POWER POLITICS: New Allies

For two and a half years the Rome-Berlin Axis has ticked like a clock. Sympathetic Adolf Hitler has cheered loudly when Friend Benito Mussolini corrected the “pyramidal errors of geography.” II Duce has applauded as the Führer grabbed Lebensraum (“living space”) for himself. The two even joined hands for a while in Spain. But while committed to give moral aid to each other, no German-Italian understanding to give military help was ever put down in black & white. In fact, rainbow-chasing French and British politicians believed that Italy would balk before it came to that.

Last week Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop called on Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano at Milan. Foreign correspondents guessed that Italy was balking at helping, even morally, her ally Germany against her old tried-&-true friend Poland, and that the German Foreign Minister’s trip (plus trips by German military men) was simply an attempt to again smooth out ruffled relations. Even the Italian press, which unanimously described the enthusiastic crowds which greeted Herr von Ribbentrop at Milan, editorially predicted that the conference would produce “no sensation.”

Then after just two days of discussion the Foreign Ministers came to a “perfect identity of view,” announced that the Axis Powers had agreed to form a firm political and military alliance. Considering the firmness of the Rome-Berlin Axis, a formal military alliance seemed to make no change in Europe’s balance of power. But what the Foreign Ministers had announced by implication was that Italy would automatically come to the help of Germany in case of trouble, and vice versa. With the fate of the Free City of Danzig already at issue between Germany and Poland, the announcement in effect placed Italy’s full force behind Germany’s demands.

Thus the Axis answered the recent bold moves of Britain and France in Eastern Europe. Following events which took place early last week, it pointed to the possibility of another big German-Italian diplomatic and military victory.

For British and French diplomacy had just suffered a shock from the retirement of anti-Fascist Maxim Maximovich Litvinoff as Russia’s Foreign Commissar (see p. 22). The suspicion was well-founded that the Soviet Union had suddenly become disinterested in a Stop-Hitler alliance with the West. On the floor of the British House of Commons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had to answer angry charges from Opposition M. P.s that he had been “dilatory” in seeking a tie-up with the Soviet Union. Most pugnacious was peppery old David Lloyd George, Wartime Prime Minister, who wanted to know if Britain’s Army chiefs had advised the Government that Britain could defend the independence of Poland and Rumania, Britain’s new allies, without the aid of Soviet Russia. Said he succinctly:

“If they ever did, they ought to be removed from the War Office and confined to a lunatic asylum.”

Just as the Peace Front was thrown into diplomatic panic, Foreign Minister Josef Beck made his announced appearance before the Sejm, the Polish Lower House of Parliament, to answer Adolf Hitler’s demands for Danzig and a corridor across the Polish Corridor. Under the circumstances he needed courage. In correct diplomatic language he called Führer Adolf Hitler a liar, denied that the Führer had made any straight offers of negotiations with Poland, asserted that the Polish Corridor is an “ancient Polish land with an insignificant percentage of German colonists.” Minister Beck admitted that Danzig (which Herr Hitler wants outright) was German in population, but reminded his hearers that it is situated at the mouth of a Polish river, the Vistula, that Poland will never give up her window to the Baltic.

“Poland loves peace and will listen to reason,” said Colonel Beck and added: “We in Poland do not know the conception of peace at any price. There is only one thing in the life of man, nation, and States which is without price—that is honor.”

Brave words were these but soon forgotten in the realistic atmosphere of London and Paris. There the exponents of appeasing Adolf Hitler were bobbing up again. The London Times printed appeasement arguments, gave prominence to a letter from onetime Minister of Labor Lord Rushcliffe: which urged Polish-German negotiations. The Times itself editorialized “Danzig is really not worth a war. It is essentially a question for skilful diplomacy.”

In Paris suggestions were even blunter. There Dissident Socialist Deputy Marcel Déat of the pro-Munich school of defeatists, printed an article in L’Oeuvre entitled “Fight for Danzig?” M. Déat’s answer: “To start a war in Europe for the sake of Danzig is going a little too far and the French peasants have no desire to die for the Poles.”

Best sign that the Democracies’ recent firm shake of the head at Germany might soon again turn into a gentle nod toward Adolf Hitler came early this week from Prime Minister Chamberlain. The Great Appeaser himself admitted in Parliament that the British Government was ready to mediate the Danzig question: “The Polish Government are of course aware that the British Government would welcome an amicable settlement.” The pattern of events which led last summer to the Munich Crisis seemed last week to be duplicating itself. And, Danzig, at this stage, looked like an even easier plum for Adolf Hitler to pluck than was Sudetenland.

> Pope Pius XII was this week reported (by Jules Sauerwein, foreign editor of the Paris-Soir) to have invited the Prime Ministers of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy and Poland to meet in the Vatican to settle the Polish-German dispute (and possibly others) amicably.

>Defensive booms across Gibraltar’s harbor entrances were removed when the German fleet steamed back to the Atlantic, bound for Lisbon to observe Portuguese “Navy Day.” At Lisbon the Germans encountered a cool reception from the leery Portuguese, who considered the Nazi junket “highly inopportune.”

> In an attempt to forestall Encirclement in the Baltic, Führer Adolf Hitler invited Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia to conclude non-aggression pacts with Germany. Latvia and Estonia jumped at the chance. The other four countries reserved judgment until their foreign ministers had a chance to meet at Stockholm, agree on a common policy. Sharpest opposition to acceptance of the offer appeared in Norway.