Rhodesia: Last, Last Chance

Britain’s Harold Wilson once called breakaway Rhodesia “my Viet Nam”—and with good reason. Since Rhodesia declared its independence in 1965, Wilson’s war of economic sanctions has cost Britain an estimated $500 million in lost trade with Rhodesia. The failure of the sanctions has diminished Wilson’s stature at home and Britain’s standing with its Commonwealth allies. With South Africa’s aid, Rhodesia has weathered the sanctions and could for all practical purposes simply declare itself a republic. It is already preparing a new green and white flag and a new constitution that would guarantee white supremacy forever.

Last week Wilson and Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith met at Gibraltar aboard the assault ship H.M.S. Fearless for what Smith called “the last, last chance” of agreement before Rhodesia goes its own way. It was also a slim chance, since both men have made pledges that are difficult to retract. Smith has vowed that Rhodesia’s 220,000 whites will rule its 4,000,000 blacks for his and his children’s lifetime —though he concedes that his grandchildren may be on their own. Wilson is publicly bound by a pledge of what has come to be called NIBMAR— No Independence Before Majority African Rule. Given Smith’s position of strength, that pledge is hollow, but it is nonetheless difficult to renege on.

Intransigent Right. Both men had at least some compelling reasons to try to reach agreement. The economic sanctions, for example, threaten Rhodesia with permanent loss of the British tobacco market. Yet far from softening Rhodesia’s stand, as Wilson hoped, the sanctions have only helped create a more intransigent opposition on Smith’s right. When Smith emerged victorious over Rhodesia’s extreme rightists in a by-election this summer, Wilson evidently decided that he might never have a better chance for compromise.

Aboard the Fearless, Wilson hinted that if Smith could guarantee the principle of “unimpeded progress toward majority African rule,” other matters might be negotiated, such as an extended timetable for giving Africans a larger say in ruling Rhodesia. Wilson has also maintained all along that any new constitution must be acceptable to all Rhodesians, meaning by majority vote. Smith has insisted that it be approved only by a vote among the black chiefs, who are in his government’s pay. Smith has not made the chiefs’ acquiescence overly difficult. Since 1965, his government has underwritten a program of public works in African villages, and won enough approval from Rhodesia’s blacks for nationalist guerrillas to be regularly turned in by their own people.

Commonwealth Wrath. The openings for negotiation at Gibraltar remained as small as the stakes were large. “If I give way on any vital point,” said Smith, “I might find 100% of Rhodesians against acceptance.” Yet if Wilson backed down, he would have to face the wrath of black nations in the Commonwealth and, humiliatingly, ask the United Nations to withdraw its sanctions. Also, he presumably does not wish to be remembered as the Prime Minister who consigned Rhodesia’s black majority to the same apartheid fate as that endured by the blacks of South Africa.