FAR EAST: Extension of Heaven

Japan’s grave-faced Emperor Hirohito last week wrapped himself in a silken robe embroidered with the sacred Paulownia blossom and stepped into the innermost sanctuary of the Imperial Palace to worship his mythological ancestress, the Sun Goddess, celebrating the ascension to the throne 2,601 years ago of his lineal ancestor, the great Emperor Jimmu. Aside from the fact, of no great importance, that there is no historical evidence that Jimmu ever existed, there was a striking difference between the two ceremonies 2.601 years apart: whereas Jimmu had given thanks to the Sun Goddess after his conquest of Central Japan, Hirohito prayed before Japan’s conquest of Southeastern Asia, which Japan and her enemies alike agree must be this year or never.

The Way of the Gods. While Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoye, his Cabinet and other privileged persons followed the Son of Heaven into the sanctuary of his ancestral goddess, thousands of lesser Japanese made their way to Shinto shrines throughout Japan. Outside the gates of the shrine to the war dead in Tokyo, women offered white girdles to the worshippers. These girdles, stitched with red, make soldiers who wear them invulnerable. Before entering the gates each worshipper purified himself by washing out his mouth in a common pool. Before leaving, each worshipper tossed coins before the shrine. In the lesser shrines, as in the Imperial Sanctuary, the ceremonies proclaimed Japan’s faith in what the Japanese call “the way of the gods”: patriotism, unity and belief in the imperial divine ancestry. Proclaimed Home Minister Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma as the great day ended: “Japan has a sacred throne. . . . Japan’s imperial rule is therefore an extension of Heaven.”

The 2,601st anniversary of the Empire’s founding was also the day the Cabinet chose to announce Year 2601’s budget: $1,128,256,000 for war, $1,894,794,000 for peace; total, $3,023,050,000, of which $1,778,375,200 must be borrowed. Prince Konoye retired to his house with a cold the next day.

Prince Konoye is the world’s most celebrated political hypochondriac; he frequently takes to his bed when things get tough. Lart week that part of the world which lies in the path of Japan’s ambition was sure Japan was on the brink of war.

War’s New Stage. At almost the same moment The Netherlands East Indies and Australia got their wind up. From Batavia orders went out for Dutch ships to put into the nearest friendly port; two of them rushed to Manila and dropped anchor. In Australia Acting Prime Minister Arthur William Fadden called a meeting of the Advisory War Council and then issued a warning to the country: “The war has moved into a new stage of the utmost gravity.”

Australia’s No. 2 man is not one who scares easily. He looks and sounds a little like Wendell Willkie. Since 1936 he has risen to, and ably handled, the Treasury portfolio. When Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies decided to visit Australian forces in Egypt and Palestine last month Fadden was agreed on as a man both major parties could trust.

London also believed that Japan was on the warpath. The exiled Government of The Netherlands learned from Batavia that Japan had served new demands on the East Indies. (The Japanese Government refuses to deal directly with the Dutch Government in London, calls it a puppet of Britain.) These demands included permission to “explore” islands around the Indies, concessions for mining and fisheries, exploitation of undeveloped regions, permission for Japanese laborers, shopkeepers and professional men to work in the East Indies, the right to operate an air service between the Indies and Japan. Neither Batavia nor Queen Wilhelmina’s Government in London had any intention of signing such a blank check. The next move was up to Japan.

Creeping South. Japan had already moved. Two flotillas of the Japanese Navy steamed out of the Yangtze and crossed the Gulf of Tonkin to Hainan Island. Five Japanese warships arrived in the Gulf of Siam, inside Thailand’s territorial waters. Japanese ships patrolled the entire coast of French Indo-China and Thailand, as far west as Bangkok. More Japanese troops moved into French Indo-China, while Tokyo blandly announced that the Thailand-French Indo-China armistice had been extended to Feb. 25. As a price for “mediating” that pint-size war Japan has demanded air bases in southern Thailand and may have got them by now. By Feb. 25 Japan could have a firm grip on the long Malayan gooseneck that dangles down to the British Federated Malay States and the fortress of Singapore.

On that fortress and on her three other great naval fortresses (the British Isles, Gibraltar, Suez) depends Britain’s life as an empire. Without Singapore, Britain could no longer freely get men and materials to the Mediterranean by way of Suez; without Singapore, she would no longer control the Indian Ocean; without Singapore, her empire would break in two. To meet the Japanese threat Britain rushed troops north from Singapore to a point close to the Thailand border, where they began digging in. Some reports estimated available British effectives at 90,000. Squadrons of bombers droned after them, settled down on advance air bases in the farthest north of the F. M. S. Minelayers blocked off the shipping route through the Straits of Singapore. If the Japanese objective was Singapore, the Empire would not be caught dozing.

Grand Strategy. Japan’s eventual objective, as Japan has made clear long since, is an Asiatic empire embracing an area as great as North and South America. It would extend westward through India and southward through Australia, whose key city, Sydney, is as far from Shanghai as Rio de Janeiro is from New York. To the Japanese it seems only logical that the strongest power in Asia should rule a great empire, but to U. S. citizens it is almost as if Newfoundland wanted to boss the U. S., the West Indies and Brazil (see map, p. 29). Standing in the way of Japan’s grand objective are the Chinese Army, the land forces of British, Dutch and U. S. possessions, the British and U. S. Navies. Bulwark of all this strength is the naval base of Singapore.

Washington and Moscow. In Washington last week arrived Japan’s new Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who had been greeted warmly in Hawaii by Admiral James 0. Richardson, but had found his reception chillier as he traveled east. President Roosevelt greeted him as “my old friend,” but wore an air of utmost gravity. At his press conference the President made no effort to conceal the seriousness of U. S.-Japanese relations. The U. S., he indicated, might be “forced” into war in the Pacific. Yet how much it would take to force the U. S. into war, even the President probably did not know, and, if he did, he would not tell Japan.

To the Japanese Diet Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka made a highly significant remark. In the event of a break between Japan and the U. S., said he, Russia would be taken care of by “prompt and effective steps.” Talky Yosuke Matsuoka went on to explain that Japan’s opposition to the extension of Communism in China had been an obstacle to a non-aggression pact with Russia, left his listeners to infer that if the U. S. got tough, Japan would give in on this point. In Moscow Japan’s new Ambassador to

Germany, Lieut. General Hiroshi Oshima, stopped off for two days of intensive diplomatic activity with the Japanese Ambassador to Russia, Lieut. General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and with the German and Italian Ambassadors, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg and Augusto Rosso. That the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis was bent on taking Russia into camp was plain. Before leaving for his post in Berlin, General Oshima beamed at correspondents and murmured: “Close Soviet-Japanese relations are . . . necessary to facilitate the construction of a new world order.”

Too Far and Too Late. At week’s end, general feeling in the Far East was that the scare had been a trial balloon, sent up to find out how Japan’s potential foes would act. It was not quite so simple as that.

The words of Japanese spokesmen were full of meaning, in their contradictions as well as their consistencies. For the Cabinet, Spokesman Ko Ishii purred: “We do not see the imminence of war in the Pacific.” For the Army,. Major Kunio Akiyama barked: “Japan will not disturb the waves of the Pacific, but if strong pressure is applied she will be compelled to take certain measures.” For the chauvinists, Tokyo Kokumin shrilled that U. S. activity in the Pacific was “approaching a state of war.” For the realists, Japanese correspondents in French Indo-China stated: “Japan will move against Anglo-American interests in the Orient and the Dutch East Indies, first attacking Singapore.”

Japan, like the U. S., was committed to a policy. Japan, like the U. S., was reluctant to follow it to war. But, as Kokumin said, Admiral Nomura’s mission to “Washington had come too late: the two countries had gone too far. Japanese believed that the year 2602 would see Japan ruling one of the earth’s richest dominions or returning to the way of her gods.