, the garrison clung to itsburrows; while they were holed up, the invaders came ashore from aswarm of armored, motorized junks.

Washington intelligence estimated the attacking force at regimentalstrength (which would be 2,500 on the Chinese scale). They heavilyoutnumbered and soon overwhelmed the Nationalists. At dusk, the bigNationalist garrison on Upper Tachen, eight miles away, could stillhear machine-gun fire. But later in the night silence fell on Yikiang.Next day the triumphant Reds sent 100 planes to bomb the Tachens—oneof the largest raids of the island war.

Shock Wave. Yikiang (full name: Yikiangshan, meaning “one-rivermountain”) is no great strategic loss, as the U.S. Administrationhastily pointed out, but the psychological shock was severe.

The Chinese Reds had apparently studied the U.S. Marines’ technique ofcombined operations—land, sea and air—and their seamanship was goodenough for the job.

They not only dared; they succeeded. The seizure of the unimportantisland quickly raised important questions.

Aside from Formosa and the Pescadores, which the U.S. is committed todefend, the Nationalists hold four groups of small islands, scatteredalong 400 miles of the Chinese coast: the Tachens, the Nanchis, theMatsus and the Quemoys {see map). The Tachens are the hardest todefend, since they are almost out of combat range for Nationalistplanes from Taipei. Conversely, they are much too far from Formosa tobe steppingstones for a Red approach to the Nationalist stronghold:their principal value is as an early radar warning post for air attacksfrom the North. The Pentagon considers the Tachens “valuable butnot vital.” They have one small airfield which cannot now be usedbecause of artillery from Yikiang; there is a second-rate radarstation. Believing the Tachens expendable, the Pentagon says that itlong ago tried to persuade the Nationalists to withdraw from them. Lastweek, after the fall of Yikiang, the U.S. pulled out its small militaryadvisory group on the Tachens and brought pressure on Chiang towithdraw the garrison (one full division) and some 8,000 civilians.

Valuable Quemoy. The other island clusters are easier for Nationalistplanes to protect, but none except the Pescadores are steppingstones toFormosa.

Quemoy, however, is uniquely useful to the Nationalists as a harassingbase, since it is only five miles (easy artillery range) from the bigCommunist port of Amoy, and so prevents the Reds from making full useof Amoy harbor.

Last September the Reds shelled Quemoy heavily, in what looked like theprelude to attack, but they have failed—so far—to follow through.U.S. strategists are inclined to agree with the Nationalists thatQuemoy must be held. Chiang Kai-shek’s government demanded a firm andpublic pledge by the U.S. to defend Quemoy. President Eisenhower’smessage this week to Congress implied that Quemoy would be defended.