National Affairs: Reluctant Fist

The anti-de Cespedes revolution in Luba was barely a day old last week when Secretary of the Navy Claude Augustus Swanson strode out of the White House and thrust himself into the thick of it. Not since this 71-year-old Virginian took office in the Cabinet had the Washington air been so electric with martial preparations. Fresh from the Presidential presence, he felt the thrill of national excitement as newshawks clustered about him plied him with questions.

“Mr. Secretary, we hear you’re going to Cuba?”

“Yep!” retorted the Navy’s chief drawing himself up importantly. “I’m sailing this afternoon on the Indianapolis.” “When do you get there?” “Friday. ” “What part of Cuba are you going to?” Havana — direct to Havana.” “Have you special instructions from the President?” “No special instructions,” and Secretary Swanson marched off to pack his bags. Within an hour big black headlines blazoned to the country the news that President Roosevelt was rushing his Secretary of the Navy to the heart of the Cuban crisis, presumably to command the U. S. naval demonstration already under way off Havana. Not stopping to read a newspaper Secretary Swanson motored to Annapolis, kissed his wife goodby, went speeding down Chesapeake Bay on the Navy’s finest and newest heavy cruiser.

The Indianapolis was hardly out in deep water before its wireless began to crackle irritably with messages from Washington. The President was seriously annoyed by Secretary Swanson’s impromptu sound-off on the White House steps. The Navy’s chief well knew there was no connection between his cruise to the Pacific and the Cuban crisis. He ceased his happy strutting long enough to radio a public message to his Washington office : “A wholly erroneous interpretation has been given to my trip. This trip to the west Coast was planned, as every one knows, a month ago. … I told Ambassador Welles I would drop in and visit him in Havana. … The President told me he saw no reason why I should not carry out my original plans. I have not been ordered to Havana. … The Cuban situation will continue to be handled from Washington by the President.” Secretary Swanson’s junket was further deflated 48 hours later when the Indianapolis swung around Morro Castle and dropped anchor almost over the spot where the Maine was sunk in Havana Harbor. At sight of the big grey man-o’-war excited Cubans along the waterfront began to shout: “Don’t welcome these Americans! They’ve come to kill us.” A white launch put out to the cruiser, carrying an Embassy secretary and the U. S. military attaché. They delivered a letter from Ambassador Welles advising Secretary Swanson not to come ashore, lest his presence stir angry demonstrations. The Cabinet officer stayed meekly on the cruiser. Two hours later the Indianapolis pulled up her hook, steamed off for Panama and the Pacific carrying the aged Secretary of the Navy definitely out of the Cuban picture.

Meanwhile the Cuban crisis had Washington screwed to a high pitch of nervous anxiety all week long. At 6 o’clock one morning Secretary of State Hull had been routed out by a telephone call from Ambassador Welles who reported that Provisional President de Cespedes, whom Washington had recognized and was actively assisting, had been overthrown by soldiers and students, that a radical junta was in power, that anything might happen (TIME, Sept. 11). Secretary Hull flashed the news to President Roosevelt, still asleep aboard the yacht Nourmahal down the Potomac, got his permission to order the first detachment of U. S. warships to Cuba to protect U. S. lives (5,000) and property ($1,000,000,000). The Nourmahal sped the President back to Washington where he promptly called Secretary Hull, Secretary Swanson and Assistant Secretary of State Jefferson Caffery to the White House. Mr. Caffery was slated to succeed Mr. Welles as U. S. Ambassador to Havana Sept. 15—an appointment which vexed such liberals as Oswald Garrison Villard of the Nation. Mr. Caffery was U. S. Minister to Colombia when that country granted the Barco concession to Gulf Oil Corp. (Mellon-owned) while getting a loan from National City Bank. Declared the Nation: “Mr. Caffery’s ready services to American Oil and Banking interests in Colombia disqualify him for his new task. Mr. Welles should stay in Cuba and see through what he has begun.” For once the Nation got its way when the White House conference indefinitely postponed Mr. Caffery’s going to Cuba. In Havana where the destroyer McFarland arrived by nightfall Ambassador Welles was having a hard time reporting conditions by telephone to Washington. Connections were bad after the hurricane. In addition Cuban politicos were eavesdropping on the wire, which prevented Mr. Welles from bluntly speaking his mind about people and policies, left President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull often in the dark. But what the Ambassador did manage to say caused Washington considerable uneasiness. Cuba seemed on the brink of going Red. More naval craft including the battleship Mississippi were ordered South. A regiment of Marines was mobilized at Quantico for foreign service. The President told the Press again & again that the iron fist of the U. S. was reluctant ; that armed intervention in Cuba was the last thing he wanted. Well aware how the warlike clatter in Washington would alarm Latin America, President Roosevelt executed one of his characteristic, precedent-breaking, common-sense moves. He had the State Department round up all the important Latin-American diplomats in Washington at the moment and bring them immediately to the White House. Argentina’s Dr. Felipe Espil was the only Ambassador on hand to respond to the summons. Mexico, Brazil and Chile sent their Counselors of Embassy. The four diplomats marched gravely into the President’s office, shook hands, sat down and heard him explain that: 1) He wanted their Governments to have all available information on Cuba, to understand what the U. S. was doing. 2) The U. S. had a legal right to intervene under the Platt Amendment to maintain order in Cuba but it had no desire to use that power unless Cuba went berserk. 3) He hoped Cuba would quickly set up a stable Government of its own choosing, which would end all thought of intervention. The four envoys left the White House smiling. Never before had a U. S. President thus taken Latin Americans into his confidence on foreign policy. He had asked for no specific support from their Governments but his candor and tact won him a favorable reaction throughout the hemisphere. Two days later Mexico, on its own initiative, asked Argentina, Brazil and Chile to join with it in impressing upon the Cuban Junta the necessity for a law & order government. While President Roosevelt was backing away from intervention diplomatically, his precautionary plans for military action went forward full blast. He did not intend to exert force but if he had to, he was going to be fully prepared to strike hard and fast. The light cruiser Richmond arrived off Havana from the Canal Zone. Aboard was square-jawed rear Admiral Charles S. Freeman, commander of the Special Service Squadron. Admiral Freeman, a quiet, cool-headed Pennsylvanian of 55, was put in charge of all naval vessels in Cuban waters. He went ashore at Havana, had his picture taken with Ambassador Welles, returned to his flagship and, while his sailors lusted for action, sat by awaiting orders to let the iron fist fly or pocket it. Within three days a dozen destroyers encircled Cuba, with another dozen awaiting steaming orders. The Mississippi hovered off Morro Castle. All available ships on the Atlantic Coast were on the move. At Quantico the 7th Regiment of Marines, Colonel Richard P. (“Terrible Terry”) Williams commanding, studied maps of Havana and Santiago, practiced the “occupation and pacification of towns,” while awaiting overseas orders. When a formation of six big Navy seaplanes whizzed over Cuba in a non-stop record flight from Norfolk to Panama natives thought U. S. forces had already intervened.

President Roosevelt well realized that his naval demonstration, excitingly described in the Press, might stir up hot antagonism in Cuba. To newshawks he objected to the use of such phrases as “an armada of U. S. warships” in the Caribbean. He explained that, except for the Mississippi and Richmond, all the vessels in Cuban waters were “little bits of things,” incapable of landing a force sufficient to occupy the island. He pointed out that Cuba is 700 mi. long, that many ships were needed to patrol its shore line. No force had been put ashore and none would be unless serious disorders developed. Cuba, he insisted, presented a special case under the Platt Amendment and was by no means to be taken as the keynote of his whole Latin-American policy.