National Affairs: Help Wanted

Since last July, Admiral Arthur W. Radford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been making a new assessment of the U.S. armed forces. Last week, their deliberations almost over, they found one problem more pressing than others. The problem: manpower.

Because of low birth rates in the Depression years, the number of young men available for the draft each year has shrunk to 1,100,000, of whom roughly 850,000 can meet physical and mental standards. To keep up the present U.S. military force of 3,500,000—made up principally of two-year enlistees, 1,000,000 new men are needed annually.

The rate of re-enlistments in the Regular Army had dropped to 6.1% by December 1952. Current re-enlistment rates in all three services are far below requirements. The Navy and the Air Force in the past have filled their vacancies with four-year volunteers—since many men of draft age preferred four years at sea, or in the air to two Army years, which might include combat infantry service in Korea. With Korean infantry service now doubtful, U.S. draftees find two-year terms of service more attractive.

It is hard to find enough good officers. The rate of resignations from the U.S. Military Academy was 12% in 1952—double the 1950 figure. Out of 810 naval R.O.T.C. college graduates, educated at Navy expense and eligible this year for regular commissions, only 10% applied. Said former Joint Chiefs Chairman Omar Bradley, at a congressional hearing last July: “If you removed today the prohibition against resigning from the [Regular] service, I think you would find a whole flock of resignations coming in.”

Why They Want Out. One reason for this state of affairs is full employment. Even in 1946 and 1947, the uncertainties of civilian life kept much good officer and N.C.O. material in uniform. In the last few years, however, almost no civilian has wanted for some kind of employment. Wages in manufacturing industries have risen to 270% of 1940 wage scales. Military pay during the same period has had no such rapid increase.

Among other specific reasons for not entering the U.S. armed forces or staying in them:

JOB SECURITY. The man in the service today is a pawn in the murky chessboard maneuvers of Congress and the services heads, continually changing the size, shape and pattern of the armed forces. A 20-year pension plan, which induces a man to rejoin the service, might be rescinded the year after he comes in. An officer who has spent most of his professional life in some branch of specialized research is apt to find that Congress or the Defense Department has scrapped his whole branch overnight.

THE RESERVES. Reservists and National Guardsmen, who should be a constant source of Regular Army material, were unjustly handled during the Korean emergency, because of badly organized reserve records. Men with large families and promising careers found themselves suddenly fighting in Korea, while unmarried students or young married men of draft age got easy deferments. Tens of thousands of reservists, exasperated by’ this system, have severed their connections with all reserve programs.

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS. In a bygone day, Army sergeants and Navy chief petty officers were important men, the backbone of their services. Now there are serious shortages of N.C.O.s in all the services. One reason: the importance of their rank has been steadily watered down. In their desire to reward technical specialists and keep men re-enlisting, the armed forces have passed out ratings far too liberally. Moves to “democratize” the services have also reduced the N.C.O.s’ authority. With the resultant loss of respect for noncommissioned rank, many veteran N.C.O.s quit in disgust.

Solutions? A Pentagon committee, headed by Rear Admiral John P. Womble, is now at work trying to recommend some policy steps for solving the armed forces manpower problem. Among their suggestions: more pay and the retention of old perquisites, such as commissaries; a consistent personnel policy with unchanging limits for pensions and retirement; a greater effort, from the top down, to enforce discipline and give troops stronger leadership—pride in a military unit is often a good substitute for big pay in a blanket factory.

Another high-level suggestion: increase the enlistment bonus from the present $600 top to $1,500-$2,000. It takes about $14,600 to bring a raw recruit into one of the services and train him properly. One trained man with a bonus of $2,000, re-enlisted, theoretically puts the U.S. Government $12,600 to the good.