National Affairs: GREATEST & LAST BATTLE OF A NAVAL ERA

THE greatest battle in the history of naval warfare, which destroyed the Japanese fleet and swept clear the sea roads to the Philippines and Tokyo, raged across 500,000 square miles of churned and bloodied Western Pacific Ocean 15 years ago this week. This was the Battle for Leyte Gulf, which pitted the U.S. fleets supporting General Douglas MacArthur’s landings on the island of Leyte against all the naval might that the crumbling Japanese Empire could salvage for a desperate last stand.

It was the grand climax to the most massive naval campaign ever, a campaign that led through Coral Sea, where the drive toward Australia was thrown back; through Midway, where the threat to Hawaii was decisively broken; through the “Marianas Turkey Shoot” (the Battle of the Philippine Sea), which broke the back of Japanese naval airpower. The relentless surge had driven the Japanese back to a final line of defense that included the home islands themselves, and hinged on the Philippines.

Against U.S. landings on Leyte, the Japanese had prepared a plan known as SHO-1, aimed at bringing “general decisive battle.” SHO1 called for a pincers movement against the U.S. landing forces in Leyte Gulf. The strongest Japanese force, under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, was to steam through the Sibuyan Sea, debouch through San Bernardino Strait (see maps) and head south to Leyte Gulf. Two smaller forces, operating independently under Vice Admirals Shoï Nishimura and Kiyohide Shima, were to come through Surigao Strait, move north and close the pincers with Kurita. Meanwhile, a fleet under canny old Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, with carriers for bait, was charged with decoy duty to “advance into Philippine Sea east of Luzon” and “lure the enemy to the north.”

Screening the Leyte landings were two great U S. fleets: the Seventh, attached to MacArthur under Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid. and the Third, reporting to Admiral Chester Nimitz 5,000 miles away in Hawaii and carrying the flag of Admiral William F. (“Bull”) Halsey.

On Oct. 17, within nine minutes after the U.S. cruiser Denver fired the first shot in the bombardment that prepared the way for MacArthur’s amphibious attack, the Japanese naval command radioed: SHO1 OPERATION ALERT. Next morning came the order: EXECUTE. The Japanese fleets began converging on Leyte Gulf and the four mighty engagements that lay ahead.

Battle of the Sibuyan Sea

As Kurita’s powerful fleet steamed through Palawan Passage toward the Sibuyan Sea early on the morning of Oct. 23, it was flushed by patrolling U.S. submarines Darter and Dace. The subs attacked. Before they were through, they had crippled heavy cruiser Takao, sunk heavy cruiser Maya and Kurita’s flagship, heavy cruiser Atago. Kurita himself had to swim to save his skin. A Japanese destroyer picked him up, and he sailed on, still in command of five battleships, seven heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eleven destroyers.

Alerted by the submarines’ contact reports, Bull Halsey ordered his carriers to launch air strikes against Kurita’and opened the Battle of Sibuyan Sea on Oct. 24. In all, Halsey’s planes made 259 sorties, sinking battleship Musashi, putting heavy cruiser Myoko out of action and damaging several others. (Halsey’s carrier Princeton was fatally wounded by a land-based Japanese Judy, the only one of scores of Philippine-based planes to score.) As the battle went against him, Kurita reversed course, as if retiring, then turned back toward San Bernardino Strait. By now he was seven hours behind schedule—and the Japanese plan had been thrown completely out of whack.

But there was a real Japanese plus in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea: Halsey mistook Kurita’s original reversal of course for genuine retirement, believed the overenthusiastic damage reports of his carrier pilots, and decided Kurita was out of the fighting. Meanwhile, Halsey had discovered the approach from the north of Admiral Ozawa—thanks to Decoy Ozawa’s zealous efforts to get himself found. Jap carriers? They were Halsey’s meat. With a blurry and misunderstood message to Seventh Fleet, he ordered his entire Third Fleet to head north after Ozawa—leaving San Bernardino Strait wide open for Kurita.

Battle of Surigao Strait

Despite the upset of the Japanese timetable, the southern forces under Nishimura and Shima sailed right on. Nishimura had two battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers; Shima, behind him, had two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and four destroyers. Awaiting them at the far end of Surigao Strait was a much stronger Seventh Fleet force under Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf. Alerted by PT-boat reports, Oldendorf was ready.

On the night of Oct. 24, Nishimura tried to run Oldendorf’s gantlet, suffered six murderous destroyer attacks, steamed on toward Oldendorf’s battle line with only battleship Yamashiro, heavy cruiser Mogami and destroyer Shigure still in action. Oldendorf had achieved the naval commander’s dream: with his battle line he had capped the T of Nishimura’s little column. At 0419 Yamashiro went down, taking Admiral Nishimura with her. Mogami got away but was sunk in the pursuit that came later, leaving Shigure the only ship afloat of Nishimura’s force.

Admiral Shima followed in Nishimura’s wake, fired torpedoes at an island which he thought to be a ship, and fled without coming under fire—colliding with crippled Mogami in the process. Relentlessly pursued by U.S. air and sea forces, Shima got home with only one heavy cruiser and two destroyers.

The Battle of Surigao Strait was the last time the historic battle line formation was to be used in naval warfare, and Naval Historian Samuel Eliot Morison writes its epitaph: “One can imagine the ghosts of all great admirals from Raleigh to Jellicoe standing at attention as Battle Line went into oblivion.”

Battle off Samar

At 0630, Oct. 25, the Seventh Fleet’s 16 escort carriers—”baby flattops”—of Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague’s Task Group 77.4 were operating off Samar without knowing that 1) Halsey had taken off after Ozawa or 2) Kurita had come through unguarded San Bernardino Strait and was only minutes over the horizon. A half-hour later, Kurita’s shells began splashing around “Taffy 3,” one of Task Group 77-4’s three task units, under Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague.

Taffy 3’s situation was desperate: its six little carriers (each with a single 5-in. gun), three destroyers and four destroyer escorts made no match for Kurita. All “Ziggy” Sprague could do was to make smoke, launch his aircraft and run for his life. In the running fight, Kurita lost three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. But Sprague lost two destroyers, a destroyer escort, one baby flattop (another, the St. Lo, was sunk later by a Japanese kamikaze). He took hits on two carriers, a destroyer and destroyer escort and seemed doomed to far worse. Then came an amazing turnabout. Still recovering from his swim off Palawan Island, bedeviled by the destroyers, Kurita broke off the action, headed back through San Bernardino Strait. Said Admiral Clifton Sprague later: “The failure of the enemy … to completely wipe out this task unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counterattack . . . and the definite partiality of Almighty God.”

Battle off Cape Engaño

All the while, Halsey was hallooing after Ozawa with the mightiest force afloat: Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher’s Task Force 38, with five fleet carriers, five light carriers, six new battleships, two heavy cruisers, six light cruisers and 40 destroyers. Ozawa had one fleet carrier, three light carriers, two battleships converted into carriers, three light cruisers, nine destroyers.

Mitscher launched his first strike at 0540, Oct. 25; during the day Task Force 38 planes made 527 sorties, sank three carriers and a destroyer and crippled a fourth carrier. U.S. surface ships and submarines sank the crippled carrier, a light cruiser and a destroyer. But Bull Halsey was not around for the slaughter; for hours he had been getting urgent queries as to his whereabouts, desperate requests for help off Samar. At 1055 Halsey gave in to the pressure, ordered a large part of his force to turn back south —and went with them. By the time he got back to Leyte Gulf, the great battle was over. With it died the Japanese navy and any chance that it could protect Japan’s island lifeline.