Soviet Union Perestroika Hits the KGB

Compared with other government anterooms in Moscow, the lobby of the three- story, neoclassical building just across from the Zoomagazin pet shop at 22 Kuznetsky Most Street exudes a civilized calm. Near the entrance a red-and- gold sign proclaims that the public is welcome 24 hours a day. Two guards politely answer questions, and visitors can leaf through the neatly arranged newspapers while relaxing on comfortable brown leather sofas. This paragon of bureaucratic efficiency is the reception center of the Committee for State Security, better known by its initials: KGB.

Peeking into the orderly KGB waiting room, a block away from the headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Square, few would question that the Soviet security service has undergone a dramatic transformation since Stalin’s era, when numbed citizens queued for news of arrested relatives. Once a crude weapon of repression, it now functions as a sophisticated instrument of state control, both at home and abroad. But despite the change of image, the KGB still inspires fear and loathing. As a letter in the magazine Ogonyok put it last August, “The time has come to lift the curtain of secrecy from the KGB’s activities — otherwise how can it be controlled by a society that knows nothing about it?”

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has moved against the military and sharpened the knife to trim the party bureaucracy in his ambitious reform programs. The key question was whether he dared to take on the third pillar of Soviet power: the security establishment. An answer of sorts came at the party plenum two weeks ago. In a blitzkrieg shake-up of the leadership, Gorbachev named KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov, 65, head of a new commission on legal reform. Deputy KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, 64, leap-frogged over two more senior officials to get Chebrikov’s vacant post.

Western intelligence experts remain puzzled by the maneuver. Although Chebrikov apparently played a pivotal role in bringing Gorbachev to power in 1985, his recent public statements suggested that he was lukewarm about too much glasnost. If Chebrikov’s new job makes him a watchdog over the activities of the Soviet security forces, his position may have been strengthened. On the other hand, as the Central Committee’s new law-and-order secretary, he must deliver on Politburo promises to turn the Soviet Union into a nation “governed by law.” Otherwise, he could be trampled in the next leadership shuffle.

It is not clear whether Gorbachev handpicked Kryuchkov as his new KGB chief, but the two shared a common patron in Yuri Andropov. Kryuchkov, whose affectionate nickname is said to be “Kryuk” (meaning hook), accompanied Gorbachev to last December’s Washington summit, marking him as a man to watch. A specialist in international operations, Kryuchkov is not closely associated with repressing dissidents during Gorbachev’s democratization effort. His appointment may be a signal that the Kremlin now attaches greater priority to KGB activities abroad. In the view of a U.S. State Department Soviet expert, “Gorbachev wants to narrow KGB responsibilities and get them out of police work.”

There have been signs in the glasnost-era press that the security empire is no longer exempt from criticism. Last year Soviet readers were shocked by reports that Ukrainian KGB officers had been dismissed for falsely arresting a muckraking Soviet journalist. That news seems almost tame compared with a recent scandal in Odessa. A senior KGB officer and a public prosecutor reportedly trumped up corruption charges that led to the false arrest of as many as 60 local officials. When the story broke in the press, the accused officials sued for libel — and lost.

In line with the mounting pressure for greater openness, the KGB has launched a public relations campaign. During an interview with Pravda last month, Chebrikov asserted that his personnel were now emphasizing “new attitudes.” He acknowleged there had been “grave violations” of legality during Stalin’s days and stressed his support for “broader democracy and greater openness.”

Perhaps the most striking example of the agency’s “new thinking” was an article last month in the ideological journal Kommunist by Vladimir Rubanov, a department head in the KGB research institute. Rubanov argued for an end to “the cult of secrecy,” which was preventing the Soviet Union from becoming an “information” society. He pointed out that although foreign specialists were allowed to visit military sites, Soviet journalists often could not even visit factories and economic institutions.

Only three days after the change of KGB chiefs, the leadership was reshuffled in the most populous of the country’s 15 republics. Vitali Vorotnikov, 62, premier of the Russian Republic (population: 144 million), was kicked upstairs into the presidency, making way for Alexander Vlasov, 56, a Gorbachev protege, to succeed him. As Interior Minister of the U.S.S.R., Vlasov had overseen a massive clean-up of the corruption-riddled police force. Now, with changes under way in the KGB, Gorbachev must decide who will replace Vlasov as top cop.