THE PISTOL AND THE CLAW: New military policy for age of atom deadlock

ON the day after Hiroshima, men began speculating on a future when two or more nations would be able to blow each other up. The appalling prospect formed a rim on the horizon; imagination would not penetrate beyond it. But when horizons are closely approached they always disclose new horizons farther on.

Now the world is only a few steps (perhaps four or five years) away from absolute atomic deadlock, the point where the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could destroy each other in all-out war, no matter which held a slight advantage and no matter which shot first.

As what was once a dim prospect takes the form of hard reality, strategic planners see that atomic deadlock does not offer a stark, final choice between absolute mutual destruction and perpetual peace based on absolute mutual fear.

Speculation about the military landscape beyond 1960 begins to be filled with quite definite shapes of other alternatives, new ways of war that will be conditioned by new technological possibilities and by the political and strategic consequences of the top-level deadlock. Beneath that uneasy firmament the struggle between the free and Communist worlds will go on. Nations and whole continents may be won or lost—indeed either side may meet final defeat—without recourse to the ultimate attack.

In recent months this new basic concept of the military future has stirred the Pentagon to the depths. Signs of the new view appear in the current budget estimates and even in statements of foreign political policy. An examination of the new prospect can be made without recourse to secret material. Such a survey falls into two parts: ¶ Establishing the fact that absolute atomic deadlock is a real possibility for the near future.

¶ Pulling together public technical and military information and examining it in the light of possible deadlock in the absolute weapons.

THE APPROACHING DEADLOCK

AN analogy, currently popular in military circles, goes back to the nation’s frontier days. Two men, their faces twisted in hatred and fear, confront each other across a card table. Each holds a revolver within inches of the other’s breast, pointed unwaveringly at the heart. There they sit, each with the sure power to cause instant death, yet afraid to squeeze the trigger. For the one who shoots first will himself be killed—by the reflex action of a dying man.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union already are near a stage where each has the power to smash the other into radioactive rubble. Yet with hundreds of bombers soon to be poised for instant take-off with thermonuclear bombs, neither nation could be confident of its power to stay the other’s deadly reflexes.

Intercontinental missiles will hasten the day of deadlock already implicit in intercontinental airplanes with hydrogen bombs. For several years, the U.S., complacent of its ability to stay ahead of Russia in all things technological, has been daintily fingering missile projects.

Its smugness was roughly shattered last year by intelligence reports of a Soviet breakthrough: the development of a rocket engine with a thrust of at least 240,000 Ibs., which could be used as part of the power plant for a multi-stage intercontinental missile.

With that chilling report, an old Air Force program called Atlas was revived and thrown on a crash priority basis.

Working also with such missile prototypes as the Northrop “Snark” and the North American “Navaho” (which have intercontinental range, but at speeds only comparable to current bomber types), the U.S. may be catching up. The prospect is that by 1960 both the U.S. and the Soviet Union will have missiles that can carry hydrogen pay loads at 10,000 m.p.h. with a range of some 5,000 miles.

Missiles have a highly pertinent advantage over bombers, which need huge runways and surrounding installations. For the vast dispersion possibilities of missile launchers will greatly increase the reflex potential of any nation that is attacked.

The intercontinental missile makes complete and inescapable the analogy of the card players, as far as the card-player scene goes. But card players cannot sit there forever, or alone. They must have friends to bring them food, allies whom they can inspire or intimidate to action outside the deadlock. And the atomic adversaries, unlike the pistol-bound card players, have means other than their main weapons with which they can claw at each other.

The tableau of international deadlock will not stay frozen. The goal of Communism is world domination. Atomic stalemate cannot change that goal; it can merely force a switch in method. The era of strategic deadlock is less likely to see a peaceful world than a busily vicious one, boiling with limited wars. These will not necessarily be little wars. The only limitation is on the use of the ultimate strategic weapons against the Russian and American homelands. This development has been thoroughly previewed. When they were far behind in the collection of nuclear tools, when they knew the U.S.

could destroy them, the Communists attacked in Korea. The U.S. limited its reply. Korea behind them, the Communists redoubled their interest in Indo-China. The U.S. answered with a threat of “massive retaliation”—which was not carried out. In those cases, the Reds relied on a U.S. reluctance which will be obviously much stronger when, by 1960, the Russians possess the means of annihilating the U.S.

A recent paper by the Center of International Studies at Princeton is regarded among Pentagon planners as the best statement of the danger of overdependence on the doctrine of massive retaliation. Korea and Indo-China, says the paper, are symbols (especially to the Communists) of how a nation that can massively retaliate may yet be challenged successfully. In the long run, the erosion of repeated U.S. failures of the Indo-China type could be nearly as disastrous as all-out thermonuclear war. Therefore the U.S. must do more than maintain its strategic deterrent: it must also establish a tactical deterrent. It must be able to punish local aggressions with such speed and force that the Communists will finally call a halt. This is the concept of the double deterrent to the wars of tomorrow. To the essential capacity of pulverizing the U.S.S.R. by thermonuclear strategic attack must be added a tactical claw —swift, deadly, flexible.

BEYOND THE DEADLOCK

AS general theory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have accepted the idea of the double deterrent. Once the necessity and function of the tactical claw are grasped, some of its future characteristics become immediately apparent. Two essentials toward meeting the requirements of the claw are massive airlift and the determination—preferably the advertised determination—to use tactical atomic weapons. Despite opposition, the decision to use atomic weapons in limited wars seems to have been made. Secretary Dulles has said: “The present policies will gradually involve the use of atomic weapons as conventional weapons for tactical purposes.” This week JCS Chairman Arthur Radford said that the U.S. is ready to use the atomic weapon to repel any new aggression in Korea.

Within the framework of the tactical-deterrent concept, how will the wars of tomorrow be fought? How will the tactical claw be used to rip the enemy? As of now, there can be no hard and fast answers, and experiments must be secret.

But the general political situation can be foreseen, and the technological possibilities are more or less known. Between them, they suggest some of the likely elements in the future development of the claw.

Air Strike. The first crackle of Red guns in remote lands will be the signal for the U.S. to smash back on the ground, from the sea and in the air. But the initial shock will still be borne by troops of the attacked nation. They should be trained and equipped by the U.S. for a limited mission: that of keeping communications lines open, forcing enemy troop concentration, and hanging on for dear life until help arrives.

That help will not be long in coming.

Within minutes after the first alarm flashes into a central control headquarters of the U.S. Tactical Air Force, strike squadrons will be ready for almost immediate departure. They will be mostly based in the U.S., with only token forces (which, in the atomic age, can still pack an awful wallop) scattered around the world. The tactical squadrons will bear little resemblance to the one-purpose units of the past. Each will consist of 30 or more bombers, fighter-bombers, airborne tankers, cargo planes and communications aircraft. These will be welded in teams that can perform any tactical mission and can sustain themselves under battle conditions for at least 30 days without additional logistic support.

Already available to TACair are such items as “flyaway kits”—giant parcels containing enough spare aircraft parts to maintain a squadron for a month or more.

Also packed in the bellies of the huge cargo planes will be necessary food, light kitchen equipment and clothing.

The basic TACair battle units might be four fighter-bombers. One will carry the atomic weapon. Another will act as cover-man and possibly carry a high-altitude precision bombsight. The others will serve as tankers for the first two, and will themselves be refueled from a C-130 tanker a safe distance away from the battle area.

Air-to-air guided missiles will be of key importance in seizing command of the air.

The U.S. Navy, for example, now has in production the Sperry “Sparrow,” a lethal little air devil that, rocket-powered and fully maneuverable at supersonic speeds when fired from jet aircraft, is electronically guided to seek out and destroy enemy planes. Also promising are missiles in the Boeing F99 Bomarc category—pilotless fighters that may one day carry.

several of their own air-to-air missiles. Air Force Chief Nathan Twining says: “Mis siles will be launched from airplanes as well as against airplanes, and planes will be used to find and attack missiles while missiles are being used to find and attack planes.” To achieve real tactical flexibility, however, TACair faces the challenge of vastly reducing required runway lengths. Assistant Navy Secretary James H. Smith Jr.

said recently: “Let me assure you that we know exactly what size bomb to use to lower the center of any man-made runway in the world to a depth of 100 feet. And you can be sure that any runway sunk that far will stay sunk.” The Communists can be expected to have the same capability to render runways useless. Solving this problem is now a high priority TACair project, and one that has every prospect of success.

Sea PuncL As for the Navy, its task force of the future will be a far cry from the massed 100-ship armadas of World War II. Consisting of perhaps twelve vessels, each task force will be dispersed over an ocean area the size of Maine. Not more than one ship could be knocked out by the blast of any existing weapon. Somewhere—and the “where” will constantly change—within a massive defensive pattern will be the supercarrier, possibly with nuclear propulsion. From its deck will speed supersonic A-bombers (the Navy has great hopes for its new jet A4D Skyhawk) to furnish tremendous tactical firepower wherever needed.

Protecting the carrier will be the primary responsibility of the other fighting ships. Cruiser-based helicopters will drag sonic ears in the water, hunting out enemy submarines and killing them with such air-to-underwater guided missiles as the Fairchild “Petrel.” Complex electronic detection systems will warn the task force of approaching enemy aircraft. From guided-missile destroyers and cruisers like the Boston and the Canberra (both scheduled to join the fleet this year) will storm fire screens of needle-nosed, radar-controlled “Terrier” missiles (successfully used in fleet exercises last year). Accompanying the force will be atom-powered submarines, e.g., the Nautilus, to move close to target areas and launch nuclear missiles.

The mission of the task force will be to 1) provide heavy firepower support to the fighting fronts, and 2) keep vital sea lanes open.

A highly promising new piece of Navy equipment is to be unveiled this week in the form of the Martin XP6M “Seamaster.” planned as a 600-m.p.h. jet seaplane with a range of some 2,000 miles and the ability to carry nuclear or thermonuclear payloads. Units of three or four Seamasters could be based in lagoons, estuaries, gulfs and bays within striking distance of danger spots.

Technically operating under the Navy, but actually a most independent branch of the military, the U.S. Marine Corps is teeming with new ideas. It is the open intention of the Marines to move toward the ability to carry all their fighting men in helicopters. They would be supported by nuclear bombs, rockets and artillery fire so as to create atom-scourged “beachheads” up to 70 miles inland. Having landed, some of the troops would secure supply and communications lines by moving back to the real beaches through “atomic sanitized corridors.” Ground Power. The U.S. Army is sure to have a role in the development of the claw. But ground-war planners have had less success than their Air and Navy colleagues in grouping their ideas around a central definition of the Army’s responsibility in the wars of tomorrow. Lacking a clear mission, Army planners have been notably unable to convince the budgeteers.

Result: of all the services, the U.S. Army this year received the harshest manpower slashes, and also suffered deep cuts in funds for its precious research and development program.

Nevertheless, present and imminent technological developments offer a fair picture of what the Army may look like.

The first requirement, without which all else becomes moot, is enough airlift to transport quickly at least four strategic divisions and all their fighting tools from U.S. staging areas to any part of the globe. To achieve maximum effectiveness and security once in the arena of war, Army planners have evolved a “cellular” —as opposed to the traditional linear—system of offense. It will permit only 2,000 men in an area occupied by 8,000 to 10,000 in World War II. Such dispersion will impose heavy demands on communications, so the Army is developing what it calls “battlefield surveillance.” This consists of sonic and electronic detection gear that will instantly track and report coordinates locating the origin of enemy fire. Recording devices could be planted along unprotected fronts to flash to control centers all unusual noises or movements on the ground and in the air. Some of the devices may detect the presence of enemy patrols and report their direction and approximate size. In control centers —probably electronics-packed trailers—communications men will receive the reports on oscilloscope-type screens.

Surface-to-surface missiles will add new sock to the Army’s firepower punch.

Among these is the “Honest John,” already in the hands of troops. Mounted on a highly mobile, self-propelled launcher.

Honest John is a freeflight artillery rocket that can carry atomic warheads some 15 miles. Another is the “Corporal.”which can be guided by remote control to targets 100 miles away.

The breakthrough into new military ideas was long overdue. In the last decade the U.S. spent $327 billions on defense, but had no military doctrine for anything short of World War III. The age of the double deterrent, of the pistol and the claw, is not a pretty prospect. But it is a prospect—and one around which a rational military policy can be built.