Who Will Save Syria?

The Debate over Syria

A rising death toll raises the question: To intervene or not?

Why We Must Fight Alongside the Rebels

By Shadi Hamid

The Syrian uprising began nearly a year ago, and despite renewed international efforts, the regime has intensified the killing. The death toll–approaching 8,000–is now five times what it was in Libya on the eve of the NATO intervention there. These are “crimes against humanity,” a U.N. panel concluded recently.

Those of us who supported military action in Libya hoped that it might set a precedent, so that the next time, the U.S. and Europe would act quickly and decisively to protect civilian populations in the event of mass slaughter during the Arab Spring. The Syrian opposition has issued unambiguous calls for foreign military intervention. This is no Western imposition. It is Syrians–like Libyans before them–who are pleading that the West do more, not less.

Already, military intervention enjoys considerable Arab and Muslim legitimacy. The Turks, Qataris, Tunisians and Saudis have all called for various degrees of intervention, whether through safe zones, peacekeeping forces or arms for the Syrian rebels. But these countries cannot do it on their own. They are waiting for the U.S. to lead efforts to assemble a coalition that can intervene effectively and then help stabilize Syria after hostilities cease.

No doubt the risks of intervention are considerable. But so too are the risks of not intervening. Opponents of intervention have warned of militarization, civil war, Iranian meddling and an exodus of refugees. Well, all these things have already come to pass. Syria today is in danger of becoming a failed state. The regime has lost control over large swaths of territory. Al-Qaeda and other extremists are hoping to take advantage of the growing power vacuum. Can the world afford a failing state and protracted civil war in such a vital region?

If the objective of intervention is to protect civilian populations, then the first step is for the U.S. to help other countries provide Syrian rebel forces with both light arms and more-advanced antitank and antiaircraft weaponry. The right to self-defense is a right guaranteed by international law. The second step would be the designation of liberated zones–particularly those along the border with Turkey–as safe havens, as was done in Bosnia during the 1990s. To protect these areas, airpower and some special forces, preferably soldiers from Arab nations or Turkey, would be needed. The goal would not necessarily be to change the regime but rather to demonstrate international resolve, encourage regime defections and compel the Syrian government to alter its calculations about the use of force.

Currently, President Bashar Assad believes he can outlast the opposition and ultimately obliterate it through sheer force and brutality. Helping the rebels peel off large pieces of territory would demonstrate to Assad that he cannot win militarily, which would breathe new life into diplomatic efforts or–at the very least–secure cease-fire agreements around key population centers. Such efforts could be accompanied by a naval blockade and an air campaign against key government and military positions and installations–as in Bosnia, Kosovo and, more recently, Libya. In Bosnia, NATO power forced the Serbs to the negotiating table, eventually leading to the Dayton Accords and the introduction of multinational peacekeeping forces. The Gaddafi regime in Libya showed more interest in negotiating with the opposition after, rather than before, military intervention. Within a few weeks of the start of the NATO operation, Gaddafi envoys were engaging in cease-fire talks. In late May, an increasingly desperate Libyan regime went further, offering to negotiate with rebels and institute constitutional reforms. Intervention and diplomatic efforts need not be mutually exclusive. They should proceed in parallel.

None of this, though, will be possible without U.S. support and leadership. Despite budgetary constraints, this is not the time for the Obama Administration to shrink from the challenge at hand. Even if the U.S. insists on leading from behind, it still needs to lead.

Hamid is director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution

Intervening Will Only Help Assad

By Marc Lynch

The escalating bloodshed in Syria has shocked the world and prompted calls for military intervention. Dozens of Syrians are being killed every day by the forces of President Bashar Assad, spiraling violence threatens to drag the country into a regional proxy war, and increasing numbers of Syrians are begging for help.

The Obama Administration clearly wants, as it should, to help protect the Syrian people. But it also should understand that military intervention is not the way to help civilians or hasten a political transition in Syria. Arming the opposition or using Western airpower against Syrian territory will likely only play into Assad’s hands.

The only hope for avoiding an escalation of the slaughter in Syria is to persuade the undecided middle ground of Syrians, many of whom continue to support Assad out of fear for the future, to abandon the regime. That means helping the divided opposition unify and develop a convincing transition plan to reassure minorities and other uncommitted communities of their place in a post-Assad Syria. And it means rebutting the regime’s narrative that the uprising is the work of foreign powers and armed gangs.

The appeal of intervention is clear. Why should Western bombers not come to the rescue of the Syrian people? Who could in good conscience deny opposition forces the means to defend themselves?

But establishing safe areas would require massive bombing to destroy Syria’s antiaircraft capability and ensure the safety of allied planes. Declaring a safe area is meaningless if there is no military means or will to defend it, as we discovered to our horror in Bosnia. And by funneling arms to the rebels in the absence of any unified leadership, we could not hope to even the military balance of power.

These measures would also likely fuel the fighting while foreclosing any chance of a political solution. The crisis would not end the first day the bombs fell–it would only shift to a more extreme level, challenging the U.S. and its allies to escalate their commitment. Is the West willing to engage in another Iraq-style occupation if that is what it takes?

Fortunately, military intervention is not the only way for the U.S. and its allies to help the Syrians. Instead, those who hope to help the Syrian people should focus on helping unify the opposition, increasing pressure on the Assad regime from the outside and accelerating the process of defections.

The necessity of unifying the opposition is obvious. Even those who back military intervention or the arming of opposition forces like the Free Syrian Army acknowledge that doing so is impossible with the current divided and ineffective independence groups. The Syrian rebels may think they most need weapons, but what they really need is a political strategy. All factions of the opposition should focus less on asking for guns and more on laying out a clear, compelling political vision–which should in turn be backed by international guarantees of economic and political assistance.

The U.S. and its allies can also do more to increase pressure on Assad and his regime. There is already an impressive coalition, supported by a broad international consensus manifested in the 137-to-22 vote in the U.N. General Assembly in support of a transition plan. The E.U., Turkey, the Arabs and the U.S. have all imposed meaningful sanctions, which have isolated regime figures and contributed to the collapse of the Syrian economy. More should be done to bring Syrian officials to international justice and to shame the regime’s remaining backers like Russia. China, in particular, should be targeted by the oil-producing Gulf states on which its economy so heavily depends.

The goal should not be simply overthrowing Assad but rather creating the conditions for a relatively smooth transition after he falls. The U.S. and its allies must continue to pursue a prudent, tough strategy of mobilizing international consensus while helping unify the Syrian opposition and carve out the space for a real political transition. That may not be as morally satisfying a battle cry as a demand for military action, but it is far more likely to help Syrian civilians in the long run.

Lynch is the director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and the author of The Arab Uprising: The Incomplete Revolutions of the New Middle East, to be published this month by PublicAffairs