China For Sale: Tools of Destruction

Even if China raised no cheers for George Bush’s concept of a new world order, it did not hinder allied action against Iraq during the gulf war. Its acquiescence, though often reluctant, included abstaining in a key vote in the United Nations Security Council. Now that the war is over, however, Beijing is breaking ranks on at least one front. New evidence indicates that the Chinese are peddling missiles and nuclear technology to Third World customers in defiance of multilateral efforts to ban such sales.

Beijing’s experts have secretly built a nuclear reactor that is now nearing completion in the Algerian desert, American officials say. U.S. intelligence has also learned that China has sent Pakistan parts for its M-11 missile system, which can propel an 1,100-lb. warhead 180 miles, and is negotiating the sale to Syria of its M-9 missile, with a range of 375 miles. With the Chinese missiles, Pakistan could target major cities and military installations in India, and Syria could put all of Israel under threat.

Mobile launchers for the M-11 arrived in Pakistan last month along with dummy missile frames for practice launches. Pakistani air force technicians are now undergoing training in China. Both of the Chinese missiles are considered more accurate and reliable than the Soviet-designed Scuds that Iraq rained on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the war.

Washington’s evidence on the reactor in Algeria comes from satellite photographs and other intelligence data. “Most of the structure is finished,” says a U.S. official. “We don’t know if any nuclear fuel is there. We don’t think it is in operation.” What worries the watchers is that the reactor was built in secret and that its capacity — estimated at between 15 and 40 megawatts — is too small for generating electricity but too large for research. The likely conclusion, they say, is that its purpose is to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

If China covertly delivers nuclear fuel to Algeria or transfers M-9 missiles to Syria, it is violating specific, public commitments. The sale of missiles to Pakistan would not break any formal Chinese pledges but would overstep the guidelines set by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) agreed on by 15 countries. Even though China is not a party to that agreement, under U.S. law the violation could trigger economic sanctions against Beijing.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s traditional reply to reports of such sales is that they are “utterly groundless.” One reason for U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft’s controversial visit to Beijing in December 1989 was his effort to head off the M-9 sale to Syria. He got a general promise that China would not sell medium-range missiles to Middle East countries and a specific statement that China had no plans to sell the M-9 to Syria.

Asked last week about the nuclear-reactor project, a Foreign Ministry official in Beijing said, “We have never heard of that,” and promptly changed the subject. Even in public, Chinese leaders make little pretense of being serious about controlling missiles and conventional armaments. They repeat pious slogans about eliminating nuclear weapons but otherwise imply that they will do what they wish with their “prudent and responsible” arms sales.

China never signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and did not take part in the recent MTCR conference in Tokyo. Because China did not attend, says Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, “it is not committed to implementing the agreement.”

In China’s faltering economy, the military has strong incentives to sell weapons abroad, even if it causes political problems. “When an arms deal happens to clash with the country’s foreign policy,” explains a Chinese defense analyst, “the military may operate independently, leaving damage control to the government.” Some experts also believe the generals have had more political influence over such decisions since they crushed the pro- democracy movement by rolling tanks into Tiananmen Square in June 1989.

China’s defense budget is so low — officially just in excess of $6 billion for 1991 — that the 3.2 million-member People’s Liberation Army has for years raised extra money by producing consumer goods for sale at home and expensive weaponry for customers abroad. The defense establishment has thus become a major hard-currency earner, though its overseas sales to Third World countries fell from $4.7 billion in 1987 to $1.1 billion in 1989.

The pressure to modernize the arsenal by raising money through arms sales is stronger than ever. Chinese commanders were shaken by the performance of U.S. high-tech hardware in the gulf war. Just three weeks ago the government decided to increase defense spending 12%.

No matter who is making the decisions in Beijing, China’s current recklessness is leading toward confrontation. The U.S. asked Beijing last month for an explanation of the Algerian reactor project but so far has received no reply. If the Chinese continue on their present course and complete the deals with Algeria and Syria, relations between Washington and Beijing could become chillier than at any time since before Richard Nixon first went to China.