EVEN as the U.S. and Soviet Union prepared to sit down in Helsinki next week to discuss ways to limit their nuclear weaponry, there were signs that the nations of Europe—both East and West—have started an important new search for their own détente. Their ultimate goal is to settle at least some of the issues that have made Europe a divided continent since the end of World War II. More than at any time since the Cold War began 23 years ago, European leaders seem convinced that some progress is possible, and that the time is right to reach for it.
Behind Europe’s hopeful new mood is West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who took office last month. As Foreign Minister in the old Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists, Brandt had argued since 1966 that West Germany should attempt to normalize its relations with Iron Curtain nations. As Chancellor, he can now press his ideas even more vigorously than before. He is eager to increase trade, travel and communication agreements and establish normal diplomatic relations with Eastern European governments, which Bonn snubbed for years. Moreover, as proof of his realistic approach, he is believed ready to renounce Germany’s claim to the 40,000 square miles of former German territory inside Poland and work out an agreement that would grant a form of recognition to the Communist government of East Germany (see box p. 56).
The most positive response so far to Brandt’s overtures has come from the country that suffered most under Nazi occupation: Poland. The Polish press, which normally rails at West Germany as a haven of unregenerated Nazis, called Brandt’s inaugural address a “step forward.” The Polish trade mission to West Germany has also started bargaining for an economic agreement that goes far beyond any deal previously negotiated by an East Bloc nation with the West. Totaling nearly $1 billion, the deal would give Poland access to West German credit, production licenses, patents and marketing procedure in return for Polish agricultural products, which are priced far below the West European level.
The key to Poland’s diplomacy is Russia, but there is also a good deal of national self-interest behind its current enthusiasm. Like many other Eastern Europeans, the Poles have watched enviously as Rumania and Hungary multiplied their trade with West Germany. Russia also has steadily increased its own trade with Bonn, and so has East Germany, which Poland had been counting on as a supplier of sorely needed technology. Moreover, Moscow has been holding talks with West Germany since 1966 about a mutual agreement renouncing the use of force—a deal that Poland fears might not provide adequate security for its own borders. Thus, when Russia finally gave permission last March for its Warsaw Pact allies to begin negotiating their own bilateral agreements with Bonn, Poland decided to try and make up for lost time.
Nor have others in the Eastern Bloc been idle. Hungary last month agreed to upgrade its trade representative with Bonn to a level just short of consular status. The Rumanians, who established full diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1967, are negotiating for another long-term trade agreement.
Security Conference. Still, there is uncertainty among the Communists about how to respond to Bonn’s offers. The East German regime of Walter Ulbricht, which has made mistrust of Bonn the cardinal principle of its foreign policy, has said very little about Brandt’s plans. The silence may well reflect a split in the ruling East German Politburo over how to handle Bonn’s new initiatives. The Soviet Union has taken a wait-and-see approach. At last week’s ceremonies marking the 52nd anniversary of the October Revolution, President Nikolai Podgorny said simply that Brandt’s government “will be judged by its practical deeds, which still have to be seen.”
The first deed that the Communists would like Brandt to campaign for is a Western agreement to attend an all-European security conference. According to the Warsaw Pact nations, the object of the meeting should be to reach agreement on a nonaggression pact between the Communist and the NATO nations, and to discuss plans for economic cooperation. For his part, Brandt believes that the Western Europeans and the Americans should test Communist intentions by attending the conference. The U.S. is doubtful. Last week, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson told a NATO gathering in Brussels that the U.S. would not participate unless the agenda was broadened to cover more substantial military questions, including the possibility, of mutual troop reductions by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Western Suspicions. Many Americans and West European diplomats suspect that the Communists have ulterior motives in calling for a security conference. Some see the move as a Soviet plan to try to encourage West Germany to move toward a more neutral role in Europe. Others fear that the Communists will lull the NATO powers into reducing their armed forces without making any reductions of their own.
There are also doubts whether the Communists are genuinely prepared to negotiate a détente in Europe that would open their own countries to closer connections with the West. As Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt made a celebrated attempt to find “an opening to the East” by more or less the same route that he is now taking. His rapid breakthrough, which resulted in establishing ties with Rumania and coming very close to agreements with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, caused panic among the East Germans and Soviets, who feared increased Western influence in Eastern Europe. The result was the Karlovy Vary summit of 1967, at which Russia ordered a halt to further diplomatic contacts with Bonn.
One chief reason for the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was Prague’s plan to form close economic links with Bonn. Anti-German feeling, moreover, for 25 years has been one of the few unifying forces in Eastern Europe. Even if a more seasoned Brandt now succeeds in winning the confidence of Communist leaders, they probably cannot afford to stop their propaganda against the West Germans altogether.
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