MANPOWER: Two Bits Worth

The President, the Congress and Paul McNutt last week continued to talk about U.S. manpower. But for the first time in many a month some clear good sense was made on the subject—by a two-bit, 25-page pamphlet titled Is There Enough Manpower? published by the Brookings Institution, written by Economist Harold W. Metz.

Like many another good pamphleteer economist, Metz makes sense not by giving solutions but by asking the right questions. When he is through the reader knows that a nation riding along on a 42-hour work week, but talking about raising a 12,000,000-man army, and Lend-Leasing the world, is kidding itself.

Mr. Metz begins with the best military estimates that the U.S. will try to push its armed forces from four million in 1942 to nine and a half million by the end of 1943, to a possible twelve million by the end of 1944. He then asks: What is the optimum quantity of war materials which we can in fact produce to support such huge forces?

Hours of Work. The present manpower force of the U.S., counting those in the services, is roughly 58 million. By 1943 it might be pushed to 62 million, and by 1944 to 65 million, through a huge recruiting of youth, a heavy drawing on women, and the problematical importation of 250,000 workers from Mexico. At the same time, a high increase in hours worked will be needed if we are serious about the manpower shortage. The present average work week of 42 hours will have to be advanced to at least 48 hours and actual work schedules to over 50 hours to allow for absenteeism.

By these steps gross national production may be pushed from $140 billion this year to $148 billion in 1943, to $155 billion in 1944. If at the same time output of civilian goods is mightily slashed, and the Government economizes on its non-military expenditures (such as big Government payrolls), actual military expenditures may rise from $35 billion in 1942 to $66 billion in 1943, to a colossal $84 billion in 1944.

Lend-lease. Is this output sufficient to supply an armed force of nine and a half million in 1943, let alone twelve million in 1944? Mr. Metz states that for lack of military data on the equipment needed per man these questions can get no categoric answer. But the Metz implication is that while an ultimate output of $84 billion might be enough for an armed force of only nine and a half million, it almost certainly would not be enough for twelve million if the U.S. also wants to go on Lend-Leasing to her Allies.

Moreover, an armed force of even nine and a half million would be justified only if at least five million were sent overseas. But on the basis of known shipping facts and production estimates it is highly improbable such an army and its equipment can be moved to Europe, let alone to the Far East.

The Pay-Off. Summing up, Mr. Metz concludes that if the U.S. is to raise only a force of nine and a half million men it must at once make “a number of significant decisions.” These are: 1) to increase the working force and the average work week from 42 hours to at least 48 hours; 2) drastically reduce the civilian output of goods back to real depression levels of $60 billion; 3) greatly increase the shipbuilding program. But how, asks Mr. Metz, can these decisions be made? They cannot be made singly by the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, nor the Manpower Board. They can be made only by the President.

Last week the President made public a tedious report of Manpower Commissioner Paul McNutt which suggested little more constructive than that he (McNutt) be given enlarged powers. The Truman Committee of the Senate flayed Mr. McNutt for thinking that this would solve the problem. The President wearily told a press conference that he was still studying the manpower question, might put off a definite move for the time being.