ARMED FORCES: Howlin1 Mad v. the Army

On Saipan, nature and the bulldozer have all but covered the four-year-old litter of battle. But last week, belching fire like one of his own flamethrowers, the Marines’ General Holland M. Smith scorched open an old, still angry scar. Writing with cantankerous zest in the Saturday Evening Post, “Howlin’ Mad” revived his case against the Army’s Major General Ralph Smith and his 27th Division, a New York National Guard outfit transferred to Marine command for the Saipan invasion.

Marines’ Version. The essence of Howlin’ Mad’s case was simple: the 27th would not fight, and Ralph Smith would not make them fight (TIME, Sept. 18, 1944). Seven days after the Saipan landing he had ordered the 27th to move up between the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions for the big attack northward along the spine of the island.

The 27th was an hour or more late getting started; it moved no more than a few steps when the advance finally began.

Gaps opened between the fast-moving marines and the stalled 27th. The whole attack ground to a halt.

Smith sent another Army officer, Major General Sanderford Jarman, to see the 27th’s Ralph Smith. Jarman reported back the Army commander’s admission: “If he didn’t take his division forward tomorrow, he should be relieved.” Next morning, the division did not budge. “In this context of all-round poor performance by the 27th Division,” Howlin’ Mad wrote, he took map in hand and went to see the overall operation commander, Admiral Raymond Spruance. He told him: “Ralph Smith has demonstrated that he lacks aggressive spirit and his division is slowing down our advance. He should be relieved.” Spruance concurred. Jarman took over the division.

Fatal Gap. Smith v. Smith became Smith v. the 27th (and, finally, the Army as a whole). Twelve days after Ralph Smith was replaced, two of the 27th’s battalion commanders settled down for the night without bothering to cover a 300-yard gap between their flanks. Though forewarned, the ailing regimental commander never bothered to check up on his front lines. Through that gap the Japs rammed their last, desperate banzai charge.

The G.I.s fought gallantly, Howlin’ Mad Smith relates. Bodies piled high before their guns. Their ammunition ran out. Then they were overrun, partly because their own 3rd Battalion made no attempt to shift over to help stop the fanatical Japs. The attack was finally halted by Marine artillerymen and a Reserve Army infantry regiment, after U.S. troops had suffered over 1,000 casualties. Smith then yanked the 27th out of the line, never let them do any more fighting in the Marianas.

Things Were Tough. As Smith’s article hit the newsstands last week, the Army leaped to the defense. Things had been much tougher for the 27th than Howlin’ Mad had had any idea of, the Army insisted. In the center, it had been up against the main enemy defenses. It was late jumping off only because the Marine division it was relieving had lost about 500 yards during the night, which the 27th had to regain. Finally, the Army pointed out that an all-Army board of inquiry had declared Smith’s relief “not justified,” and had found that Marine Smith had not known what was going on.

“Whitewash, pure and simple,” snorted Howlin’ Mad. “The so-called board . . . had no more judicial standing than an Army kangaroo court. This board had no access to Saipan records of the Navy and Marine Corps, and sought none.”

“A Lack of Spirit.” To prove its point, the Army unlocked long-secret files. But some of the Army’s own testimony went far to corroborate Howlin’ Mad. After relieving Smith, General Jarman reported simply: “The problem . . . was to get the 27th to advance.” In an official memo on the conduct of the 27th, Jarman explained: “I have noted … a lack of offensive spirit … A battalion will run into one machine gun and be held up for several hours.” Other Army officers reported “fainthearted” attacks, noted “a lack of spirit in moving forward.”

There seemed little doubt that the 27th had suffered from lack of battle training and sloppy leadership, that it was equipped neither by discipline nor inclination for the Marines’ hell-for-leather tactics. But Howlin’ Mad’s running battle with the Army served little present purpose. The whole story of the Army on Saipan seemed destined to take its place with such other military causes célèbres as the conduct of the Dardanelles campaign in World War I and the reason Longstreet was late in attacking Little Round Top.