GERMANY: Big, Long Haul

Last week Germany began to hint at what it would do with Russia once the Bear was in the bag. The weekly Reich suggested that there would be a “healthy mixture” of individual and collective farming. It could be gathered from Reich’s discussion that the Russian peasants would be loudly assured that some day they might again rule their own roosts. Possibly the little vegetable patches and few animals that Stalin has allowed Russia’s collective farmers to cultivate privately—sometimes life-savers—would be somewhat increased under Hitler. But almost certainly Germany would stick to basic collectivism—the easiest way of forcing the slaves to work as the master requires.

Premature as it might be, the question of what Germany would get out of a conquered Russia was being widely raised last week.

No one knew how much of Russia the Russians were destroying in their retreat. Some Russian experts felt sure that most Soviet peasants would not destroy their farms unless forced to; that the warfare, centering around main roads, would leave vast tracts of Russia in apparent peace (from the air, reporters had seen such areas behind the German advance); that the scorching of the Russian earth, sluiced by many streams, wetted by many rains, would be difficult in any case. Anyone could guess that if the Russian High Command surrendered or fled, most Russian self-destruction would cease.

On the other hand the great Dnieper Dam may have been destroyed (see p. 10) and various Russian cities had already been reported ruined by Russian hands. The retreat had been slow enough to make possible some industrial destruction (factories cannot be destroyed by the hasty heaving of dynamite sticks). Last week Berlin’s radio Propagandist Lord Haw-Haw acknowledged an earth-scorching holocaust in the Western Ukraine, gave a clue to the reason for Stalin’s reestablishment of political commissars in the Red Army (TIME, July 28).

Said Lord Haw-Haw: “Blazing fields, burned-out oil tanks, dead horses, slaughtered pigs . . . destroyed tractors, plundered stables and shops. . . . These criminal means of destruction . . . can always be traced back to the work of the commissars which evokes the most bitter resentment among the long-suffering population. . . . On many occasions the inhabitants of villages in the Ukraine had to be held back from lynching their former tyrants.”

But even supposing a vast amount of Russian industrial and agricultural suicide, minerals could not be wrecked in the ground, fertile fields could not be set afire. Hitler was presumably not trying to conquer Russia just for the day or the year. The question remained as to what he might get, given a reasonable time for regrowth and repairs. Generalizations could be made about an imagined conquest of European Russia (west of the Urals) if Asiatic Russia, from the Urals to the Pacific, remained in the hands of a refugee Russian Government.

> Hitler would get 80% of Russia’s man power—193,200,000 people. They are used to tyranny, and many are used to sabotaging it.

> European Russia has 85% of Russia’s huge oil production—Hitler’s most pressing need—and it is chiefly in the great Baku and North Caucasus fields—190,000,000 barrels a year, as against a 1940 German consumption of only 35,000,000 barrels. All but 10% of this possible prize is protected by Caucasian mountain bastions, could be strongly defended. And the fields could be fired, so that it would probably be two years before anything like full production could be restored. Moreover, Russia has needed almost all of her oil ever since she lost 15,000,000 horses by famine or slaughter (some to encourage, some in rebellion against collectivization), making tractor power essential. So if Hitler wants Russian food he must leave his captives much Russian oil.

> Hitler already can get most of the iron ore he needs from occupied countries and Sweden. European Russia has 67% of Russia’s iron-ore production, plus gigantic unmined reserves. Just before the war Germany imported about 20,000,000 metric tons of iron ore per year, and the Ukraine reserves alone are estimated at 800,000,000 metric tons.

> European Russia would also ease Hitler’s shortage of manganese, aluminum, lead and zinc—but not markedly. He would get little badly needed copper, nickel, tin or gold out of the Russian earth, but probably one of his greatest quick gains would be millions of tons of scrap metals, of many sorts, from wrecked Russian machinery and weapons.

> Hitler wants rubber badly, and textile fibers. He would get most of Russia’s rubber output but Russia produces only about 70% of her own rubber requirements (synthetically, and from the dandelion-like kok-sagyz plant). He would get only about a quarter of Russia’s cotton, and very little wool unless he lets most of his Russian slaves freeze.

> Hitler wants timber. He would get 405,000,000 acres of it.

> Hitler does not need coal, but he would get 70% of Russia’s giant production, including that of the Donetz and Moscow basins.

> Hitler wants foodstuffs for a badly nourished Germany and New Order Europe. He would get 78% of Russia’s cultivated land (260,000,000 acres), a somewhat higher percentage of Russian livestock. But Russia has seldom been much more than self-sufficient as to food. War damage would make export surpluses highly un likely. Hitler could scarcely afford to steal important quantities of food from the peasants responsible for succeeding crops. As a long-term investment, handled with German efficiency, Russia’s “great granaries” might prove a mighty asset, but the immediate profit would undoubtedly be quite small.

>Barring sabotage, Hitler would get most of Russia’s electric, hydroelectric and manufacturing plants — 70% of pig iron, steel and rolled steel capacity; 90% of oil refineries; 63% of tractor factories; 85% of machine and machine-tool factories; 90% of chemical, synthetic rubber and tire plants. But Russia’s manufacturing plant, like its agricultural resources, is usually hard-pressed to sustain even the longtime poor living standards of Russia.

> For the efficient, heavy movement of goods from Russia to Germany, Russia’s railroads would need virtual rebuilding as their gauge is now wider than the German. Enormous quantities of new rolling stock would also be essential to replace the present rickety equipment.

In sum, from European Russia, Adolf Hitler would get a potentially big haul. But considering sabotage possibilities, and most importantly Russia’s own needs — if it is to remain enough of a going concern to make its conquest worthwhile at all — it is likely that the big haul would take a long time. Possibly Hitler could hold and control Russia long enough for German technical and administrative genius to make the big haul come true. The alternative might be one of the greatest headaches in history.