BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC: Moving on Munda

The troops closing in on Munda had learned much since Bataan; these troops were fighting a new kind of warfare. Once they wore khaki and blue dungarees; now they were clad in mottled yellow-brown-green coveralls that blended with the deep color and shadow of the tropics. Once they had little else to fight with but machine guns, rifles and knives; now they had ample artillery and support from sea and air. Once they massed and deployed awkwardly in textbook tactics; now they crept silently through the jungle. At Viru Harbor, U.S. Marines, infiltrating from the rear, wiped out Jap outposts and drove the defenders into the sea. The Jap supply line to Munda was cut by a roadblock which the Japs were unable to bypass. The Americans were using Japanese tactics to drive the Japs out of the Solomons.

Smashing the Defenses. Last week’s invasion of Rendova Island had been followed by a crossing of the six-mile channel to a landing at Zanana, from which “Barracudas” (specially trained infantry units) pressed west to within two miles of Munda. On western New Georgia a landing was effected at Rice Anchorage, four miles above Bairoko Harbor, from which Munda had been supplied. Troops moved to isolate Bairoko and Munda.

From Rendova, from coral islets in Blanche Channel, from positions on New Georgia, American artillery pounded at Munda. In one supporting raid the Allied Air Forces dropped 70 tons of bombs on the surrounded Japs. U.S. warships lobbed hundreds of shells on Bairoko and Vila.

Both Air Forces and Navy were out looking for trouble. But the wide-ranging bombers met little Jap interception. The Jap was having difficulty mustering enough aircraft for his own purposes. The flights he was able to put over Rendova during the week dwindled gradually, did little damage.

Under pressure, the Jap resorted to sea action. Three times he attempted to send the “Tokyo Express* to the aid of his embattled forces. The first was surprised, escaped in the night (TIME, July 12). The second, having possibly landed some reinforcements near Vila on the island of Kolombangara, was trapped in Kula Gulf by a U.S. task force and virtually wiped out.

Nine Jap destroyers and light cruisers were sunk, possibly two more. U.S. losses: one ship—the valiant cruiser Helena, which, when sunk, had been firing for six minutes and was on her third and fourth victims. Early this week, another naval force was engaged in the Kula Gulf. In a night battle lasting into the next day, one Jap cruiser, three destroyers were sunk, two more destroyers hit so badly that they probably went down.

Command. Much credit for the combined operations at New Georgia will undoubtedly go to 58-year-old, high-domed Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the amphibious forces in the South Pacific. “Terrible” Turner commanded the task forces of occupation in the first U.S. attacks in the Solomons, received the Distinguished Service Medal for it. “If you want something tough done, call on Turner,” is a Navy adage, one reason why he was selected to coordinate sea, air and land forces in island warfare. He foresaw the importance of submarines in a U.S.-Japanese war, was a prophet of raiding warfare. Before the attack, at his Guadalcanal headquarters (where his staff includes a Marine colonel, a Navy captain, an Army major), he saw everyone from PT-boat skippers to major generals.

The Initiative. Upon this action hinged the success or failure of General MacArthur’s new offensive. The occupation of the Woodlark and Trobriand Islands had been a mere drawing together of the new offensive line. The landings of troops below Salamaua had put greater pressure on that Jap stronghold, but the numbers of men involved were small, the action bitter and slow because of the difficulties of terrain, the prize of less strategic importance than New Georgia. Could the U.S. hold the initiative in the Solomons, or would the Jap be able to reinforce and doggedly hold his own, as he had for so many months on Guadalcanal? As the week ended, the force and diversity of U.S. attacks had been stepped up; the initiative was being held. The fall of Munda, the forward base with which the Jap had hoped to neutralize U.S. holdings in the Solomons, seemed near.

*The name U.S. Marines and Navymen gave to Japaneselight surface units which reinforced Guadalcanal.