An Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev

Any leader of the Soviet Union is inevitably and rightfully an object of worldwide curiosity. That interest is only increased by the secrecy and mystery that traditionally shroud the Kremlin. In the case of Mikhail Gorbachev, the world’s attention is intensified still further because he represents a new generation of Soviet leadership, a new attitude and a new style. But until last week, the General Secretary of the Communist Party had never met with Western journalists for a face-to-face interview. Now he has granted that first interview, a remarkably detailed, frank and far-ranging one, to a group from TIME: Henry A. Grunwald, editor in chief of Time Inc.; Ray Cave, managing editor of TIME; Richard Duncan, chief of correspondents; Moscow Bureau Chief James O. Jackson; and the Moscow Bureau’s Felix Rosenthal. Their report:

Newly back from a vacation on the Crimean seashore, Mikhail Gorbachev looks well tanned, just a bit ruddy in the cheek. He conveys an image of robust | health and naturally controlled energy. He is solid but not fat. He laughs easily.

He dominates a meeting with three extraordinary tools: eyes, hands and voice. The eyes go into action first. They are an intense dark brown. During conversation they will lock onto a listener and not let go until the listener gives some sign of acknowledgment, agreement–or flinches. The eyes are neither harsh nor kind. They are big and strong, and sometimes quick, too.

The hands have a variety of specific functions. The right often holds the steel-rimmed glasses, occasionally manipulating them when Gorbachev pauses to search for a word. The left hand talks. It can lecture, pointing with one finger, or declaim with the palm up, or thump with its edge on the table, karate style, but always quite gently. It is seldom still. Sometimes both hands work together, the fingers clasped, drumming the table for emphasis.

The voice is extraordinary, deep but also quite soft. Sometimes Gorbachev talks for several minutes in a near whisper, low and melodious. Then, without warning, his voice can cut across the room. It is not angry or bullying, just stronger than any other sound in the room. Occasionally the eyes, the hands and the voice reach peak power at the same time, and then it is clear why this man is General Secretary.

Resplendent in a well-tailored blue pinstripe suit, diagonally striped tie and gleaming white shirt, Gorbachev ushered the interviewers into a large, spare third-floor office lined with cream-colored silk wall coverings. On the walls hung portraits of Marx and Lenin. The center of action was a table flanked by 18 chairs, covered with green baize and amply supplied with plates of sweet pirozhki (bite-size pastries), mineral water, lemon soda and cut- glass vases filled with colored pencils. Extensively briefed by his aides, Gorbachev had brought along typewritten notes ruled in red, blue and green. He also brought an expert: seated next to him was Georgi Arbatov, Moscow’s best- known Americanologist. Viktor Sukhodrev, who has served as the top-level Kremlin interpreter since the Khrushchev era, again acted in that role.

At the end of the extensive interview, Grunwald lightened the serious tone by inquiring whether Gorbachev’s attractive wife Raisa would accompany the General Secretary to the summit talks in Geneva. Gorbachev said she would. “That’s good,” said Grunwald. “You know, the Western press is in love with her.” The jocular answer was vintage Gorbachev: “Well, in that case, maybe I should reconsider.”

TIME originally submitted six written questions, and Gorbachev then agreed to supplement his written answers with oral ones to other questions. Herewith the slightly condensed transcripts of the written interview, followed by more than two hours of conversation with his American visitors.

Q. How would you characterize U.S.-Soviet relations at this juncture, and what are the primary events that are defining that relationship?

A. Had you asked me this question some two months ago, I would have said that the situation in our relations was becoming somewhat better and that some hopes of positive shifts were appearing. To my deep regret, I could not say that today.

The truth should be faced squarely. Despite the negotiations that have begun in Geneva and the agreement to hold a summit meeting, relations between our two countries are continuing to deteriorate, the arms race is intensifying, and the war threat is not subsiding. What is the matter? Why is all this happening? My colleagues and I are quite exacting and self-critical when it comes to our own activities not only in this country but also outside of it, and we are asking ourselves again and again if (the decline in relations) is somehow connected with our actions. But what is there that we can reproach ourselves with in this context? In this critical situation Moscow is trying to practice restraint in its pronouncements about the U.S.; it is not resorting to anti-American campaigns, nor is it fomenting hatred for your country. We believe it very important that even in times of political aggravation the feeling of traditional respect harbored by the Soviet people for the American people should not be injured, and as far as I can judge, that feeling is largely a mutual one.

And is it bad that when the disarmament negotiations have resumed and preparations are under way for a first summit meeting in six years, we are persistently seeking ways to break the vicious circle and bring the process of arms limitation out of the dead end? That is precisely the objective of our moratorium on nuclear explosions and of our proposal to the U.S. to join it and to resume the negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests as well as of the proposals regarding peaceful cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in space. We are convinced that we should look for a way out of the current difficult situation together.

It is hard therefore to understand why our proposals have provoked such outspoken displeasure on the part of responsible U.S. statesmen. Attempts have been made to portray them as nothing but pure propaganda. Anyone even slightly familiar with the matter would easily see that behind our proposals there are most serious intentions and not just an attempt to influence public opinion. All real efforts to limit nuclear weapons began with a ban on tests –just recall the 1963 treaty that was a first major step in that direction. A complete end to nuclear tests would halt the nuclear arms race in the most dangerous area, that of qualitative improvement, and it would also seriously contribute to maintaining and strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

If all that we are doing is indeed viewed as mere propaganda, why not respond to it according to the principle of “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth”? We have stopped nuclear explosions. Then you Americans could take revenge by doing likewise. You could deal us yet another propaganda blow, say, by suspending the development of one of your new strategic missiles. And we would respond with the same kind of “propaganda.” And so on and so forth. Would anyone be harmed by competition in such “propaganda”? Of course, it could not be a substitute for a comprehensive arms-limitation agreement, but it would be a significant step leading to such an agreement.

The U.S. Administration has regrettably taken a different road. In response to our moratorium, it defiantly hastened to set off yet another nuclear explosion, as if to spite everyone. And to our proposals concerning a peaceful space, it responded with a decision to conduct a first operational test of an antisatellite weapon. As if that were not enough, it has also launched another “campaign of hatred” against the U.S.S.R.

What kind of impression does all this make? On the one hand, that of some kind of confusion and uncertainty in Washington. The only way I can explain this is anxiety lest our initiatives should wreck the version of the Soviet Union being the “focus of evil” and the source of universal danger, which in fact underlies the entire arms race policy. On the other hand, there is an impression of a shortage of responsibility for the destinies of the world. And this, frankly speaking, gives rise again and again to the question whether it is at all possible in such an atmosphere to conduct business in a normal way and to build rational relations between countries.

You asked me what is the primary thing that defines Soviet-American relations. I think it is the immutable fact that whether we like one another or not, we can either survive or perish only together. The principal question that we must answer is whether we are at last ready to recognize that there is no other way to live at peace with each other and whether we are prepared to switch our mentality and our mode of acting from a warlike to a peaceful track. As you say, live and let live. We call it peaceful coexistence. As for the Soviet Union, we answer that question in the affirmative.

Q. What do you think will be the results of your Geneva meeting with President Reagan in November? What specific actions should the U.S. and the Soviet Union take to improve relations?

A. Its outcome, after all, will depend to a great extent upon what is taking place now. Everyone would probably agree that the political atmosphere for talks takes shape well in advance. Neither the President nor I will be able to ignore the mood in our respective countries or that of our allies. In other words, actions today largely determine the “scenario” for our November discussions.

I will not hide from you my disappointment and concern about what is happening now. We cannot but be troubled by the approach that, as I see it, has begun to emerge in Washington. That is a scenario of pressure, of attempts to drive us into a corner, to ascribe to us, as so many times in the past, every mortal sin–from unleashing an arms race to “aggression” in the Middle East, from violations of human rights to some scheming or other even in South Africa. This is not a state policy, it is a feverish search for “forces of evil.”

We are prepared to have a meaningful and businesslike talk. We can also present claims: we have something to say about the U.S. being responsible for the nuclear arms race, and about its conduct in various regions of the world, and support to those who in effect engage in terrorism, and about violations of human rights in America itself, as well as in many countries close to it. But here is what I am thinking about: Is it worthwhile for the sake of that to set up a summit meeting? Abusive words are no help in a good cause.

But there is every indication that the other side is now preparing for something quite different. It looks as if the stage is being set for a bout between some kind of political “supergladiators” with the only thought in mind being how best to deal a deft blow at the opponent and score an extra point in this “bout.” What is striking about this is both the form and the content of some statements. The recent “lecture” of Mr. (Robert) McFarlane (the President’s National Security Adviser) is a case in point. It contains not only the full “set of accusations” we are going to be charged with in Geneva but also what I would call a very specific interpretation of the upcoming negotiations. It appears that even the slightest headway depends exclusively upon concessions by the Soviet Union, concessions on all questions –on armaments, on regional problems and even on our own domestic affairs.

If all this is meant seriously, then manifestly Washington is preparing not for the event we have agreed upon. The summit meeting is designed for negotiations, for negotiations on the basis of equality and not for signing an act of someone’s capitulation. This is all the more true since we have not lost a war to the U.S., or even a battle, and we owe it absolutely nothing. Nor for that matter, does the U.S. owe us.

But if the bellicose outcries are not meant seriously, then they are all the more inappropriate. Why flex muscles needlessly? Why stage noisy shows and transfer the methods of domestic political struggles to the relations between two nuclear powers? In them the language of strength is useless and dangerous. There is still time before the summit meeting, and quite a lot can be done for it to be constructive and useful. But this, as you will understand, depends on both sides.

Q. What is your view of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) research program in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations?

A. We cannot take in earnest the assertions that the SDI would guarantee invulnerability from nuclear weapons, thus leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of our experts (and, to my knowledge, of many of yours), this is sheer fantasy. However, even on a much more modest scale, in which the Strategic Defense Initiative can be implemented as an antimissile defense system of limited capabilities, the SDI is very dangerous. This project will, no doubt, whip up the arms race in all areas, which means that the threat of war will increase. That is why this project is bad for us and for you and for everybody in general.

From the same point of view we approach what is called the SDI research program. First of all, we do not consider it to be a research program. In our view, it is the first stage of the project to develop a new ABM system prohibited under the treaty of 1972. Just think of the scale of it alone–$70 billion to be earmarked for the next few years. That is an incredible amount for pure research, as emphasized even by U.S. scientists as well. The point is that in today’s prices those appropriations are more than four times the cost of the Manhattan Project (the program for development of the atom bomb) and more than double the cost of the Apollo program that provided for the development of space research for a whole decade–up to the landing of man on the moon. That this is far from being a pure research program is also confirmed by other facts, including tests scheduled for space strike weapons systems.

That is why the entire SDI program and its so-called research component are a new and even more dangerous round of the arms race. It is necessary to prevent an arms race in space. We are confident that such an agreement is possible and verifiable. (I have to point out that we trust the Americans no more than they trust us, and that is why we are interested in reliable verification of any agreement as much as they are.)

Without such an agreement it will not be possible to reach an agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons either. The interrelationship between defensive and offensive arms is so obvious as to require no proof. Thus, if the present U.S. position on space weapons is its last word, the Geneva negotiations will lose all sense.

Q. You have taken several steps to improve the Soviet economy. What further steps do you propose to take? What are the main problems of the Soviet economy?

A. It is often asserted in the West that it would take the U.S.S.R. 50 to 100 years to restore all that had been destroyed as a result of the fascist invasion. Having restored their national economy in the shortest possible time, the Soviet people did what would have seemed the impossible. But the fact remains that after the Revolution we were forced to spend almost two decades, if not more, on wars and reconstruction. Under those arduous conditions, using our system’s potential, we have succeeded in making the Soviet Union a major world power. This has attested to the strength and the immense capabilities of socialism.

There are also difficulties of a different nature due to our own shortcomings and deficiencies. We make no secret of this. Sometimes we do not ^ work well enough. We have not yet learned proper managerial skills as is required by a modern economy. The imperative of our time is to decisively improve the state of things. Hence the concept of accelerated social and economic development. Today it is our most important, top-priority task. We are planning to make better use of capital investments, to give priority to the development of such major industries as engineering, electrical engineering and electronics, energy production, transport and others. Attention remains focused also on the agri-industrial complex, especially as regards processing and storage of agricultural produce. We will do all that is necessary to better meet demand in high-quality food products.

To improve the functioning of the national economy it will be necessary to further strengthen centralization in strategic areas of the economy through making individual branches, regions and elements of the economy more responsive to the needs of economic development. But at the same time we are seeking to strengthen democratic principles in management, to broaden the autonomy of production associations, enterprises, collective and state farms, to develop local economic self-management and to encourage initiative and a spirit of enterprise.

In short, we seek the most rational method of managing the economy. Large- scale economic experiments are under way that are aimed essentially at developing a more efficient mechanism of management that would dramatically accelerate the rate of scientific and technological progress and make better use of all resources. Our objective is that in solving this task, all levels of material and moral incentives and such tools as profit, pricing, credit and self-sufficiency of enterprises should be put to work. That is the thrust of our work for radical improvement in the entire system of management and planning.

In addition, we are bringing into play other potentials for speeding up economic development. I mean greater discipline and order, demanding more from everyone, from worker to minister, a drive against irresponsibility and red tape, instilling labor ethics, ensuring greater social justice throughout the whole of society.

So we have enough economic problems and things to attend to, and indeed what country doesn’t? We are aware of our problem, and we are confident of the capabilities inherent in our social system and our country. I have recently visited various regions, had meetings with many people–workers and < farmers, engineers and scientists. And what was common to all those meetings? Need for a drastic change and the necessity to radically improve performance are not only supported by the people but becoming their demands, the real imperative of our time.

I want to emphasize this: the attention we have recently devoted to the economy is due not to an intention to set new records in producing metals, oil, cement, machine tools or other products. The main thing is to make life better for people. There is no goal more important to us. This year alone the decision was made to raise the salaries of several categories of engineers and technicians, to improve the material status of a considerable number of retired people, to allocate annually, free of charge, about 1 million plots of land for planting orchards, for people to have what you call a “second home.” We are planning many other steps as well. Their scope will naturally depend on progress in the economy. Of late, positive changes have become evident: the rates of industrial production and labor productivity have increased.

You ask what changes in the world economy could be of benefit to the Soviet Union. First of all, although this belongs more to politics than economics, an end to the arms race. We would prefer to use every ruble that today goes for defense to meet civilian, peaceful needs. As I understand, you in the U.S. could also make better use of the money consumed nowadays by arms production. While insisting on cessation of the arms race, we also believe it immoral to waste hundreds of billions on developing means of annihilation, while hundreds of millions of people go hungry and are deprived of the elementary essentials. We, all of us, just have no right to ignore the situation.

Q. The Soviet Union is anxious to gain better access to advanced technology developed in the U.S. How badly is this needed in the Soviet Union, and primarily for what purpose? If the U.S. does not provide greater access, where do you intend to turn to obtain this technology?

A. The very way you are framing the question gives food for thought. Is there anyone who is not anxious nowadays to gain access to advanced technology? Everyone is, including the U.S.–even primarily the U.S. I mean not only the legal purchase of licenses and science-intensive goods or illegal industrial espionage. The U.S. practices its own specific methods as well. The brain drain, for example, and not only from Western Europe but from the developing countries as well. Or take the activities of transnational corporations, which through their subsidiaries are laying their hands on scientific and technological achievements of other countries.

As for the Soviet Union, it uses the achievements of foreign science and technology in a much more modest way. Those selling the idea of the U.S.S.R. allegedly being consumed with thirst for U.S. technology forget who they are dealing with and what the Soviet Union is today. Having won technological independence after the Revolution, it has long been enjoying the status of a great scientific and technological power. This enabled us to blaze the trail in space and to undertake space research on a large scale, to acquire a reliable defense potential and to successfully develop the country’s productive forces. Incidentally, how are we to understand the following inconsistency in the U.S. reasoning? To substantiate increased military spending, all they do in the U.S. is talk about the fantastic achievements of the U.S.S.R. in the field of technology. When, on the other hand, they need an excuse for prohibitive measures, they portray us as a backward country of yokels, with which to trade and to cooperate would mean undermining one’s own “national security.” So where is the truth? What is one to believe?

We speak openly about our dissatisfaction with the scientific and technological level of this or that type of product. Yet we are counting on accelerating scientific and technological progress not through “a transfer of technology” from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., but through “transfusions” of the most advanced ideas, discoveries and innovations from Soviet science to Soviet industry and agriculture, through more effective use of our own scientific and technological potential. That is the thrust of our plans and programs. At the same time, we would naturally not like to forgo those additional advantages that are provided by reciprocal scientific and technological cooperation with other countries, including the U.S.

The ’70s have seen fairly broad development of such cooperation in the energy field, including nuclear power, in chemistry, space research, cardiology and other fields. The benefit was mutual, and U.S. scientists are well aware of it. This cooperation has by now come to naught. We regret it, but let me assure you that we will survive because we have first-class science of our own and because the U.S. is far from having a monopoly on scientific ; and technological achievements.

By the way, the U.S., being aware of this, is trying to apply growing pressure on its allies so that they too should not trade with us in science- intensive products. What is more, the U.S., under the very same “national security” pretext, places a ban on deliveries of some types of such products to Western Europe and ever more frequently denies access to U.S. laboratories and scientific symposiums to representatives of Western Europe.

Yet I would not wish to end (these written answers) on a negative note. I should like to convey to the readers of your magazine wishes of good endeavor, happiness and a peaceful future. On behalf of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people, I would like once again to tell all Americans the most important thing they should know: war will not come from the Soviet Union. We will never start war.

The General Secretary formally passed his answers to TIME’s written questions, signed by him, across the table. “I’m giving this to you in a green folder,” said Gorbachev. “Not even a hint of the export of revolution.” He then began the spoken interview with an opening statement.

I have a great many requests for various speeches, statements and interviews, but let me just say why–and I took counsel with my colleagues in the Soviet leadership on this–we decided to respond to the request put in by TIME.

First of all, when I first saw the way your questions were formulated, I felt–maybe I’m mistaken, and if I am, correct me–that the questions themselves reflected concern about the state of SovietAmerican relations. Unfortunately, that is something that we don’t hear all that often in our contact and conversations with representatives of U.S. political or other circles. I felt that that in itself was very important if the questions themselves reflected concern. There is another reason of no less importance. And that is connected with our assessment of the situation in the world. That situation today is highly complex, very tense. I would even go so far as to say it is explosive. And as we see it, the situation in the world has a tendency toward deterioration. I do not want to set out our views as to the source of this present situation. I believe that you yourselves understand, and you are familiar with the situation as it stands today. So therefore I believe that it would be best of all to try and give a response to the question of where we stand, in what kind of a world we’re living, at what / stage we are in world development.

I would not like to overdramatize the situation in my response to this major question on which a great deal depends. So I believe that if we were to touch upon the question of the leaders of two such great nations as the U.S. and the Soviet Union, then surely in all of their way of thinking, in their analyses, in the practical conclusions that they draw therefrom, their starting point should be an awareness of the tremendous responsibility that rests upon them as leaders of two such nations.

It is in that spirit that I would like to try to answer the question that I myself formulated just a short while ago. Today it is a reality that the development of science and technology has reached a level where the broad- scale introduction of new achievements, particularly in the military field, can lead to an entirely new situation and an entirely new phase in the arms race (Star Wars).

I endeavored in my replies to your (written) questions to be very sincere and very frank in the hope that this will not be treated as “one more propaganda exercise by Moscow.” I endeavored to say that at present, even today, it is very hard indeed to reach accord, to come to terms. There are so many accretions, so many exacerbations, such a lack of confidence, that it is even hard to begin moving toward each other. But if we were to come in the future to this new phase, and to open up a new stage in the military sphere, then surely the question is: Could we really deal with these matters? Would not there be a temptation on one or the other side to believe, “At last we have overtaken our partner. Is it not time then to seek to achieve superiority and to untie our hands in the field of foreign policy?”

Given the present exacerbated state of relations between our two countries and the present aggravations in the world at large, we must admit that today, thus far, there do exist certain restraints on the actions of either side. There is strategic parity. That is, after all, the foundation of equal security. There are also still in effect such treaties as the ABM treaty, the SALT II provisions, the nonproliferation treaty, the banning of nuclear weapons tests in three environments. To this day, so far, they are in operation. But even today, attempts are being made to remove these restraints or at least to raise the question of overturning the treaties, of abrogating them.

So when opportunities appear to take the path of creating and developing absolutely new types of arms, well then, of course, a new era will come about. We must give thought to this. So if the situation were to arise, if somebody were to give in to these illusions–and they can be nothing but illusions, because history shows that if one side has plans, the other side has counterplans; if one side wants to take some measures, the other side takes countermeasures; if there is a poison, there is an antidote–that is the lesson of history. So the question is: Where do we go from here?

And this brings me to the second point, my second reason why I decided to give this interview. That reason is that time is passing, and it might be too late. The train might have already left the station. If we are realists–and we hope we all are, we all want to live, none of us wants to be destroyed –then we must muster the political will and the wisdom and stop this process, and begin the process of eliminating weaponry, and the process of improving, invigorating relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

Perhaps we have too high an opinion of ourselves, but we feel that we are realists, both in terms of our policies and in terms of our practical actions. We believe that we do not simply limit ourselves to appeals, mere appeals for disarmament and improvement in relations. We act likewise.

We want to show our intentions and we also want to show by our actions what steps we are counting on the American side to take. Yet all our attempts to somehow escape this present bad situation in Soviet-American relations, attempts to somehow lead matters toward ending the arms race, toward relaxing tensions, toward disarmament–all these attempts come up against a negative position of the U.S. Administration. We keep hearing one and the same answer: “No, no, no. It’s propaganda, propaganda, propaganda.” Surely the most responsible people in the land cannot, should not, conduct themselves in that way in respect to their opposite numbers.

This reminds me–maybe it’s a little out of place, but it reminds me of a story, a true story. For quite a few years there was one Minister of Finance in the Russian Federation government. His name was Ivan Ivanovich. He was rather old and would doze off at the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Whenever you would wake him up, no matter what you asked him about, he would always say, “No money, there’s no money.” We would hope that the American Administration has not given us its final word.

– We hope that our understanding of these matters and of the direction in which we want things to move will, through your magazine, be brought to the attention of the U.S. public. This is the view of the Soviet leadership, so when I say these things it is a responsible statement.

We must not allow things to go so far as confrontation between our two countries. This is a reflection of the interests of our two peoples and of the politicians who represent them. It is after all the people of the two countries who put the politicians into the positions they hold today. So it is in our interests to express those wishes in practical ways. We must seek ways to put an end to the arms race, to seek disarmament, to switch Soviet-American relations onto a normal track. Surely, God on high has not refused to give us enough wisdom to find ways to bring us an improvement in our relations, an improvement in relations between the two great nations on earth, nations on whom depends the very destiny of civilization. We for our part are ready to take that role.

What I said is particularly acute and topical because we get information about the political atmosphere in Washington, and that information disconcerts and disappoints us. (Reading from papers in front of him.) Here are some of the reports we’ve heard emanating from Washington just this last week. In one report the White House intimates that there can be no agreements with the Soviet Union on limitation of U.S. strategic programs, and the most that can be expected is agreement on a kind of agenda for the future. That agenda is to be considered over a period of many years, if not decades. Meanwhile and parallel with such a discussion, new types of arms would be developed, including space systems.

Now that is not some kind of information cooked up by any Soviet correspondent in Washington. That information is based on what is written by the American media. Or here is a report about some statements made by (U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael) Armacost and (U.S. Strategic Weapons Negotiator John) Tower in interviews. Some other statements. We can discern that some of these statements are actually designed to make the product look better, or designed to hide the actual true meaning behind the words. But the main thrust of what they want to say is that it is essential to do everything possible to ward off, even to prevent, the slightest opportunity of reaching any accord with the Soviets on space-weapons bans or on the ban on nuclear testing. Now from these pronouncements made by Tower it appears that nothing depends on whatever the Soviet Union does at the talks in Geneva or in the military field. The U.S. will still go on developing antisatellite systems. It will go on developing space weapons systems. So here you see how certain people in the U.S. are driving nails into this structure of our relationship, then cutting off the heads. So the Soviets must use their teeth to pull them out.

So how are we to react to this kind of thing? We must all of us do all we can to end this present negative process in our bilateral relations, and proceed toward ending the arms race, and proceed seriously toward disarmament. I do believe it is in the best interests of the Soviet Union and the U.S. After all, there have been countless attempts in the past to bring us to our knees, to bring us to the point of utter exhaustion. But all such attempts have been in the past, and will be in the future, doomed to utter failure. We have never accused the U.S. of being an “evil empire.” We understand what the U.S. is, what the American people are, and the role they are playing and will play in the world. We are certainly in favor of beginning a new phase in Soviet-American relations. But let me repeat that perhaps if a new phase appears, a phase still worse than the present one, this goal will be all the harder to achieve, if it is possible at all. Then a process might be launched that would be simply impossible even to conceive of today. That is why we are calling upon the U.S. to reach an accord with us on the basis of equal security, to reach an accord first and foremost on all three components, the most dangerous strategic offensive arms, medium-range arms and space weapons.

Q. You have spoken just now about “certain people” in Washington who seem to you to be trying to undermine the progress of U.S.-Soviet relations, but President Reagan himself has said on a number of occasions that there is no hostility toward the Soviet Union, that he is not seeking unilateral advantage or superiority over the Soviet Union. How do you take these assurances from the President? Do you accept them? More broadly, what are your impressions so far of President Reagan?

A. Let me just say at least that our attention certainly was drawn to certain positive elements contained in some of the President’s remarks. We note some of his public statements in 1983 and 1984–I recall one speech I think was made at the United Nations–so we do duly respond to those positive elements when we see them. One of those statements was that war was inadmissible, that nuclear war was not winnable, and of course we gave our attention to the statement. Then we also paid due attention to his statement that the U.S. was not seeking superiority over the Soviet Union. These are very positive elements, and we believe that we could and should find positive elements in other spheres as well. They could all give us opportunities to cast a responsible glance at the state of our relations and especially toward the future and to find a basis to overcome the present negative phase in the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

That is indeed why we agreed to hold the forthcoming summit meeting in the first place. We did so because we felt that we could do a lot by trying to meet each other halfway. That, again, is why we have reacted so sharply to some of the statements being made these days in connection with the summit. So we see that there are some who want to generate a situation to persuade the U.S. and the American public that, as (Columnist) Mary McGrory put it, even if the only thing to come out of the summit was an agreement to exchange ballet troupes, then even so people would be gleeful and happy.

We for our part have very serious intentions in respect to the summit. We are making very serious preparations for that meeting, and we shall be prepared to submit some very serious proposals, regardless of what some of Reagan’s advisers to the right or to the left–if I am correct he does not have any advisers on the left–regardless of what any of his advisers try to sell to him. If we did not believe in the possibility of bringing about an improvement in our relations, we never would have agreed to have the Geneva summit in the first place. That is our considered position.

About my impression of President Reagan, I have not had a chance to meet him or talk to him or see him in person, so it is hard for me to give you any human impressions, but politically of course I can say what my impression is. I regard him as President of the U.S., a man elected to his high office by the American people, and therefore our attitude toward President Reagan is prompted by our feeling of respect for the people of the U.S. We are therefore prepared to do business with him and to treat him with the respect that is befitting him.

– Q. You said that you wished to reach accords in three areas, including space weapons. Yet from much of the commentary that one reads coming from the Soviet Union, there seems to be really no room for any agreements on space weapons because the only thing you want with regard to them is to stop them, to stop all research even in the narrowest and almost academic sense.

A. If there is no ban on the militarization of space, if an arms race in space is not prevented, nothing else will work. That is our firm position and it is based on our assessment, an assessment that we regard as being highly responsible, an assessment that takes into account not only our own interests but the interests of the U.S. as well. We are prepared to negotiate, but not about space weapons or about what specific types of space weapons could be deployed into space. We are prepared to negotiate on preventing an arms race in space.

In Geneva the Soviet Union proposed a ban on the development, including research, testing and deployment, of space strike weapons. Therefore, as we see, our proposed ban would embrace all stages in the birth of this new kind of arms.

Research is something we regard as part of the overall program for the development of space weapons. When, therefore, we see tens of billions of dollars being earmarked for such research, it is clear to us what the design is of the authors of such research and what is behind the specific policy pursued with regard to outer space. Now, when the question comes up about research, and the question of banning research, what we have in mind is not research in fundamental science. Such research concerning space is going on and it will continue. What we mean is the designing stage, when certain orders are given, contracts are signed, for specific elements of the systems. And when they start building models or mockups or test samples, when they hold field tests, now that is something–when it goes over to the designing stage –that is something that can be verified. So we believe this process is verifiable. So if money is appropriated for such research, then that research has to culminate in the designing of mockups, models that are elements of the system, and that can be verified through national technical means of verification. There will have to be field tests of various components. After all, if we can now, from our artificial earth satellites, read the numbers on automobiles down on earth, surely we can recognize these things when they come to that stage. So therefore we can say flatly that verification is proper.

But the main thing is that if all this work on space weaponry were to stop at this stage, then no one would have any more interest in going over to the next stage in the process of designing and developing, because nobody would think of appropriating any more money for these purposes if it were known that money could not subsequently be used. But on the other hand, if billions and billions of dollars had already been spent on research, then nobody is going to stop because all that money had been invested in SDI. And so then, once space weapons are deployed, once they are in space, then nobody could control that process. And that is what I mean when I say that we would come to an unpredictable phase in relations. And of course you have to bear in mind that the other side is not going to be dozing all this time. That is something you may be very sure of.

When they talk about the purely scientific research nature of the SDI at this stage, they do so to somehow conceal that what is under way today is the whole process of developing space-weapons systems. The very fact that the U.S. is now planning to test a second-generation antisatellite system is fraught with the most serious consequences. We will surely react. This test, in effect a test of a second-generation ASAT system, means in fact testing an element of a space-based ABM.

This we are witnessing against the background of a negative response to our proposal for the U.S. to join the moratorium on nuclear explosions. The U.S. does not want to join that moratorium for one simple reason, among others: the U.S. needs nuclear testing to provide the nuclear element for space lasers. It has to be used to produce an X-ray laser effect. All these are elements in the space-based antiballistic missile defense. Think then what would happen if the whole thing goes full steam ahead. We believe America should give honest thought to these matters before proceeding further.

I guess that somebody in the U.S. must have thought they would be able to forge ahead of the Soviet Union, to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union through these programs. That is something that would never succeed: come what may, we will find an accurate response to any challenge. But if that transpires, it will mean the burial of all negotiations, and when we might return to the negotiating table, nobody can say.

All this may of course suit the U.S. military-industrial complex, but we, on our part, have no intention of working for the U.S. military-industrial complex. Our proposals, we firmly believe, are in the best interests not only of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, but equally in the best interests of the American people and the U.S.

That is why our proposals cause the most irritation on the part of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. We notice that by the behavior of some in the U.S. Administration. There are some there that can certainly be regarded as representatives of the U.S. military-industrial complex. We can feel their presence.

But we do have a large reserve of constructive ideas, and will continue to invite the U.S. Administration to take a different approach. If a different approach is taken by the U.S. Administration, that will open up tremendous possibilities in the field of strategic arms, medium-range arms, in the entire area of armaments. It will open wide an avenue for a broad-based process for improving relations between our two countries.

I was recently in the town of Dnepropetrovsk, and in the street there a worker asked me, “Now what is all this Star Wars that people are talking about, this new idea that Reagan is proposing, Star Wars? Aren’t you afraid the U.S. might trick us in the talks?” And I said, “No, have no fear. We will not allow that to happen. We will not allow ourselves to be tricked.”

But if the other side displays readiness to seek solutions to these problems, we will be equally prepared, come what may, to leave no stone unturned to seek accommodation. I firmly believe our position is humane. It is not selfish, it meets the interests of the U.S. as it does the interests of the Soviet Union and indeed all nations. Surely the U.S. has areas where it can invest money. We know that you have your own problems; perhaps we are less familiar with your problems than we are with ours, but we certainly do know that you have some problems. And we know that you have an area where you can invest money.

Q. The events of recent weeks, such as the U.S. announcement of the ASAT test and the spy dust charges, could hardly have been helpful in terms of preparations for the summit meeting. Is this type of thing seriously damaging?

A. As far as preparations for the upcoming meeting, let me assure you that we certainly attach tremendous importance to it. We have high hopes and serious hopes about the outcome, even though we do hear from the other side that they are taking a much more modest view of the meeting. They are not giving it that much significance, and we hear words to the effect that it is going to be an introductory meeting, only an agenda for the future, things to that effect. Well, we believe that to travel all the way to Geneva just to get acquainted, just to look at the beauties of Lake Geneva, the beauty of Swiss mountains, that is not adequate to the leaders of two such great nations. It is an expensive luxury. We will do all in our power to make the summit meeting instrumental in improving relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

Q. In an article to be released this weekend in Foreign Affairs magazine, former President Nixon says that an agreement reducing arms, but not linked to restraints on political conduct, would not contribute to peace. In effect he is saying that the first priority of a summit should not be arms control, but potential flash points and pressure points between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Do you share that view?

A. It is interesting for me to hear what President Nixon is doing these days. As for the topics that we are going to take up in our discussions with President Reagan, we are working on that right now. We are in contact with the State Department, the White House, and this is an ongoing process. I would not like at this point to go into any of the details of this preparatory work.

Your mentioning Nixon certainly gives me some associations and some memories of a different kind. After all, it was in a very difficult period of our relationship that we managed to find, with Nixon when he was President, the solutions to some very important issues. I recall still further back in 1961 the meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy in Vienna. That was a very difficult time as well. There was the Caribbean crisis, yet in 1963 we saw the partial test-ban treaty. Even though that was again a time of crisis, the two sides and their leaders had enough wisdom and the boldness to take some very important decisions. History is very interesting in that way, when you attempt to draw lessons from it.

Q. You have, at least in the view of the world press, started a quite new style of politics in the U.S.S.R. You have gone out and met many people, mingled with workers, and been very visible. Do you enjoy this kind of activity? What benefits do you see deriving from it?

A. Well, first of all, it is not just my own personal style. This is something that we all learned from Lenin. It goes back to Lenin. He said on quite a few occasions that to know life you must live as the masses do, live among the masses, learn from the masses, feel their pulses at work and reflect their thinking, their mood in your policies. I would give priority in that to Lenin. It is not my invention.

Second, it is nothing new in my practice. I used that style all along. I did that kind of thing in Stavropol. I did it here when I was transferred here before I became General Secretary. It is my usual work style. Maybe on occasion, when I have been traveling in the country, the press has given it more prominence and played it up a lot more. The press can do anything. But also I should say there was a need to go out and meet people more.

We are now in a new phase in our economic development, qualitatively in a new phase, new plans, new problems. We do have problems, some serious big problems to resolve. We have for the past several years been making a thoroughgoing analysis of our development of all the problems at hand, and we feel that there is a need to familiarize the working people generally with the conclusions that we are arriving at, to test those conclusions and the people’s reactions so that when those analyses have been tried and tested we can come out with them at the forthcoming Party Congress early next year. I would say that it is not a question of whether I enjoy that style or not. You cannot work otherwise. It is the only way you should and can work, provided you want to achieve results.

Q. You have proposed some very deep changes in Soviet society and have already replaced quite a number of of- ficials. One assumes you will replace quite a number more. Are people afraid of you?

A. (Laughter from Gorbachev.) Well, what we have been doing and intend to go on doing is not a reflection of just my point of view. It is the common view of our leadership. We are convinced that we are doing the right thing. These questions are ripe for a solution and they clamor for a solution. They need to be resolved. That is the most important conclusion that I have drawn from my many meetings with people in all walks of life: workers, engineers, scientists, intellectuals, everybody. I see exceedingly warm support for what we are proposing for the line we are taking. What’s more, I see that many, both within the party and among the population at large, are impatient for more than we are doing.

But while we try to be bold and determined, we also try to be circumspect in what we are doing. We will continue to act in a spirit of great responsibility to the people. But the people are really clamoring for firmness in our policies. There should be no difference between words and deeds. The deeds should match words. You know we are under very strict control in this country as to what we do and what we have been doing, that is, greater publicity for major decisions and other measures have led to a sense of greater opening and flowering of our democracy. I think that people are not only not afraid of me but welcome the approach we are taking.

I trust that you will not think that I am inclined to look at all of this with rose-colored glasses. This is a very profound process, and it is one that is concerned with the very deep restructuring. It is a very important thing in this country. It affects people, it affects personnel, it affects the very methods of management. The fact that we have been replacing some people is nothing of an extraordinary nature. This is a process that has been going on since perhaps a couple of years ago, it is an ongoing process, it is a natural process of replacement. It will be a bad situation when the process stops. It is not that these various decisions on personnel problems reflect some kind of political struggle around the problems that we are endeavoring to resolve nowadays.

We feel that everyone everywhere in the Soviet Union must change all of their work styles; that goes for all of us here and down at the regional levels and down at the worker-collective level. Everyone has got to restructure things, restyle his whole way of working and thinking. This will still require a great deal of work within the party and within the entire population. This policy has enjoyed some very great support among the people, and that shows that we have taken the correct line. Now if only we can fulfill our plan as well as we have done during this interview.

I think that there was some prior arrangement that we would spend about one hour together. It has now been two hours. If we could overfulfill our production plans like that it would be great.

I would like to end by just saying a few words that are important in understanding what we have been talking about all along. I don’t remember who, but somebody said that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. If that is so, then I ask you to ponder one thing: If we in the Soviet Union are setting ourselves such truly grandiose plans in the domestic sphere, then what are the external conditions that we need to be able to fulfill those domestic plans? I leave the answer to that question with you.