The Little Unit That Couldn’t

The 48th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Georgia National Guard appears to exemplify all that can go wrong with the Total Force policy. Some $40 million a year was spent to train and equip the 48th, which was considered a crack Guard unit. In the event of war, it was scheduled to augment the regular Army’s 24th Mechanized Infantry Division. Said General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the 24th before he was tapped to lead Desert Storm: “I expect them to fight alongside us. They are, in fact, combat ready.”

But when the 24th Division was rushed to the gulf last August, the 48th, which was finally called up on Nov. 30, was replaced by a regular Army brigade. In December the 48th was put through a rigorous desert-warfare program at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. It was not until Feb. 28, the day the gulf war ended, that the 48th was deemed fit to fight.

Brigadier General William A. Holland, commander of the 48th until his dismissal last February, maintains his unit was a victim of Army politics. “There is no question I was the whipping boy of the Army,” Holland said. “They had us convinced that we weren’t worth a toot. But in mock battles we did well.” Army officials, however, insist that the 48th suffered from deficient leadership and training, poorly maintained equipment and key personnel sidelined with medical conditions. The 48th did set one record, however: the brigade spent more time at the NTC than any other unit since the training center opened in 1981.