World: A SIGH OF RELIEF IN SAIGON

SOUTH VIET NAM’S President Nguyen Van Thieu has never been a demonstrative sort, but last week he was clearly elated by President Nixon’s address about the war. “It is the greatest and most brilliant speech I have ever known a United States President to make,” said Thieu. His exuberance was understandable. Saigon has always bridled at the Viet Nam alternatives discussed in the U.S., such as a cease-fire or massive withdrawals by a specified date—and Nixon called for none of these. Though he refrained from mentioning or endorsing the Saigon regime, his promise that the U.S. would not precipitously abandon its ally was what Thieu really wanted to hear.

While Thieu and his colleagues congratulated themselves, U.S. military men in Saigon matched up their on-the-spot view of the war with Nixon’s assessment, which had filtered through the layers of State Department and White House bureaucracy. The consensus was that the President was generally close to the mark, though optimistic. If the military in Saigon had any reservation about the speech, it concerned the favorable statistics that Nixon cited—which could be reversed in a painfully short time if the Communists once more decided to intensify the conflict.

Hopeful Assumptions. Nixon said that prospects for turning the burden of ground combat over to the South Vietnamese looked “more optimistic now” than they did even last summer when Washington was talking in terms of a pullout by the end of 1972. After Nixon’s speech, South Viet Nam’s Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky offered an off-the-cuff guess that all U.S. ground-combat troops could be withdrawn by the end of 1970 and the remaining support units, such as artillery batteries and helicopter crews, by the end of 1971.

In Saigon, American commanders were less optimistic. Their view was that all combat troops could be home by mid-1971, but they doubted that U.S. airpower and artillery support could be withdrawn for a long time thereafter. U.S. military men also pointed out that the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) has not yet proved itself in heavy combat. Last week, when North Vietnamese regulars inflicted heavy losses on ARVN units in a battle near Due Lap, a fortified strongpoint 131 miles northeast of Saigon, U.S. authorities hustled American correspondents, including TIME’s Burton Pines, away from the scene. Conceded one American commander: “They are fighting hard, but not with exceptional skill.”

Enemy Attacks. As an indication of the improving situation, Nixon noted that North Vietnamese infiltration is less than 20% of what it was a year ago. But American military experts warned that infiltration, which has declined in the past, can suddenly increase. At present, there are unsettling reconnaissance reports that Communist engineers are repairing and widening the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and there are indications that Hanoi is preparing to put more troops in the pipeline to South Viet Nam.

President Nixon pointed to the current low U.S. casualty rate as a sign that the war was winding down. In Saigon last week, the U.S. command reported that October’s total of 409 battle deaths was the lowest monthly toll since 1966. Nixon stressed that a low “level of enemy activity” must accompany U.S. withdrawal. Even as he spoke, the enemy stepped up its activities in what U.S. officers described as the beginning of the winter offensive. Communist units launched scattered attacks, and Saigon’s defenses were hit for the first time since September.

Inside the capital, two Viet Cong agents at a camp for defectors tried to toss a grenade at the South Vietnamese Cabinet Minister who heads the “open arms” program for defectors, but a genuine defector managed to get the grenade away from the two before it could explode. Captured enemy documents indicate that the Communists at present are in the process of preparing to launch the final phase of their war plan. That phase is not so much an “offensive”—the weakened Communist forces no longer use the word—as a series of “high points” or sporadic attacks designed to make the American people so weary of the war that they will demand an immediate pullout.

Coup Rumors. The contest for South Viet Nam could also be lost on the political front. Last week Saigon was once again alive with talk of a coup. The speculation started when South Vietnamese Senator Tran Van Don invited some 300 Vietnamese to his home in Saigon’s Cholon section to toast the anniversary of the 1963 overthrow of the Diem regime. Among the guests was General Duong Van (“Big”) Minh, a popular leader of the 1963 plot and an old Thieu rival, who is regarded as the possible leader of a coalition government. Asked about his plans, he is quoted as replying: “You will see. I am ready to do anything to serve the cause of unity among my people.” Don, who was the chief architect of the plot against Diem, favors neutrality for South Viet Nam and a severance of ties with the U.S. At the party, he openly warned that “a coup once made could be made again.”

Don’s threat was discounted by U.S. authorities in Saigon and by most South Vietnamese politicians. The greatest restraining influence against a coup is the conviction in Saigon that the Americans would wash their hands of the commitment in Viet Nam if the politicians and generals undercut the country’s fragile stability by staging another government overthrow.

Another inhibiting factor is that Thieu is becoming a more effective President. In his elation over Nixon’s speech, Thieu last week journeyed into the countryside for the second time in five days. In Lam Dong province, north of Saigon, he made a presentation of land titles to two of 1,737 peasants being given acres under his accelerated land-reform program. At a stopover in the mountain resort of Dalat, he hosted a lamb barbecue for a group of foreign diplomats and journalists.

Tears on TV. Thieu’s best performance of the week came when he went on radio and television to fight for his rather courageous but unpopular new “austerity taxes” on imports. The measure is intended to help curb inflation, which is running at the rate of 30% this year, but so far its main effect has been to stir up discontent. The new taxes have doubled the price of a Japanese Honda to $400 and raised U.S. cigarettes from $2.10 a carton to $2.80. In addition to defending the need for the taxes, Thieu spoke candidly of the political realities in South Viet Nam. Of the U.S. he said: “We have to realize that the Viet Nam war has been their longest war, and that their contribution in funds and human lives has been too great. Without help from others, even the most kindhearted will get tired, even the wealthiest will be affected, and the day will come when owing to internal problems, the initial enthusiasm has to decrease and patience no longer exists.”

As tears streamed down his cheeks, Thieu went on: “We cannot go on living on alms. We cannot go on relying on outsiders. The allied forces are not inexhaustible. The allies’ fortunes are not inexhaustible. Our allies will continue to help us, but they are only going to help those who accept sacrifices for themselves.”

Thieu’s speech was long overdue, especially considering the fact that Saigon did not get around to formally mobilizing for the war until a year and a half ago. It will now be the test of his presidency to see if he can translate his insights into action.