South Viet Nam: The Trials of Thieu

Nearly everyone in Washington last week expected that South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu would soon come around and abandon his stubborn refusal to participate in the expanded peace talks in Paris. But while the conflict lasted, perhaps the most ironic element in it was the way in which it demonstrated Saigon’s new-found independence. The U.S. has all along labored to help create a stable constitutional government that could eventually stand on its own, a government immune to Communist charges that it is a mere puppet of the Americans. President Thieu’s defiant holdout provided an unexpected confirmation that the U.S. has indeed been at least partially successful in those objectives in Viet Nam. The impasse, as Washington saw it, constituted an untimely assertion of nationalism by Saigon, making the U.S. quest for peace far more difficult.

Lyndon Johnson would like nothing better than to get the negotiations resumed quickly in the hope of achieving major progress toward a settlement before his term in the White House runs out. However, he also wants to avoid any semblance of bullying Thieu to the conference table. Thieu’s task is equally complicated. Standing up to the U.S. won him such enthusiastic support from Saigon’s politicians and generals that he felt compelled at one point to promise: “I will try to keep flexing my muscle as long as I can.” At the same time, he was prudently laying the groundwork for sending a delegation to the talks.

Wanting to Lead. When Johnson first proclaimed the bombing halt and expanded negotiations more than two weeks ago, Thieu balked at any South Vietnamese participation in a conference in which the Viet Cong’s National Liberation Front would be permitted to speak for itself, rather than through Hanoi’s delegates. But after several days, he announced that he would let his representatives come, provided South Viet Nam took over from the U.S. the leadership of the allied delegation and dealt directly with the North Vietnamese, not the N.L.F., at the negotiating table.

Thieu’s proposal got short shrift in Washington. What was more, Thieu received scant support from President-elect Richard Nixon, who the South Vietnamese had hoped would be much tougher in dealings with Hanoi than Lyndon Johnson. They were disappointed when Nixon declared that until the inauguration Johnson could speak for the incoming administration.

Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford was obviously upset by Saigon’s intransigence and unable to hide his pique. Saigon had known all along that the National Liberation Front would accompany Hanoi to the Paris peace talks, he told a press conference. The South Vietnamese, Clifford said, had pulled out of the deal “in the ninth inning.” Then he added: “We should make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to Saigon why it should come in and join the talks. At the same time, if they choose not to, I believe the President has the constitutional responsibility of proceeding with the talks.” Clifford’s tough position, while doubtless reflecting the frustration and resentment of many U.S. officials over the delay, was hardly calculated to make it any easier for Thieu to compromise. Both the White House and the State Department, however, tried to assure Thieu that the U.S. was not now considering going it alone.

Arrangements for Arrival. But Thieu had already fired back through his Information Minister, Ton That Thien, who asserted that “at no stage, at no time” had Thieu agreed to the U.S. formula for negotiations (see box). And, added Thien, “We cannot win the war without the U.S., and the U.S. cannot win the war without us. The same applies to making the peace.”

Thieu meanwhile was quietly lining up support in the Senate and the National Salvation Front for a change of stance that would enable his country to join the talks. Ambassador Bui Diem was recalled from Washington for consultations with the President. From Paris, Ambassador Pham Dang Lam reported that arrangements for the arrival of a South Vietnamese delegation had been completed: housing had been secured and cars had been hired. Thieu also spent time working on the composition of a delegation, amid insistent demands from Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky that he head the negotiating group. Ky is one of the hawks (or eagles, as they prefer to call themselves in Saigon) on the negotiations issue. Moreover, there were reports that able, popular—but ailing—Premier Tran Van Huong and other Ministers might be replaced. The idea behind such a Cabinet reshuffle would be to strengthen the Thieu government internally in preparation for the negotiating period.

No Impediment. In Paris, the North Vietnamese vowed that they would not talk without the presence of an N.L.F. delegation. The N.L.F. declared that there was no impediment to three-sided talks (minus Saigon) and that it was perfectly willing to discuss South Vietnamese affairs, indeed to speak for South Viet Nam—exactly what Thieu fears it will try to do anyway.

For its part, the U.S. warned North Viet Nam that it took a “serious view” of incidents since the bombing halt in which Communist forces fired on allied troops from inside the Demilitarized Zone, thus violating the tacit agreement that North Viet Nam would respect the inviolability of the DMZ in return for the halt. There have been several such violations confirmed so far. In the most serious, Communist 122-mm. rocket and 75-mm. artillery fire killed five U.S. Marines at Con Thien and wounded 46. The U.S. retaliated with fire in each incident.