Naval Air Matters

Naval aeronautics last week went on trial before a Senate Committee. Sponsor of the investigation was Maryland’s Senator Millard Evelyn Tydings, bony-faced War veteran, whose Committee was authorized to inquire into “the conditions surrounding the type, speed and comparativity of fast pursuit and bombing planes with those of other nations and all other matters pertaining thereto.” In the background of the investigation there loomed up the old Navy controversy of battleship v. plane.

What started the investigation was the resignation of Lieut. Alford Joseph Williams Jr., the Navy’s fastest flyer (TIME, March 17). From the witness stand Lieut. Williams told his story.

At his request citizens had contributed $30,000 to construct at the naval aircraft factory at Philadelphia a racing plane for him to pilot in last year’s Schneider cup races in England. The plane. Mercury II, was 880 Ib. overweight, would not fly. He wanted to take it to England anyway, crack it up at the starting line and thus conceal the naval aircraft factory’s “bungling construction.” For six years the Navy had hampered his speed experiments. When in February he was ordered to sea duty, he resigned from the service in the belief that only in private aviation could he develop a plane fast enough to regain international speed honors for the U. S.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy David Sinton Ingalls in charge of naval aeronautics appeared next on the stand. He contradicted Lieut. Williams. His story:

The Navy had spent $174,000 on the Mercury. Lieut. Williams, who had a shore assignment for twelve years, had been ordered to sea at his own request, after the Mercury’s failure. “Such a romantic proposal” as a deliberate crack-up at the Schneider races was promptly vetoed. Lieut. Williams had been given opportunity to make his experiment a success.

But the scope of the questions before the committee was larger than the Williams case. Assistant Secretary Ingalls denied that the U. S. was behind other powers in fast combat planes, though the Navy has been experimenting steadily with aircraft, seeking to develop a combination of endurance and reliability with speed. Lack of funds has been a constant handicap. The Navy’s request for $3,000,000 to carry on aircraft development has been cut down to $2,000,000 per year for three successive years. In 1929 the Navy’s air fleet was given $32,089,000. This year it was cut to $31,430,000. For next year the service has asked for $32,230,000.

Today the Navy has 829 planes, including those for training purposes. Mr. In galls is sure that, in battle efficiency, bombing and scouting, these compare favorably with any other foreign airfleet. Aboard the giant carriers Lexington and Saratoga are carried 80 planes apiece, with a secret higher battle capacity. War plans call for the assignment of three planes to each battleship and large cruiser. In peace practice each such ship carries only two.

The importance of air control in naval combat was last month clearly emphasized in the fleet’s maneuvers off Haiti (TIME, March 24). Umpire of that theoretical conflict was Rear Admiral Thomas Pickett Magruder, whose criticisms of the Navy put him on the “waiting orders” list for months (TIME, Oct. 3, 1927). Scouting planes from the Lexington located the Saratoga and Langley just after daybreak while their flight decks were filled with aircraft. Admiral Magruder ruled that the Lexington planes damaged the Saratoga’s flight deck which was later destroyed by bombers from the Lexington. Likewise the Langley was put out of commission before her planes could rise and fight.

According to Admiral Magruder and the Navy’s Bureau of Navigation these maneuvers proved the “high vulnerability” of the carrier at the hands of an attacking squadron, which was offset by “the tremendous advantage in a main action by that side which had command of the air.”