Diplomacy Change of Course

As Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze disappeared behind closed doors in Paris last week, the expectation was that they would work out some new approach to the problem of Afghanistan. But when Baker emerged two hours later, few were ready for the announcement he made.

Reversing a position that dates back to the Carter White House, Baker said the U.S. would withdraw diplomatic recognition of the Cambodian resistance coalition that includes the Khmer Rouge and would open talks with Vietnam about a Cambodian settlement. Officials in Washington and Moscow were caught off guard; diplomats in Hanoi and Beijing were stunned; and most Southeast Asian nations, with the exception of Thailand and Vietnam, were dismayed.

If the 180 degrees shift came as a shock, it should have been no real surprise. U.S. support of the bloodstained Khmer Rouge — however grudging — had long looked too contradictory and too immoral to sustain. The Bush Administration’s strategy has three goals: securing the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, preventing the Khmer Rouge’s return to power, and holding free elections to seat a new government.

Goal No. 1 was achieved last September when the last of Vietnam’s 200,000 combat troops returned home — though some have apparently returned to bolster the faltering Cambodian army. As for Goal No. 2, it never made sense for Washington to support a three-part coalition that included the Khmer Rouge while decrying the possible return to power of Pol Pot’s forces. With last week’s unequivocal shift away from the Khmer Rouge, the U.S. Administration finally brought strategy and policy into line on Goal No. 2, paving the way for movement on Goal No. 3.

The decision resulted primarily from the Administration’s belated recognition of battlefield realities in Cambodia and political realities on Capitol Hill. Over the past six months, the Khmer Rouge forces, an estimated 30,000 strong, have been pursuing a rural-based strategy similar to the one that enabled them to encircle and take the capital city of Phnom Penh in 1975. While the Khmer Rouge are stronger militarily than at any other time since they were chased from power by Vietnam 11 years ago, some well-informed analysts do not believe the gains made during this rainy season represent a dramatic shift of strength on the ground. As yet, no town of significant size or importance has fallen to the Khmer Rouge. Still, with fighting raging through the countryside, the situation could change swiftly.

While the Khmer Rouge have been pressing the regime of Prime Minister Hun Sen, Congress has been pressuring the White House. Lawmakers have been growing increasingly alarmed at the possibility of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge forces, which were responsible for the death of at least 1 million fellow Cambodians during their reign of terror from 1975 to 1978. Last month the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted against further covert aid to the tripartite coalition; the corresponding House committee was expected to follow suit. Two weeks ago, a bipartisan group of 11 Senators circulated a letter asking the Administration to alter its policy.

Congressional reaction to the policy reversal was largely positive. “This will help make it clear to one and all, at home and abroad, that the U.S. will have nothing to do with the Khmer Rouge,” said Representative Stephen Solarz, a New York Democrat. It seems likely that the Senate will follow the lead of the House and approve the Administration’s request for $7 million in overt aid to the two non-Khmer Rouge factions of the resistance, one headed by former Cambodian head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the other by former Prime Minister Son Sann. Some officials are ready for direct negotiations with Hun Sen, whom Washington has, until now, dismissed as a mere puppet of Vietnam. Baker himself suggested to the President two weeks ago that talks be opened with the Cambodian Prime Minister. In a decision made in typical Bush fashion — maximum secrecy, high domestic political content — Bush approved the move to withdraw diplomatic support of the guerrilla coalition but would go no further for now. That was still good news for those officials at the State Department, led by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, who have been arguing for months that the U.S. should distance itself from the Khmer Rouge. Explains an official familiar with Baker’s thinking: “It gets much harder, as the Khmer Rouge advance, for us to ignore the relationship between our allies and the Khmer Rouge and, by extension, between us and the Khmer Rouge.”

Only China now backs the Khmer Rouge. Last week Beijing issued a stern rebuke to Washington for withdrawing support from the resistance coalition and vowed to continue its support. “So long as Vietnam has not withdrawn all its troops from Cambodia genuinely,” said Jin Guihua, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, “China will continue to support the Cambodian people in their struggle against foreign invaders.” Beijing has not softened its hostility toward Hun Sen, but there are subtle signs that China may yet shift its position. Some officials now mention that Hun Sen’s grandfather was Chinese, seeming to hint at the possibility of a new relationship.

The decision to break with the Khmer Rouge eliminates a political and diplomatic embarrassment for the Bush Administration, but U.S. officials acknowledge that peace in Cambodia is unlikely until the Chinese agree to cut off aid to the Khmer Rouge. “As long as they get whatever they want from China, they will see no reason to go from the battlefield to elections,” says a congressional staffer. “They aren’t going to throw in the towel just because they lost their seat in the U.N.” The noncommunist resistance also sounds determined to carry on. From his residence in North Korea, Sihanouk branded the U.S. decision “an act of very serious injustice” and vowed to continue the fight.

If Cambodia’s future is still problematic, Vietnam’s looks more promising. Ever since the Vietnamese withdrew their troops from Cambodia, they have been eagerly waiting for the U.S. to restore diplomatic relations and end the trade embargo that deepens their desperate economic problems. By agreeing to open talks with Hanoi on the Cambodian issue, Baker has at least opened the door to the possibility of normalizing relations after 15 years of isolation.

Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, hailed the U.S. overture and expressed Hanoi’s readiness to talk. “It is the beginning of the thaw we have been waiting years for,” said Nguyen Xuan Oanh, a onetime South Vietnamese Vice Premier and now a national Assemblyman and an economic adviser to the government. “We are ready for anything.”

Last week Baker seemed to anticipate Hanoi’s enthusiasm and, wary of the political fallout in the U.S. from any cozying up to Vietnam, applied a brake. “This change in policy does not constitute a decision to normalize relations with Vietnam,” he cautioned. “We are just beginning a dialogue with Vietnam on Cambodia.” But he held out the promise that firm movement on a Cambodian settlement leading to free elections, coupled with greater cooperation in resolving questions about U.S. prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action, might lead to full diplomatic ties. After almost four decades of conflict in the region and millions of deaths, such normality seems a goal devoutly to be desired.

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CAPTION: CAMBODIA: UP FOR GRABS