National Affairs: THE OPPENHEIMER CASE

IN its 992 pages of fine print, the Oppenheimer case transcript contained ample evidence to show why the Atomic Energy Commission’s personnel security board reached a 2-1 decision that Physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance should be revoked.

Basically, Oppenheimer’s case was what he had outlined in his earlier, eloquent statement to the AEC (TIME, June 14). He had been a “fellow traveler,” an active Communist fronter from late 1936 until around 1942, but all that was behind him. He had been a loyal citizen, working hard for his Government ever since he went to work on the atomic bomb in 1942. To support their case, Oppenheimer’s lawyers had called in an impressive list of character witnesses. Notable on the list were men who had worked above Oppenheimer, including some who had a measure of responsibility for what he did, and they expressed broad-gauge opinions. Among them were:

¶New York Banker Gordon Dean, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1950-53. Dean had suffered some doubts about Oppenheimer’s “very unpleasant early associations,” but finally had concluded that the physicist was “a man of complete integrity … a very devoted man to his country.”

¶Vannevar Bush, director of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II, now president of the Carnegie Institution. Bush had “complete confidence in Oppenheimer’s loyalty, judgment and integrity.” But he would not presume to prejudge the case before the board.

¶ Dr. James B. Conant, United States High Commissioner for Germany, former president of Harvard University. Conant still subscribed to a statement he had made about Oppenheimer in 1947: “A more loyal and sound American citizen cannot be found in the whole United States.”

¶Dr. Norris Edwin Bradbury, professor of physics at the University of California, who was selected by Oppenheimer as his successor at the Los Alamos atomic project in 1945. Once a graduate student under Professor Oppenheimer at California, Bradbury had found his old teacher “extremely helpful and cooperative,” and “completely loyal to his country.” He did not think that Oppenheimer had done anything to slow down development of the hydrogen bomb.

¶ General Leslie R. Groves, vice president of Remington Rand, wartime head of the Manhattan Project, who had appointed Oppenheimer director at Los Alamos in 1943. Groves was cautious. Oppenheimer had done a “magnificent job” at Los Alamos, but “you must remember that he left my control shortly after the war was over.” While Oppenheimer “did not always keep the faith with respect to the strict interpretation of the security rules,” neither did other leading scientists.

When he appointed Oppenheimer, he was aware that there were suspicions, but he was not aware of all the derogatory material in the Atomic Energy Commission’s bill of particulars for this hearing. If he had to make the same decision again, under the same conditions, he would appoint Oppenheimer. “In general, my policy was to consider the fact that the man was already in the project, and that made it very questionable whether I should separate him, and also whether I should separate him under what might be termed unpleasant conditions, because then you never know what you are going to do to him. Are you going to drive him over to the other side or not?”

A Piece of Idiocy. Despite the array of testimonials, the record contained evidence that clearly gave the board majority serious doubts about Oppenheimer as a security risk. In the list of witnesses against J. Robert Oppenheimer, the most effective was J. Robert Oppenheimer himself. His testimony showed that he had lied repeatedly in the past about important security matters. What he said in the hearing caused the board to comment, mildly enough, that Oppenheimer was even now being “less than candid.” The most telling example of Oppenheimer’s past capacity for untruths was drawn out in cross-examination about his relationships with his good friend Haakon Chevalier, a linguist who was once a professor at the University of California.

Chevalier was, by Oppenheimer’s own testimony, a “fellow traveler” and “quite a Red.” Oppenheimer’s story about a key incident with Chevalier was brief enough.

Security Board Counsel Roger Robb*: Would you begin at the beginning and tell us exactly what happened? Oppenheimer: Yes. One day … in the winter of 1942-43, Haakon Chevalier came to our home. It was, I believe, for dinner, but possibly for a drink. When I went out into the pantry, Chevalier followed me or came with me to help me. He said: “I saw George Eltenton [a Russian-trained scientist] recently.” [He said that] Eltenton had told him that he had a method … of getting technical information to Soviet scientists. He didn’t describe the means. I thought I said, “But that is treason.” I’m not sure. I said anyway something, “This is a terrible thing to do.” Chevalier said or expressed complete agreement. That was the end of it. It was a very brief conversation.

But the full story of the incident was not so brief. Not until the next August—more than half a year after the incident occurred—did Oppenheimer say anything about it to security officers. And when he did, by his own testimony, he “invented a cock-and-bull story.” Among the several officers he admitted lying to were General Groves and Colonel Boris T. Pash, an Army counterintelligence officer.

Security Board Counsel Robb: Did you tell Pash the truth about this thing? Oppenheimer: No.

Q: You lied to him?

A: Yes.

Q: What did you tell Pash that was not true?

A: That Eltenton had attempted to approach three members of the project . . . through intermediaries . . .

Q: So that we may be clear, did you discuss with or disclose to Pash the identity of Chevalier?

A: No.

Q: Let’s refer for the time being to Chevalier as X.

A: All right . . .

Q: Didn’t you say that X approached three people?

A: Probably.

Q: Why did you do that, Doctor?

A: Because I was an idiot.

Q: Is that your only explanation, Doctor?

A: I was reluctant to mention Chevalier … no doubt somewhat reluctant to mention myself.

Q: But why did you tell him that Chevalier had gone to three people?

A: I have no explanation for that except the one already offered . . .

Q: Did you tell Colonel Pash that X had spoken to you about the use of microfilm?

A: It seems unlikely. You have a record, and I will abide by it.

Q: If X had spoken to you about the use of microfilm, that would have shown definitely that he was not an innocent contact?

A: It certainly would.

Q: Did you tell Colonel Pash that X had told you the information would be transmitted through someone at the Russian Consulate?

(No reply.) Q: Did you? A: I would have said not, but I clearly see that I must have.

Q: If X had said that, that would have shown conclusively that it was a criminal conspiracy, would it not? A: That is right.

Q: Did Pash ask you for the name of X? A: I imagine he did.

Q: Don’t you know that he did?

A: Sure.

Q: Did he tell you why he wanted it? A: In order to stop the business . . .

Q: And didn’t you know, Doctor, that by refusing to give the name of X you were impeding the investigation? A: I must have known that . . .

Q: Why did you go into such great circumstantial detail about this thing if you were telling a cock-and-bull story?

A: I fear this whole thing is a piece of idiocy. I’m afraid I can’t explain why there was a consul, why there was microfilm, why there were three people on the project, why two of them were at Los Alamos . . .

Q: Isn’t it a fair statement to say, Dr. Oppenheimer, that, according to your testimony now, you told not one lie to Colonel Pash but a whole fabrication and tissue of lies?

A: Right . . .

While the whole “cock-and-bull story” had a ring of the past in it, Oppenheimer’s association with the Red-tainted Chevalier did not. He testified that when he was in Paris last December, he and Mrs.

Oppenheimer saw Mr. and Mrs. Chevalier on two occasions, had dinner with them one evening.

“A Better Summary.” In his defense against the charge that he delayed the development of the hydrogen bomb, Oppenheimer was also a bad witness for himself. In the past he had maintained that he, as chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, had not opposed the hydrogen bomb. What he was against, he insisted, was a “crash program” to build the bomb in a hurry, with very high priorities which he felt might inter fere with A-bomb production. But he ran into difficulty as Security Board Counsel Robb cross-examined him.

Robb: Doctor, is it a fair summary of your answer . . . that what the GAC opposed in its October 29, 1949 meeting was merely a crash program for the development of the Super [the H-bomb]? Oppenheimer: Yes, I think it would be a better summary to say we opposed this crash program as the answer to the Soviet atomic bomb.

Q: What did you mean by a crash program?

A: On the basis of what was then known … a commitment be made to build this thing irrespective of further study and with a very high priority, a program in which alternatives would not have an opportunity to be weighed . . .

Q: Doctor, isn’t it true that [you wrote] the report of the GAC?

A: I wrote the main report. Yes.

Q: Isn’t it true that the report of the GAC and the annex to which you subscribed unqualifiedly opposed the development of the Super at any time?

A: At that time.

Q: At any time?

A: No, at least let us say we were questioned about that in a discussion with the commission, and we made it clear that this could not be an unqualified and permanent opposition . . .

Q: Didn’t the annex to which you subscribed say in so many words: “We believe a super bomb should never be produced”?

A: Yes, it did.

Q: Do you interpret that as opposing only a crash program?

A: No. It opposed the program.

On the question whether the GAC was unanimous in its opposition to the development of the hydrogen bomb, Dr. Oppenheimer had additional difficulty.

Robb: Now I have a note here, Doctor, that you testified that there was a surprising unanimity, I believe that was your expression, at the GAC meeting of October 29, 1949, that the United States ought not to take the initiative at that time in an all-out thermonuclear program. Am I correct in my understanding of your testimony?

A: Right.

Q: In other words, everybody on the committee felt that way about it?

A: Everybody on the committee expressed themselves that way.

Q: How many people were on the committee?

A: There were nine on the committee.. One man was absent in Sweden.

Q: Who was that?

A: Seaborg [Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, professor of chemistry at the University of California].

Q: So you didn’t know how he felt about it?

A: We did not . . . He was in Sweden, and there was no communication with him.

Q: You didn’t poll him by mail or anything?

A: This was not a convenient thing to do.

Later that day Counsel Robb pulled that testimony out from under Dr. Oppenheimer.

Robb: You testified that you had no intimation from Dr. Seaborg prior to the GAC meeting of October 29, 1949, as to what his views on the subject were. I am going to show you a letter . . . dated October 14, 1949, addressed to you, signed “Glenn Seaborg,” and ask you whether you received that letter prior to the meeting of October 29, 1949.

Oppenheimer: I am going to say before I see it that I had no recollection of it …

Q: All right, Doctor. You told this board this morning that Dr. Seaborg did not express himself prior to the meeting of October 29,1949.

A: That is right. That was my recollection.

Q: Was that true?

A: No, that was not true.

In his letter Dr. Seaborg had said that he “would have to hear some good arguments before I could take on sufficient courage to recommend not going toward” a thermonuclear program. He noted that Dr. Ernest 0. Lawrence, director of the radiation laboratory at the University of California, was already proposing to get the program under way. If the GAC were asked to comment on the proposal, he wrote, “It seems to me clearly we should heartily endorse it.” Despite this sharp exception to the GAC’s “unanimous” stand, Dr. Oppenheimer originally had said that he did not recall the letter.

“An Odd Point of View.” Among many scientists Oppenheimer is held in high esteem, and even awe. Yet a number of his colleagues came before the security board, in answer to subpoenas, and testified against him. Among them was Dr. Luis Alvarez, professor of physics at the University of California, who was on the staff at Los Alamos during World War II (he helped develop the detonating mechanism for the atomic bomb). In September 1949, after the Russians exploded an atomic bomb, Dr. Alvarez and Dr. Lawrence decided to push for development of the H-bomb. Nearly all of the scientists they reached were enthusiastic and anxious to get the program going, Dr. Alvarez testified. He expected Oppenheimer to be enthusiastic, too, because during World War II Oppenheimer had been anxious to get on with thermonuclear research. But in 1949, in the face of the Soviet threats, he found-Oppenheimer opposed.

Counsel Robb: What did he tell you?

Alvarez: He said he did not think the United States should build the hydrogen bomb, and the main reason he gave for this . . . was that if we built a hydrogen bomb, then the Russians would build a hydrogen bomb, whereas if we did not build a hydrogen bomb, then the Russians would not build a hydrogen bomb. I found this such an odd point of view that I don’t understand it to this day . . .

Q: You testified that you talked to various individuals about your plan and the plans of others for the development of the thermonuclear weapon in early October 1949. Is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: At that time these individuals were enthusiastic for going ahead with it. Is that right?

A: That was my very strong impression.

Q: To your knowledge, were those conversations in advance of any talks that these people had with Dr. Oppenheimer?

A: I think that is so, sir . ” .

Q: Subsequently these people changed their views. Is that right?

A: Quite drastically, yes.

Q: Did you learn at that time whether in the interim they had talked to Dr. Oppenheimer?

A: I am sure that in the interim they talked with Dr. Oppenheimer, because the interim extends until now.

Later, Dr. Alvarez was questioned by Dr. Ward V. Evans, professor emeritus of chemistry at Loyola University of Chicago, a member of the security board (also later was the one member to vote for restoring Oppenheimer’s clearance).

Q: Do you think that Dr. Oppenheimer had considerable power with men like Conant, Bush and Groves?

A: I don’t think power is the right word. Dr. Oppenheimer is certainly one of the most persuasive men that has ever lived, and certainly had influence. They respected his opinions and listened to him.

Q: Looking by hindsight, do you think he showed good judgment in the fact that he opposed this bomb in the light of present conditions?

A: I think he showed exceedingly poor judgment. I told him so the first time he told me he was opposed to it. I have continued to think so. The thing which I thought at that time was the overpowering reason for building the hydrogen bomb was [that] if we did not do it, some day we might wake up and read headlines and see pictures of an explosion such as we saw a month or so ago, only this would be done off the coast of Siberia. I felt sure that this would be one of the most disastrous things that could possibly happen to this country. I thought we must not let this happen.

“Elements of the Mystic.” Wendell Mitchell Latimer, professor of chemistry at the University of California and associate director of the university’s radiation laboratory, painted the same picture as Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Latimer wanted to move ahead with thermonuclear development right after the Russians exploded an atom bomb in 1949.

Robb: Do you recall whether you talked to any other scientists …’?’ Latimer: Yes … I talked to everybody I could … I tried to build up pressure for it …

Q: What was the reception to your suggestions received at that period of time? I am speaking of the time two or three weeks after the Russian explosion.

A: It was favorable, I would say. We met practically no opposition, as I recall.

Q: Will you tell us whether or not that situation changed?

A: It definitely changed.

Q: When?

A: Within a few weeks. There had been a lot of back pressure built up, I think, primarily from the Advisory Committee [the GAC].

Q: Did you ascertain the source of any of this opposition?

A: I judge the source of it was Dr.

Oppenheimer.

Q: Why?

A: You know, he is one of the most amazing men that the country has ever produced in his ability to influence people.

It is just astounding the influence that he has on a group. It is an amazing thing. His domination of the General Advisory Committee was so complete that he always carried the majority with him, and I don’t think any views came out of that committee that weren’t essentially his views . . .

Q: Would you care to give the board, sir, any comments you have, upon the basis of your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer, as to his character, his loyalty and his associations? . . .

A: That is a rather large order.

Q: I know it is, Doctor.

A: His associations at Berkeley were well known—the fact that he did have Communist friends. I never questioned his loyalty. There were elements of the mystic in his apparent philosophy of life that were very difficult to understand . . .

A man’s motives are just something that you can’t discuss, but all his reactions were such as to give me considerable worry about his judgment as a security risk.

Confused & Complicated. The sharpest blows any scientist struck at Oppenheimer came from Dr. Edward Teller, the physicist who developed the H-bomb. In 1942, he said, Oppenheimer was all for thermonuclear experimentation. But after Germany and Japan were defeated, he used his influence strongly against it. As a result, there was little progress until the Oppenheimer advisory committee’s recommendation was overruled by President Truman in 1950.

Robb: Doctor, let me ask you for your opinion as an expert on this question.

Suppose you had gone to work on the thermonuclear in 1945 or 1946—really gone to work on it. Can you give us any opinion as to when in your view you might have achieved that weapon, and would you explain your opinion? Teller: It is my belief that if at the end of the war some people like Dr. Oppenheimer would have lent moral support —not even their own work, just moral support—to work on the thermonuclear gadget, I think we could have kept at least as many people in Los Alamos as we then recruited in 1949 under very difficult conditions. I therefore believe that, if we had gone to work in 1945, we could have achieved the thermonuclear bomb just about four years earlier.

On the question of Oppenheimer’s loyalty and security, Dr. Teller had well-defined views.

Teller: I do not want to suggest any [disloyalty]. I know Dr. Oppenheimer as an intellectually most alert and a very complicated person, and I think it would be presumptuous and wrong on my part if I would try in any way to analyze his motives. But I have always assumed, and I now assume, that he is loyal to the United States. I believe this, and I shall believe it until I see very conclusive proof to the opposite.

Q: Do you or do you not believe that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk? A: In a great number of cases I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer act—I understood that Dr. Oppenheimer acted—in a way which for me was exceedingly hard to understand. I thoroughly disagreed with him in numerous issues, and his actions frankly appeared to me confused and complicated. To this extent I feel that I would like to see the vital interests of this country in hands which I understand better, and therefore trust more. In this very limited sense I would like to express a feeling that I would feel personally more secure if public matters would rest in other hands.

In addition to the doubts created by Oppenheimer’s stand on the hydrogen bomb, the board heard that there was serious concern about his attitude toward detection of atomic explosions in Russia.

Air Force Major General Roscoe Charles Wilson, who held research and new weapons assignments during and after World War II, testified that Oppenheimer opposed detection devices to such an extent that “the overall effect was to deny the Air Force the mechanism which we felt was essential to determine when this bomb went off.” As a result of this and other actions by Oppenheimer, General Wilson testified: “I felt compelled to go to the Director of Intelligence to express my concern over what I felt was a pattern of action that was simply not helpful to national defense.” A Unique Scope. The testimony ranged all the way to those who bluntly questioned his loyalty. David Tressel Griggs, professor of geophysics at the University of California at Los Angeles, new weapons consultant for the Air Force during World War II, told the board: “I want to say, and I can’t emphasize too strongly, that Dr. Oppenheimer is the only one of my scientific acquaintances about whom I have ever felt there was a serious question as to their loyalty.”

The most direct attack on Oppenheimer’s loyalty before the board came from William Liscum Borden of Pittsburgh, assistant to the manager of the Westinghouse atomic-power division, who was executive director of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy from 1949 to 1953. He testified that he had written FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover a letter last November, expressing opinions that he still holds. Said his letter:

“As you know, [J. Robert Oppenheimer] has for some years enjoyed access to various critical activities of the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Research and Development Board, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Resources Board, and the National Science Foundation. His access covers most new weapons being developed by the armed forces, war plans at least in comprehensive outline, complete details as to atomic and hydrogen weapons and stockpile data, the evidence on which some of the principal CIA intelligence estimates is based, United States participation in the United Nations and NATO, and many other areas of high-security sensitivity.

“Because the scope of his access may well be unique, because he has had custody of an immense collection of classified papers covering military intelligence and diplomatic as well as atomic-energy matters, and because he also possesses a scientific background enabling him to grasp the significance of classified data of a technical nature, it seems reasonable to estimate that he is, and for some years has been, in a position to compromise more vital and detailed information affecting the national defense and security than any other individual in the United States … As chairman or as an official and unofficial member of more than 35 important Government committees, panels, study groups and projects, he has oriented or dominated key policies involving every principal United States security department and agency except the FBI.

“The purpose of this letter is to state my own exhaustively considered opinion, based upon years of study of the available classified evidence, that more probably than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union.”

Among the factors which led him to this conclusion. Borden wrote, were Oppenheimer’s long record of close Communist associations which survived the Russian-Nazi pact of 1939, his financial contributions to Communist causes, his false statements to security officers, his stand on the H-bomb.

Counsel for Oppenheimer declined to cross-examine Borden, on the ground that what he had submitted was not evidence but his own conclusions. On that point Security Board Chairman Gordon Gray agreed, asserting that the board “has no evidence before it that Dr. Oppenheimer . . . has been functioning as an espionage agent.”

The Puzzled Banker. The board majority’s view was more nearly summed up in Counsel Robb’s cross-examination of John J. McCloy, board chairman of the Chase National Bank, former (1941-45) Assistant Secretary of War, who was one of the character witnesses on behalf of Oppenheimer.

Robb: As far as you know, Mr. McCloy, do you have any employee of your bank who has been for any considerable period of time on terms of rather intimate and friendly association with thieves and safecrackers?

McCloy: No, I don’t know of anyone . . .

Q: Suppose you had a branch bank manager, and a friend of his came to him one day and said: “I have some friends and contacts who are thinking about coming to your bank to rob it. I would like to talk to you about maybe leaving the vault open some night so they could do it,” and your branch manager rejected the suggestion. Would you expect that branch manager to report the incident? A: Yes.

Q: If he didn’t report it, would you be disturbed about it?

A: Yes.

Q: Let us go a bit further. Supposing the branch bank manager waited six or eight months to report it, would you be rather concerned about why he had not done it before?

A: Yes.

Q: Suppose, when he did report it, he said this friend of mine, a good friend of mine, I am sure he was innocent, and therefore I won’t tell you who he is. Would you be concerned about that? Would you urge him to tell you?

A: I would certainly urge him to tell me for the security of the bank.

Q: Now, supposing your branch bank manager, in telling you the story of his conversations with his friend, said: “My friend told me that these people that he knows that want to rob the bank told me that they had a pretty good plan. They had some tear gas and guns, and they had a car arranged for the getaway and had everything all fixed up.” Would you conclude from that it was a pretty well-defined plot?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, supposing some years later this branch manager told you: “Mr. McCloy, I told you that my friend and his friends had a scheme all set up, as I have told you, with tear gas and guns and getaway car, but that was a lot of bunk. It just wasn’t true. I told you a false story about my friend.” Would you be a bit puzzled as to why he would tell you such a false story about his friend?

A: Yes, I think I would be.

The majority of Gordon Gray’s security committee wound up feeling about Oppenheimer the way McCloy felt about Roger Robb’s hypothetical bank manager.

* A onetime (1931-38) Assistant U.S. Attorney in Washington, Lawyer Robb, 46, was hired by the AEC in February to handle the Oppenheimer case. A Yaleman (’28), Robb is associated with the Washington law firm of Bingham, Collins, Porter and Kistler, is a vice president of the District of Columbia Bar Association.