Law: Ex Parte Snatch

In February 1936 the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the death sentence conviction of a smalltime crook named Gooch for the abduction of two sheriffs from Paris, Tex. to Pushmataha County, Ark. Kidnapper Gooch and a pal did what they did to thwart arrest for a series of robberies. In a scuffle preceding the abduction one of the sheriffs was injured in the leg, thus enabling the jury at Gooch’s trial to recommend the death penalty under the Lindbergh Law. Gooch was executed.

Potency of the Lindbergh Law depends on Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, interpretations of which have been so notoriously contradictory. Currently in the Illinois Law Review a smart young Louisiana State University law professor named Thomas A. Cowan licks his legal chops in a fancifully-written article which shows just how loose has been the courts’ usage of this Constututional phrase, “commerce . . . among the several States.” Crux of Lawyer Cowan’s thesis is that the U. S. Supreme Court has been willing to expand the meaning of “interstate commerce” when a law involves “morals,”* but has narrowly circumscribed Congress’ power where business and industry were concerned. With many an obscure legal phrase and many a learned footnote, Lawyer Cowan pokes fun at legalists as only another legalist can. He sets forth how, in an “exhaustive and painstaking opinion,” a learned jurist whom he calls Alyce has settled once & for all the subject matter of “interstate commerce.”

The hypothetical case which Justice Alyce decides, modeled after thefacts of the Gooch case, is called Ex parte Snatch. Oscar Snatch, a candidate for the senior class presidency of Siwash College, situated ten miles from a State line, kidnapped his rival, one Jeremiah Kelly, held him for seven days prior to the election. According to Candidate Snatch’s story at his trial, after being indicted under the Lindbergh Law, he seized Candidate Kelly, bundled him into a darkened automobile and drove toward the State line but did not cross it. In the preliminary scuffle Jeremiah Kelly tripped & fell trying to get away, broke a leg. Oscar Snatch was convicted on the ground that he had kidnapped his rival for “ransom or reward or otherwise.” Since the victim was missing seven days, the law presumed he had been transported in interstate commerce. The jury chose to believe a State line had been crossed, recommended the death penalty because Candidate Kelly had not been released unharmed.

In his opinion denying Snatch’s appeal, Justice Alyce says: “Unquestionably Snatch has been engaged in commerce, for no one can deny that he has done something. And precedent is abundant that doing anything is commerce. Thus, cows ranging back and forth over State lines because their owners have neglected to fence them in are engaged in commerce (Thornton v. U. S.). . . . However, Snatch is technical. He says that commerce has to do with trade, business, commercial enterprise, adventure involving profit or loss. . . .

“Snatch claims that a State line cannot be crossed presumptively. … In law anything may be done presumptively. . . . Since the law does not know that Snatch did not cross the State line, it is perfectly proper to assume that he did. . . . If presumptions of this sort were not permitted district attorneys might be put to considerable trouble to prove their cases. We are not unmindful of certain theoretical difficulties inherent in presuming that State lines have been crossed. For example, it would never do to presume that the United States Steel Corporation is engaged in interstate commerce. Similarly, we could not presume that dealers in live poultry are engaged in interstate commerce. In fact, we cannot conceive how this could even be proved [Schechter (NRA) case]. If Congress, by statute should presume that the products of the bituminous coal industry move in interstate commerce, we should have no hesitation in setting the act aside [Carter Coal Co. (Guffey) case]. . . . These instances . . . involve rights of property; Snatch is arguing for personal liberty. The two must not be confused. . . .” Here the Justice proceeds to Oscar Snatch’s contention that he was denied due process of law:

“This is admittedly a tough nut to crack. If judges have . . . political or economic predilections . . . they are scrupulously suppressed. . .. Judges are moralists and good fellows. They like to see people get a square deal. For example, any railroad company which has not had its tax assessment lowered since the Depression . . . may have its tax bill cut down by this court [Great Northern Ry. v. North Dakota]. This is the type of legislative tyranny which is clearly a violation of due process. . . . We shall give back any money exacted as taxes . . . for the benefit of farmers . . . but we shall have nothing to say if the money is for no one in particular [Hoosac Mills (AAA) case]. And do not ask us to return money exacted from consumers for the benefit of manufacturers in the form of tariff duties. . . .

“The analogy between [the Gooch] case and this is too close to be ignored. If [the Supreme Court] was right then, this court is right now. . . . Judgment affirmed.” Lawyer Cowan finally reports that the President denied Kidnapper Snatch’s petition for clemency, being a lawyer himself.

*Kidnapping (Lindbergh Law), white slavery (Mann Act), transporting stolen automobiles (Dyer Act).