WAR IN SPAIN: Favors

The wooing by Britannia and La Belle France of little Francisco Franco received a set-back last week. The French-British courtship had been planned along these lines: the Loyalists were to be persuaded to quit, the Rebel Generalissimo was to be recognized and then, it was hoped, he could be persuaded to jilt Germany and Italy, who had helped him so well to win his war. But, to the democracies’ chagrin, the Generalissimo suddenly got the sulks.

Lever. Handiest card the French and British had in dealing with the Loyalists was the presence in Paris of Manuel Azaña, President of the Spanish Republic. Loyalist decrees, to be legal, must be signed by the President. The French have served notice that Don Manuel cannot function as President—i.e., cannot sign decrees—on French soil. Moreover, French and British ambassadors to Spain are accredited to the President of the Republic rather than to the Republic itself. With the President in France, Britain and France could easily maintain that Loyalist Spain had ceased to exist.

Loyalist Foreign Minister Julio Alvárez del Vayo flew from Madrid to France to persuade Senior Azaña to return to Loyalist Spain and thus rob Britain and France of an excuse to withdraw recognition. Long and heated conferences took place in the big, flat-faced brown stucco Spanish Embassy on the Avenue George V in Paris. But Don Manuel, who has been wanting to surrender since the Rebels took Teruel a year ago, flatly refused to leave the safety of Paris. Peace at any price was his line. General Vicente Rojo, Loyalist Chief of Staff who crossed over into France with the fall of Catalonia, also declined to go home. French and British diplomats applied pressure at this opportune time and the upshot was that Loyalist Spain at last agreed to reduce its conditions of surrender to one: that Generalissimo Franco promise a general amnesty for Loyalist leaders.*

To France and Britain this condition seemed not only a reasonable but a necessary one. The French Government is anxious to get the 380,000 Spanish refugees now in France back into Spain. Moreover, wholesale executions and arrests following a surrender arranged by the French and British Governments might be embarrassing to Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier at home.

The arrangement seemed so near to going through that Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet announced that Jules Henry, French Ambassador to Spain, would not return to Loyalist territory. Senator Léon Bérard, who has already been to Rebel Spain on one “unofficial” mission, returned to Burgos, this time for “official” negotiations. Sir Robert Hodgson, British Agent to Rebel Spain, began long talks with Count Francisco Gómez Jordana, Rebel Foreign Minister.

Surprise. At this point both France and Britain got an unpleasant surprise. Generalissimo Franco, it appeared, did not prize British and French recognition as highly as British and French statesmen thought he would. His motto was: “Recognition first, negotiations second.” As to declaring an amnesty, he wanted the Loyalists’ “unconditional surrender.”

Even more disturbing to European democratic statesmanship was the announcement in Dictator Mussolini’s Milan newspaper Popolo d’ltalia that Dictators Mussolini, Hitler and Franco were planning a get-together soon in Italy. As proof of Generalissimo Franco’s increasing international importance a number of smaller States—Poland, Switzerland, Peru, Uruguay—announced recognition.

Best note on whether Rebel Spain would ally itself with the dictatorships or the democracies was sounded by Harold Callender, in the New York Times: “Spain’s ingratitude to Hitler and Mussolini will probably be in proportion to their [future] strength in Europe. If … the dictators received a setback, then Spain might be as ungrateful as the British Admiralty could wish.”

Regardless of which way Spain finally turns, the War and social revolution have bloodily aroused the country out of its ancient impotency, inefficiency, backwardness. The general agreement that Spain seemed due for a greater share of international power was expressed last week by Jules Sauerwein, foreign editor of Paris-Soir in a cable to the New York Times: “When peace definitely is established in Spain, that country . . . will enter upon such an era of prosperity and power as it has not enjoyed for a long time. Spain is a country that can prevent a Mediterranean conflict, or if such conflict were to break out, could throw its advantage to the side it favored.”

*Rebel Spain published last week a “Law of Political Responsibilities” decreeing exile and loss of citizenship to those who “contributed to aggravation of subversive activities by which Spain was victimized” after October 1934 (one and a half years before the war began). Best, though inconclusive, evidence so far of the number of Loyalists who would fear for their lives in a complete Franco victory was seen in the recent surrender of Loyalist Minorca to the Rebels. Then 450 of the island’s 42,000 inhabitants left on a British cruiser. The same ratio applied to Loyalist Spain’s 7,000,000 inhabitants would mean that about 75,000 would need amnesty if they did not flee.